Preamble

The House met at Ten o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

GOVERNMENT OF WALES

10.5 a.m.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide a scheme for the domestic self-government of Wales; and for connected purposes.
Today is St. David's Day, Dydd Gwyl Dewi. To our English friends, on this day, the wearing of the daffodil or, perhaps, the leek, as may be more appropriate in some cases, may seem a sentimental gesture to be greeted with friendly condescension, but to me, to my Welsh friends in the House—they are all my friends today—and to millions of Welshmen in Wales and throughout the world, it is the symbol of the survival of a small nation.
I am happy to say that, in many facets of our national life, we are still conscious of that harmony of spirit which unites us as a nation. We inherit a small but distinct culture whose origins are lost in antiquity. Our language is an expressive language of lyrical and emotive beauty. But we are bound by something beyond language, beyond culture only, by that curious blend of romanticism and radicalism which in one way or another finds expression in every son of Wales. This is the peculiar fervour which for well over 1,000 years has enabled us to preserve our individuality and enabled us to make a contribution to life outside Wales as well as within Wales in a distinctive way.
In seeking today to introduce a Bill for a domestic Parliament for Wales, I do not come to the House of Commons looking to the past, although I am conscious of it. I do not come here nursing grievances or imagining injustices. I do not subscribe to the myth that the English are bent malevolently on the destruction of Wales.

Sir Gerald Nabarro: Hear, hear.

Mr. Hooson: There are exceptions, of course. If that were so, we could easily deal with them, and far more effectively. What I fear far more is their sympathetic but inactive benevolence. There is in this House a great measure of sympathy and kindly feeling towards Wales, but there is not here the time, the committed interest, the single-mindedness, the over-whelming concern, to ensure that the economic, social and cultural life of the Welsh nation is properly safeguarded.
There are those who see Wales merely as an economic appendage to the Midlands, to Merseyside, to the West of England. They miss the point. There can be no greater dynamic than the will of any nation—than the will of the Welsh people in Wales—properly harnessed and directed to fight for the very future of their country.
As all hon. Members know, I am not an economic nationalist and I never shall be, but I believe that Wales, like Scotland and Northern Ireland, has the right to organise its own domestic affairs. This is not only a right but it has now become an urgent necessity. I see domestic Government as a pyramid. At the base there is local government to deal with the smaller and more intimate decisions, a government very close to the people and as local as possible. On the next tier I see a number of national Parliaments, for Wales, for Scotland and for Northern Ireland, which has it already and even, perhaps, provincial Parliaments in England itself. The concern of these national Parliaments should be the domestic issues of the people within their boundaries.
I see the Parliament at Westminster as a federal Parliament concerned with foreign affairs, overseas trade, defence and the overall direction of the economy. In other words, it deals with some of the larger issues. But it has little time to deal with those smaller but vitally important issues which materially affect the daily life of Wales.
Why should I stop there? I want to make clear that I campaign, as many of the sponsors of my Bill do, for political as well as economic ties with Europe, with a power to take decisions binding on all members at the European level.


I have never tried to hide my view on that. Furthermore, as Chairman of the All-Party Group for World Government in the House, I am concerned, as I believe most hon. Members are, eventually to achieve the peak of the pyramid in the form of a world government, concerned with keeping the peace and spreading the rule of law and the distribution of world resources for the relief of world poverty and starvation. Unless, in the reasonable future, we achieve the peak of the pyramid, the outlook for mankind is very bleak.
It is in that context that I would like the House to consider the Bill that I seek leave to introduce. I am not a universalist; I am an internationalist. I believe that people will come under the same law only when they consent to do so. Their consent will be obtained only when it is recognised that their vital interests, culture, social heritage and rights must properly be safeguarded.
We live in a time of great change, but in this time of change can the institutions which we have inherited ensure the stability and give the security we need at home if we are to lead in the solution of some of the great problems abroad? Can we pretend that we have achieved the ultimate both in democracy and executive efficiency in the House? In some of our archaic procedure, our facades of party warfare, we have lost touch with the people, and the historic rôle of Parliament as the watchdog of the Executive is now no more than a mask in many instances.
I firmly believe that the natural energies of the people of this United Kingdom and the nations of which it is comprised are strangled by our constitution. As a lawyer, I have been conditioned to regard our unwritten constitution with something approaching holy awe. The plain fact is that it does not work in many regards. The life which once gave meaning to our rituals has departed and no amount of tinkering with our timetable, with the appointment of investigating committees, will ever bring back power to this Chamber. Our country needs a more urgent, comprehensive and radical constitutional reform. That is what the Bill, like the Bill for Scotland which my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston) introduced recently, is intended to do.
My Bill proposes for Wales a Senate of 88 members elected for the whole of Wales, which of course includes Monmouthshire. The Senate would have powers to make and enforce laws on all issues appertaining to the domestic life of Wales, her industry, trade, agriculture, education, health, transport and so on. Matters of defence, Commonwealth, foreign affairs, certain areas of the general law and so on would be reserved to this Parliament, to which Wales would continue to send her 36 Members. I want to see an elected body in Wales which can consider the urgent problems that oppress us, a body which has executive power to take action to solve those problems.
I ask leave to bring in the Bill, and I hope that the House will take courage to ensure that this time next year, this time in a hundred years, and so on into the 22nd century, not only will the daffodils still bloom but the Welsh nation will survive and grow and make its own distinctive contribution to a greater whole in Britain, Europe and the world.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Hooson, Mr. Thorpe, Mr. Grimond, Mr. Lubbock, Mr. S. O. Davies, Mr. Gwynfor Evans, Mr. Alasdair Mackenzie, and Mr. Russell Johnston.

WALES (SELF-GOVERNMENT)

Bill to provide a scheme for the domestic self-government of Wales; and for connected purposes, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday 16th June and to be printed. [Bill 197.]

SUGAR BEET (RESEARCH AND EDUCATION)

10.14 a.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. James Hoy): I beg to move,
That the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) (Increase of Contributions) Order 1967, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th January, be approved.
The purpose of the Order is to provide for the increased income needed to finance the programme of research and education which the sugar beet industry,


that is, the growers of beet and the British Sugar Corporation, has in view. Under Section 18(1) of the Sugar Act, 1956, my right hon. Friend and the Secretary of State for Scotland make an order each year approving a programme of expenditure on research and education concerning the production of home-grown sugar beet. Under the Act they must consult the industry.
For this purpose there was set up some years ago a standing Sugar Beet Research and Education Committee whose members include representatives of the National Farmers' Unions of England and Wales and of Scotland, representatives of the Corporation, and agricultural scientists and independent members.
The income for the programme is raised under the authority of Section 18(3) of the 1956 Act by contributions from the industry—from the growers and from the Corporation. They are paid into a Sugar Beet Research and Education Fund under the charge of the Minister. That method of financing the research and education programme is long standing. It was introduced as part of the regulation of the sugar industry brought in by the Sugar Industry (Re-organisation) Act, 1936. I think that it is generally accepted that it has worked well.
The 1956 Act specified that the maximum contribution should be 3d. per ton each from the growers and the Corporation for each ton of home-grown beet delivered to the Corporation. But, like agricultural research generally, research and education in sugar beet growing have steadily expanded, and the industry now finds that the proceeds of the 3d. levy are proving insufficient to finance the programme.
The estimated cost of the programme in 1967–68 is £166,000, while on an average crop the income with a 3d. levy is £142,000. The alternative to asking Parliament to approve an increase in the maximum contribution would be to reduce the scale of research. That is not the course desired by the industry.
The 1956 Act provides that the maximum contribution may be raised by an order of the Ministers approved by affirmative Resolution, and that is the course now proposed to the House.
The specific proposal embodied in the Order is that the maximum of the con-

tribution should be raised by 1d. to 4d. per ton from the grower and 4d. per ton from the Corporation, for a period of three years. The Sugar Beet Research and Education Committee has carefully considered the plans for sugar beet research in the next few years. It has looked closely at proposals for additional expenditure and has in view some expansion of research, although no major developments are proposed for the present.

Mr. David Webster: I was trying to follow the hon. Gentleman's remarks about the shortfall last year, when he said that there was expenditure of £166,000 and income of £142,000. That is a very abrupt change from the previous year, when there was an excess of £41,000. Has that excess all been wiped out?

Mr. Hoy: I am saying that the budget for the coming year is £166,000 and that the present levy of 3d. per ton would have produced £142,000, which would have left a short-fall.

Mr. John Farr: Will the Minister find out whether all the money was used?

Mr. Hoy: I was not giving a balance-sheet; I was giving proposals for the future. I shall find out if the £41,000, which the hon. Gentleman says was a balance, was used. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] There is no difference about this. If hon. Members will look closely at the proposals for additional expenditure, they will see that there has been an expansion of research but that no major new development is proposed for the present.
My right hon. Friends are satisfied that the programme the Committee has in view is reasonable and that, to meet the cost, it is not necessary to increase this sum by more than 1d. per ton. They do not feel that it would be wise even at this stage to look further ahead than three years. The increase will not affect the price of sugar.
I should like now to tell the House a little about the research which is supported by the sugar beet contributions. I feel sure that it is good value for money. The part which research and technical advice has played and can play in increasing agricultural productivity is well


known. Agriculture today has nothing to fear in this respect from comparison with other industries. New varieties of cereals, pest and weed control, advances in animal genetics, health and nutrition, mechanisation—all bear witness to the work of the agricultural scientist, and the success in applying the new knowledge bears witness to the progressive outlook of our farmers. Research on the sugar beet crop, whose importance I need not underline, has kept pace.
It has been thought best—and I hope the House will agree—that the money contributed to the Sugar Beet Research and Education Fund should be used to support investigations at established research institutions and universities at Rothamsted, the Plant Breeding Institute, the National Institute of Agricultural Botany, Sprowston, Nottingham, and so on. There is, therefore, no danger of sugar beet research being done in isolation from the main fields of agricultural research.
I will not go into details of the many lines of investigation that are pursued, or the success that has attended them, but I can claim with confidence that really solid results come from research into such matters as seedbeds, optimum nutrient requirements new varieties, control of virus yellows, precision drilling, and use of herbicides.
Effective research and rising standards of farming together tell a good story. To give but one example, in the period 1941–45, the average root yield per acre was 9·2 tons. It had risen by 1961–65 to a figure of no less than 14 tons. The House will agree that this is good progress and that the sugar beet industry and the scientists associated with it deserve to be congratulated.
I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Sugar Beet Research and Education Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Peter Greenwell for their advice and help in this field. I therefore ask the House to approve this Order, in order to ensure the continuance and development of this highly desirable research programme sponsored by the sugar beet industry.

10.23 p.m.

Mr. J. E. B. Hill: I am sorry that spring seems largely to have faded from the Government

benches. I was hoping that it was a delicate tribute to horticulture as well as to the Principality. I hope that the daffodils were grown in Wales and not in the Prime Minister's holiday garden.
I think that this is the first agricultural Order we have taken in the morning and I am very glad that we have avoided a Monday morning. But even a Wednesday morning has its inconveniences. I am in a personal difficulty because I should be upstairs with the Standing Committee on the Slaughter of Poultry Bill and some of my hon. Friends feel strongly against the taking of any business, but particularly agricultural business, in the mornings, because it may involve them cancelling a lot of arrangements so as to be able to cover what may be short points but which may affect many rural constituencies.
We accept, of course, the need for the Order. The hon. Gentleman has made out a case for an increase, although it is one of 33⅓ per cent. and I cannot help making the comment that such an increase in the levy is something that might well be referred to the Prices and Incomes Board. In 1955, when we fixed the maximum of 3d. a ton, it seemed to quite substantial maximum but the fact is that inflation has meant that it has cost more each year to maintain the same effort in research, quite apart from the desire and the need to extend the scope of research and education.
There has been a sharp rise over the last three years in the cost of the programme—about 30 per cent. Against the proposed programme for 1967–68 of £165,000, the last published accounts for education and research, covering 1964–65, show a programme which actually cost about £116,000, leaving a balance of income over expenditure of £41,000, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) has drawn attention.
In these accounts, the total balance carried forward into the following year was £62,000 and, therefore, I am wondering how much of that balance, if any, will be left after the completion of the current programme, 1966–67, which comes to an end on 31st March, and will be available towards the cost of next year's programme. Does it mean that the levy will not necessarily have to be at the 4d. maximum forthwith?


As I said, during the 12 years since the Act was passed, when my interest started, the industry and farmers have had good value from the activities of the Sugar Beet Research and Education Committee. I, too, pay my tribute to the chairmanship of Sir Peter Greenwell, who is a most progressive farmer in Suffolk. His Committee is most expert and powerful and, very important, it represents all the interests and institutions concerned.
Indeed, it has a strong eastern, and especially East Anglian, flavour. As I am a Norfolk Member, perhaps the House will forgive me if I single out and pay tribute to the work done in cultivation and crop husbandry by the Norfolk Agriculture Station at Sprowston. We in Norfolk are glad not only to have our Lord Lieutenant, Sir Edmund Bacon, as Chairman of the British Sugar Corporation, but are delighted to see, as is the Corporation, that he has recently been appointed Chairman of the Economic Development Council for the Agricultural Industry.
Sugar beet is one of the agricultural success stories in which I both take and declare an interest. Arable farmers value it very much for its key part in the rotation as a cleaning crop which is also a cash crop, with important by-products, the use of which research and education have greatly developed. Leafy beet tops and dried pulp are valuable animal foods and lime sludge for soil fertility is a use of the waste products of the factory. It was originally not a very economic crop for sugar production, but, by taking advantage of the results of research, the British industry has kept the cost of home-produced sugar from beet very closely in line with that of the cane sugar which we receive under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
The Parliamentary Secretary has referred to the striking increase in yields. I was considering the changes since the Sugar Bill and the duration of the 3d. limit and I made the difference from an average yield in the five-year period 1953–1955 of between 11 and 12 tons an acre to an average of 14 to 15 tons an acre in 1961–65, taking a broad bracket, with sugar per acre up from 37 to 38 cwt. in the five-year period 1953–1955 to about 45 cwt. an acre currently.
A most remarkable fact, and to farmers a painful fact, is that in all this period there has been little change in the guaranteed price.

Mr. Speaker: We are discussing an Order which increases the levy for research from 3d. to 4d. The hon. Member must link his remarks to that.

Mr. Hill: I beg your pardon, Mr. Speaker. I am endeavouring to show what fruitful results have flowed from the purpose of this levy and why I want it to be encouraged and strengthened.
The Committee has a considerable job to do because, although these improvements have been made, circumstances are making it harder for farmers to stay in sugar beet production, and in the last ten years the number of growers, and, therefore, contributors to the levy, has gone down from 40,000 to 26,000, so that one in three have gone out of sugar beet production. The reason is that it is a very exacting crop to grow and very extravagant in its demands for labour. Therefore, anything which the Committee can do to help farmers to save labour and improve yields and get a better return at this tight price is extraordinarily important.
The more intense production becomes, the greater the need for disease and pest control and this is a very important part of the Committee's future work. Research in this respect has often had a decisive effect, but it is a matter of constant warfare against known or new enemies. In 1957, the plague of virus yellows cost us 1 million tons of beet, but again intense research, in which Rothamsted played a considerable part, into the transmission of disease by aphids has evolved in a very short time a spray warning system to alert farmers when insect attack is building up and enabled them to use the successful pesticides which themselves are the result of research encouraged by the Committee.
This battle against disease is never-ending. If we think that we have got control of the virus yellows, we are now faced in Norfolk with a new and rather mysterious disease which first appeared at Docking and which, at the moment, is known as the "Docking disease". Its exact cause is unknown and I would like


to know whether the Parliamentary Secretary is satisfied that everything is being done within the resources of the Committee and of the Ministry to combat this threat.
Central in the research programmes is the selection and breeding of better seeds with all sorts of desired characteristics some of which the Parliamentary Secretary has mentioned—a better yield, easier to drill, higher sugar content, purer juice —which may not be a characteristic of which the farmer necessarily thinks—and the desirability that new strains of seed themselves should be disease-resistant or disease-tolerant in the case of virus yellows. The most important seed breakthrough has been to evolve a genetic monogerm seed.
This is an interesting development. The natural sugar beet seed gives many seedlings per seed. The genetic monogerm seed is designed to give a single seedling at each point instead of a cluster and it therefore avoids the extremely costly task of having to reduce the plants to one by expensive hand labour.
Twelve years ago, or even less, this was only a hope, but this year, for the first time, two varieties of genetic mono-germ seeds appear on the approved list and a substantial acreage will be grown, although even in this respect there are many difficulties still to be overcome. Here I should like to pay tribute to the National Institute of Agricultural Botany and the Plant Breeding Institute at Cambridge, and to the commercial seed industry whose efforts have evolved and multiplied this type of seed. Much effort and money have also been spent evolving other varieties which have been rejected in practice. In view of the high cost of plant breeding there seems to be a case for ensuring that there is no wasteful duplication of effort in this aspect of research, or the prolongation of unfruitful lines merely for the sake of continuity.
Without a satisfactory monogerm seed, we could not achieve our objective of total mechanisation without a drop in yield. The harvesting of sugar beet is almost wholly mechanised as to 95 per cent. of the crop, subject to the difficulties of weather. For some years, the peak labour demand has come in the spring and it is at this point that the breakthrough is urgently needed by successful

research. It is urgently needed before more growers are forced to give up because of lack of labour. After all, the labour force available for dealing with this crop is declining faster than the projected decline in the National Plan. It is about the only item in the National Plan which is ahead of schedule.

Mr. Webster: And the Civil Service.

Mr. Hill: It is, therefore, essential to obtain a high proportion of single plants per acre by mechanical sowing with precision drilling and correct spacing. The Committee is following two lines of development, "drilling to a stand" or mechanical thinning out. I do not want to go further into the technicalities and nor would you wish me to, Mr. Speaker, but it means that in addition to the research which the Committee is doing on soil cultivation, fertilisers and herbicides, a great deal of machinery, which has to be precise and sophisticated and yet robust, is required. When I say that the latest developments include the use of electronics, it will be seen that the specialist machinery required for drilling, hoeing and gapping, and spraying with herbicides in the spring to eliminate weeds can be almost as expensive as a self-propelled sugar beet harvester. If the machinery gets too expensive, then any saving of labour is cancelled out by overheads being too high.
This emphasises not only the value of the current research into machinery, but the value of a wider development of machinery syndicates. The problem of requiring very expensive machinery for spring cultivation is an example of the very unsatisfactory position, upon which I will only touch, of the Government's revised investment allowances for agricultural machinery.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not even touch upon that.

Mr. Hill: I will leave it as a dark thought. I hope that the current developments in the National Institute of Agricultural Engineering, which is represented on the Education Committee, will produce a break-through. As I have said, time is not on our side. Besides the work of the Committee, much research is undertaken by the Agricultural Research Council, by the Ministry and by


many commercial firms. Is the Minister satisfied that there is effective coordination and little duplication?
It is usual to inquire how far the results of research are being effectively disseminated and put into practice. Here we have the advantage that this Committee has the twofold responsibilities, of research and education. No one can say that the British Sugar Corporation has not publicised the results of its research and made effective recommendations. In addition to the Sugar Beet Review, there are always the great spring sowing and autumn harvest demonstrations, in which all of the new techniques and machinery and other sugar beet equipment can be seen at work in the fields and a crop can be judged at its sowing and harvesting.
I believe, but I would like this confirmed, that part of the future development plan of the Committee is to have more development offices. What relationship is there between this Committee and the Ministry's educational efforts and the National Agricultural Advisory Service? Is that relationship satisfactory? It is important that the Minister and the Sugar Corporation should be satisfied that all of this advice emanating from the Committee is being acted upon, widely enough and quickly enough. Naturally, one wonders how our research progress compares with that of sugar beet growers in other countries, in America and Europe.
Can the Minister give us some information on this, because in the 1966 programme there is provision made for £800 subscription and £900 to cover visits to the International Institute of Sugar Beet Research? Presumably members learned about researches and prices in the European Economic Community? I understand that French producers have a roughly comparable price at the moment, but from 1st July, 1968, their target prices will become about one-third higher than our existing guarantee prices.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I doubt whether this is a matter for this research.

Mr. Hill: With respect Mr. Speaker, I was wondering what effect on the activities of this Committee any possible entry into the European Community might have. I assume and hope that these activities could go on unchecked. The

research effort and the levies might have to be pooled and equalised, but meanwhile we can say that we are well enough satisfied with the results of this Committee. It has given to the industry much by its programmes, which incidentally are not all that insular.
Foreign countries have learned a great deal from us. There are still many problems to which farmers as contributors are anxious to have the answers. Farmers always want value for any levies paid. At the 4d. rate, on an average crop of 15 ton, it would mean a contribution by a farmer of 5s. per acre of sugar beet. It is not an extra 1d. here which concerns the farmer, but rather the fact that the squeeze on producers has gone very far, and they would be much more interested in a better guaranteed price in another place in negotiations now pending.

10.45 a.m.

Sir John Gilmour: My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) paid tribute to Sir Peter Greenwell, the Chairman of the Research and Education Committee, and I would like to add to that, as I have had the pleasure of serving on the Committee with him. I would also like to pay tribute to the work of Sir David Erskine, who is the Chairman of the Scottish Sub-Committee, and who sits on the main Committee and, therefore, has to do a double stint. Also, to the scientific staff of the East of Scotland College of Agriculture, the Meteorological Office and to the Macaulay Institute, in Aberdeen, for the work that it does for the Committee.
In Scotland, the need for the activities of this Committee is perhaps three times as much as the need in England, because our sugar-beet factory is working at something like half of its potential capacity. This is a very urgent matter for us and the Committee should do all that it can to help the Scottish industry to reach a viable level of production and enable our factory to keep going. Was the 50–50 break-up between the B.S.C. and the farmers a necessity for all time? Is it sacrosanct and is it a right plan?
Some aspects of research have taken a good deal of time and money over the last few years, particularly the bringing in of the cleaner loaders to cut down


the amount of dirt entering the sugar factory. A great deal of the capital investment to achieve this has to come from the farmers who already pay 50 per cent. of the cost of research. The person who gains from the cutting down of the amount of soil entering the factory is the Sugar Corporation and there are certain aspects of sugar beet research which could quite rightly be paid for by a bigger percentage from the Sugar Corporation and a correspondingly smaller one from the growers, because it is demonstrable that the Corporation is obtaining the greater benefit from research and education programmes. I hope that the Minister can tell us something about this.
We are particularly interested, because we grow our beet further north and in the words of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis), spring comes late in Scotland. We suffer from more difficult conditions than our friends in the Eastern Counties, but we have to receive the same price at the end of the day. We are very interested in developments talked about last year in Japan, where there was the possibility of producing beet in small paper receptacles, which could be germinated and then transplanted. One of the main difficulties of sugar beet growing in Scotland is that if there is a period of wet weather during April, and one is unable to get one's beet planted by 15th April, for every week that one drills after that date there is almost certain to be a considerably reduced tonnage of beet.
We have seen what happens to so many growers in Scotland who have found the crop entirely uneconomic and have given it up. The Research and Education Committee could help by developing a means of transplanting beet. For example, there is the problem of expense in weed control. With modern herbicides, spraying either before or after emergence, it is possible to cut down the amount of weed growth, but this is an expensive way of doing it. If one could, by previous cultivations, kill the previous growth of weed and then transplant, there would be great economies to the grower.
One welcomes the demonstration work which has been extended in Scotland by the Sugar Beet Research and Education

Committee. By having the chance to see trial plots of a sufficient scale to present conditions comparable with those encountered on the ordinary farm, sugar beet growers can see the money being spent, as it were, and they can see how the same methods can be applied to their own use.
Last year, we had a very good demonstration in my constituency on the Falkland Wood Farm. It was visited by many growers. This is one of the ways in which the money coming from the levy is spent. It is necessary, of course, to take ground and to compensate the farmer if the resulting crop is a failure by reason of the particular experiment not being successful.
I take it from what the Parliamentary Secretary said about the amount of money expected to be spent during the ensuing year that, although the Order calls for an increase of 1d., the programme can be achieved with an increase for the growers of only ½d. In the present economic climate, unless, as one hopes, there is to be a considerable increase in the guaranteed price for sugar beet, the ½d. is all that ought to be added, at least in the foreseeable future, and still enable the committee to carry on its valuable work.
The side-effects of some of the research can at times be unfortunate. We had one such experience in Scotland. Because of our northern climate, we do not suffer from the incidence of virus yellows to the extent experienced by the grower in England. My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. B. Hill) referred to the last bad attack of virus yellows. When this took place, we in Scotland, because we escaped it, appeared to have a much better result as compared with England, and, therefore, the preferential treatment which we used to have by way of price for beet growing was taken from us.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must resist the temptation to talk about the Price Review.

Sir J. Gilmour: With respect, Sir, it was the effects of research in England which led people to believe that sugar beet growing in Scotland could be as profitable as it was in England, and this had the result of altering the price of sugar beet to us. This was a way in


which research did harm rather than good to growers in Scotland in their financial returns.
We do not begrudge the work done to prevent virus yellows in Norfolk and the south of England. Indeed, we welcome it. Sugar beet growers stand together and wish to see everyone having profitable results. But it did happen to work against our interest. I hope that the Minister is aware of this point and will take it into account when he is sitting somewhere else and doing something else. I promise, Mr. Speaker, that I shall not go into that aspect of the matter further.
In the interests of sugar beet growing in Scotland, everything must be done to ensure that, although our factory is working at only half capacity, the amount of research and education which goes into making certain that we get it back to full capacity again is maintained and the money for that purpose is in no way reduced. We need the money more than any other part of the industry, and I hope that the research programme will be directed to that end.

10.55 a.m.

Mr. John Farr: I follow my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, East (Sir J. Gilmour) in his reference to virus yellows. Two facts are apparent as one looks at the floral decoration in the Parliamentary Secretary's lapel. One is that it was never grown in Wales. The other is that, as one looks at his flower and the many others we have seen, one can be forgiven for thinking that they are all made of plastic. I say that just en passant, and I come now to the Order.
The Order increases by 1d. the joint contribution which growers and processors will make to this worthy fund. No one—certainly no one on these benches—fails to appreciate that the money going into the fund goes to an excellent purpose. It is being well used and is meeting many urgent requirements in research and education in all the complicated aspects of sugar beet growing. However, although I am by no means opposed to adequate finance for the scheme, I must ask why it is necessary for an extra 1d. to be put on each ton at this time.
Farmers are having a difficult enough time now without being required to pay

an additional 1d. levy on sugar beet. What happened to the £40,000 excess of income over expenditure which the fund enjoyed last year? If the levy of 3d. a ton produced an excess of income over expenditure of £40,000, why is it necessary to put an additional £50,000 into the scheme this year by pushing another 1d. a ton on the levy?

Mr. Webster: This is an important point. On the last occasion when accounts were given to the House, there was a surplus of £40,000. It is estimated that the present proposed increase will produce another £50,000, making £90,000 in all. We find from the balance sheet that most of the excess was used as a subsidy for local authority borrowing. This is a serious matter, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising it.

Mr. Farr: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend for that helpful intervention. The question must be looked at. It is no good the Parliamentary Secretary saying that he does not know and he will deal with it later. We must have a full explanation.
By what right was a fund of this kind in credit to the tune of over £40,000 last year, and by what right was the excess, which had been taken 1d. by 1d. from sugar beet growers, put into some local authority fund? On whose authority was it done? If a large excess of income over expenditure was received by the fund last year, why is it necessary now to have another £50,000?
The Parliamentary Secretary is a sound and reliable man in his way, as we know from experience, and he will probably offer a sound explanation. We shall certainly demand that he satisfies the House. But there is another way of bringing in the extra moneys which, no doubt, the hon. Gentleman will say that it is essential that the project should have. It may be thought not practicable, but it is a simple way. Everyone with experience of farming knows that, if the levy cannot be increased, one can increase production. In future years, after the three-year period has elapsed, one way of doing it would be by an expansion of home production.
This could, possibly, be achieved and, with the necessary expansion—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We can discuss only what is in the Order.

Mr. Farr: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I am trying to point out that there is an alternative method for raising the money.

Mr. Speaker: Order. With equally great respect, I understood what the hon. Gentleman was trying to point out, and it was out of order.

Mr. Farr: I quite understand, Mr. Speaker, and, in deference to your Ruling, I shall not pursue the point.
I content myself with saying that, although in general I support a levy, I think it possible that in future years another way to achieve the same worthy end could be taken.
I now come to a point on which I feel adamant. I want to lodge a most strong and vociferous objection to discussing agricultural, horticultural, forestry, or any other such Orders in the mornings. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It is bad enough to come in on Wednesday morning to discuss them, but what I am trying to put to the Parliamentary Secretary and to the House is that if we are to have these Orders on Monday morning, many of them will go by default simply because quite a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House are unable to be present.
The Parliamentary Secretary's colleague on the Front Bench has substantial agricultural interests himself and he will tell the hon. Gentleman that often his weekends commence on Friday afternoon, either at home or in his constituency, and they terminate on Monday afternoon. Interspersed with occasional constituency engagements, many hon. Members on both sides of the House have to apply their minds very fully to agricultural, horticultural and forestry topics, and it really is most inconvenient, if not impossible, for them to be present at Westminster on a Monday morning to discuss this sort of thing.
I see from the appreciative smile on the face of the hon. Gentleman that he is grateful that the point has been made. He is a sensible and sound man, and I am quite sure that he will back us in this suggestion, and that possibly he will have a word with the Leader of the House or get his right hon. Friend to do so.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has made his point. He must now come back to Wednesday morning.

Mr. Farr: I quite appreciate that, Mr. Speaker. I hope you will forgive me for making these points. Perhaps I do elaborate on them, but I feel that it is necessary at times to do so. I will, of course, press on.
My one criticism of the Order is that considerable excess income over expenditure was achieved last year, and I am disappointed to think that the grower has to pay yet another penny per ton this year. My second general remark is one of deep opposition to discussing any rural order in the morning, and for that reason alone I shall most definitely oppose the passing of this Order today.

11.3 a.m.

Mr. David Webster: I should like to know what has been done under Section 18 of the Sugar Act, 1956, particularly regarding the progress towards the treatment of virus yellow. I am wondering whether this will involve considerable additional expenditure next year.
The point about it being aphid-borne was made very ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill). The development of an early warning system is very important, and I pay tribute to the work done at Rothamsted. Being a Scot myself, from not the "dead beat" area but the sugar beet area of Scotland, I am very interested in the subject. I am particularly interested in the problem of single germination of sugar beet and developments in this respect. As we know, the labour intensive nature of hoeing out and thinning out is extremely difficult, and anything that can be done to solve the problem will be valuable.
My hon. Friend talked about developments in nuclear research and I am wondering whether the Parliamentary Secretary is able to tell me whether he has contact with the Sieberdorff Research Unit in Vienna, where there has been considerable development on juice preservation and other matters useful for sugar beet extracts. I should like to know what type of co-operation we are receiving from the Viennese authorities at Sieberdorff.


I notice from the 1964–65 accounts, published under Section 18 of the Act, there has been a visit to the Institut International de Recherches Betteravières, where subscriptions and expenses of visits amounted to £1,719. This seems to be a regular practice. It would be a good thing if communications were established with Sieberdorff. With the increase in revenue requested this year we should try to develop a new type of beetroot producing a daffodil for Scotsmen. I have seen a number of hon. Members, particularly Liberal Members, wearing what is to me an alien flower, and I am glad to see that the deputy Chief Whip is not wearing one.
As my hon. Friend so rightly said, this should have been referred to the National Board for Prices and Incomes because under Section 18(16) of the Sugar Act, 1956, the Minister is the person responsible for publishing accounts that are presented to the House. They are presented in November of each year, and I was a little surprised to hear the Parliamentary Secretary say that the main reason for the increase in revenue, an increase of 1d. on the levy—a very considerable increase of 33⅓ per cent.—was that there was a shortfall of £28,000 in last year's accounts. There was expenditure of £166,000, and income of £142,000.

Mr. Peter Kirk: With great respect, what the Parliamentary Secretary was talking about was next year. He has given us no figures for last year.

Mr. Webster: Would the Parliamentary Secretary clarify that point?

Mr. Hoy: I thought I had made that perfectly clear. I was dealing with the year ahead.

Mr. Webster: I am exceedingly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Saffron Walden, who comes from the valley of the blue men, not the valley of the blue beetroot—the Saffronman.
It is necessary that we should know how these figures are arrived at. We are within one month of the end of the financial year for which these accounts should be presented, and we have not had an estimate from the Parliamentary Secretary. This means that we are getting an increase in revenue a year in

advance of requirements at a time of the income freeze. It seems the old story—and this is the Minister's responsibility—when the Government say that anybody who puts up prices, rates or levies, is being disloyal to his country; and yet, because there is an estimated shortfall of £28,000 in 13 months' time, the Government are to have authority to increase the levy now.
I should like to refer the Parliamentary Secretary to the previous year, the year ending 31st March, 1965, when there was a surplus in favour of the Sugar Beet Research and Education Fund of £41,125. I should like to know how much accumulated surplus there has been over the years. It is exceedingly important that farmers should know about this increase in their costs and the increase in the costs of the British Sugar Corporation because in 1965 they contributed £77,729, an increase of 20 per cent. We should like to know what the contribution is estimated to be last year.
What was done with those assets? In the year ended 31st March, 1965 "cash at Paymaster-General" stood at £23,000. It was then taken away from the Paymaster-General. It used to be £54,000. I am not surprised that the Minister of Agriculture should wish to take £20,000 away from the Paymaster-General. I think that is excellent and very reasonable. It makes one wonder what his functions are. A figure of £20,000 was taken away from him, but £65,000 was in local authority loans including accrued interest. This seems to be exceedingly important.

Mr. Michael Jopling: I think that my hon. Friend has made a slip of the tongue. He said that £20,000 had been taken away from the Paymaster-General. If he looks again, he will find that it is £30,000.

Mr. Webster: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I would almost dub him senior wrangler. He has put my faulty figures right. He has reinforced my point. I know that he will develop the point, because he is expert on the Paymaster-General and the finances at his disposal.
What worries me is that from this increase going into the fund there has been new investment in a local authority loan of £65,000. If there is to be a surplus


of £50,000 in the next financial year as a result of the increase in revenue, and if this is simply to be invested in local authority loans, the unfortunate producer and the Corporation will be subsidising local authority borrowing. The House will need to examine this aspect thoroughly before approving the Order.
I hope that we shall have a reply from the Joint Parliamentary Secretary. I have asked him why there was a surplus last year and why nothing was done to reduce the income of the fund. Now that there is an estimate of an increased deficit in 13 months' time, the Government require increased powers to raise finances for the fund now. Beetroot growers and the Corporation will regard this as an excessive increase in their costs to the extent of 33⅓ per cent. at a time when the Government are asking everybody to act with restraint.
This is the Minister's responsibility. I exonerate the Committee from responsibility. This great increase which is now to be levied quickly will have to be done on a gradual basis. I hope that it will not even be necessary to increase the levy by ½d. at present. As we have not yet got an estimate of the accounts for this year, it is less than justice to producers and to the House that the Order should go through without a great deal of scrutiny.

11.12 a.m.

Mr. Michael Jopling: I am glad to be able to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster), because on one tack he was not quite right. He said that the figures which we have been able to get from the Vote Office are last year's figures. They are the figures for the year before that.

Mr. Webster: I was merely saying that they are the latest figures available to the House. This is a delay which makes the whole situation much more aggravated.

Mr. Jopling: Indeed. It is intolerable that we should be asked to debate the Order this morning, since we only have figures which are nearly two years out of date. The figures for the year ended 31st March, 1966, should have been available to us by now. The Minister must explain why he invites us to

approve the Order when we have not got figures for the year which ended 10 months ago. Those figures should have been available to us. We should also have had from the Committee an estimate of what the position will be in 1966–67.
I come now to why it is essential that we press on as fast as possible with research and education into the sugar beet crop. My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) gave us a clear, comprehensive, concise and understanding account of the need for research. He made his speech from the point of view of the Eastern Counties, which is a predominantly arable area. I want to paint the position that sugar beet holds in the more predominantly mixed farming areas in the north of England where I come from. I must declare an interest, because I have been a sugar beet grower for 12 years.
In my area sugar beet serves rather different purposes. It has certain other disadvantages and problems for farmers. As to its advantages, it is a most valuable crop as a rotation break. It is a high gross cash return crop, which it is important to have in the highly mechanised arable and mixed farming in this country. It plays an important part, particularly in the north of England, in the residues—the tops—which provide an important part of the lowland sheep management system, in the winter fattening of sheep. These are the advantages.
The crop has disadvantages. The principal one is the conflict which growing it has with the management of other crops and other enterprises on an arable, and particularly on a mixed, farm. I am thinking in particular of the conflict that there is on a mixed farm in May and June at the time of singling and hoeing, which is so labour demanding and the timing of which is so critical. Very often it is necessary to devote all one's resources and efforts to cleaning, hoeing and singling the beet. This is often done at the expense of silage making, and sometimes at the expense of hay making. This aspect is particularly important in view of the swing there has been to silage. The Joint Parliamentary Secretary must be aware of this problem, because it is one which many commercial firms—for instance I.C.I.—are well aware of. Much better silage could


be made if it were possible to cut out the great labour demands of sugar beet growing in the spring.
Often the crop conflicts in the autumn with the lifting of potatoes on arable farms. Because the Corporation is anxious to get beet moving into the factories early in the season, it also often conflicts with wheat sowing. All this must be considered against the general trend of the smaller pool of labour being available to handle the crop and hoe it.
It is, therefore, essential that there should be more research and education into the new techniques of beet growing. From the educational point of view, the spring demonstrations are of the greatest possible value. Three or four years ago there was a demonstration in Yorkshire close to my own farm. That very comprehensive and well-managed demonstration had a dramatic effect on farmers. In the markets farmers talked in terms of new techniques and new methods of growing beet which they had not talked about before they attended the demonstration. I know of many farmers who remarked on the extraordinary change that took place after just one day's visit to the demonstration.
It is important that research should be improved and more techniques made available. There should be better ways of mechanising and controlling techniques, particularly weed eradication. My sugar beet fieldsman said to me only within the last fortnight that he thought that the day was rapidly approaching when it would be possible to sow the crop and just close the gate on it and virtually let it grow. This was rather an exaggeration, but it painted the direction in which present research on beet growing can lead us. Especially with the use of monogerm seeds, the hoeing and singling can be largely eradicated. The new machines can be used—the precision drills, the band sprayers and the methods of controlling insects, particularly aphis. New chemical methods of controlling weeds have become available to us. It is important to get on with this. Many farmers are thinking of getting out of sugar beet, particularly in the north of England. Speaking for myself, I can say that I have considered very seriously whether I should grow it this year. At one stage,

I decided that I would not, but I have changed my mind again since.

Mr. W. H. Loveys: Is my hon. Friend aware that this is a problem which is not confined to the north of England and that sugar beet growing is being reduced all over the country, with the exception of East Anglia, where all the beet factories are centred? It is a definite problem, which has resulted in a reduction in acreage everywhere except in East Anglia.

Mr. Jopling: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I had not realised that the trend was working in the same direction in Sussex. There is no arable crop where there is a greater pressure for research and new techniques than sugar beet, and it is important that all the work which is being done is continued and expanded.
I was disappointed when the Joint Parliamentary Secretary said that no research developments are planned in the immediate future. It is a pity that the work is not expanding. If we are not careful, we shall find that the sugar beet crop will be reduced radically in the next few years. As I have said, I know quite a number of growers in the north of England who have gone out this year and say they do not intend to grow sugar beet any more. It is a great pity.
Finally, I want to turn to a point which was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr), and that is the matter of having debates on Orders of this sort in the mornings. Wednesday mornings are not so bad, but it will not be long before the Leader of the House comes shambling in to tell us that he is proposing that agricultural Orders should be debated on Monday mornings.

Mr. Kevin McNamara: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is this directly in order?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): I was waiting to see how far the hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) was proceeding to go. It is in order to make some incidental reference to the fact that this is a Wednesday morning. But it is not in order on this Sugar Beet Order to discuss in general the advantages or disadvantages of morning sittings.

Mr. Jopling: Mr. Deputy Speaker, what I wanted to do was to support what was said, when Mr. Speaker was in the Chair, by my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough. As he said, hon. Members representing agricultural constituencies find it very hard to come to the House in the mornings, particularly at the beginning of the week. It is much more difficult for such an hon. Member to get to the House than it is for an hon. Member from Glasgow, who has only to go out of his house and take the bus to the airport to be at Heathrow in an hour. That is not possible for the vast majority of hon. Members from agricultural constituencies.
Again, those of us who specialise in agricultural matters find it particularly helpful to keep in touch with the Ministry, which is a very complex one, and it is essential that we try to go to the markets and talk to farmers. Quite often we do that on Monday mornings, before coming to the House, and there we find out what is going on in the context of the agricultural marketing system.
I resent the fact that we are debating this Order this morning—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not pursue this any further.

Mr. Jopling: Very well, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Then I conclude by saying that on this point of principle we ought to be prepared to divide the House when the time comes.

11.25 a.m.

Mr. Paul Hawkins: Coming from the county of Norfolk and representing a constituency which is greatly involved in sugar beet growing, I am very interested in the research programme which has aided sugar beet growing tremendously over the years.
The first factory for sugar beet was in Norfolk, and close to my home in my constituency, I have a factory at Wissington, which I went round during the last recess.
Norfolk has produced many pioneers in farming. "Turnip" Townsend first introduced the growing of row crops, from which the technique of sugar beet growing has evolved. A short list of famous Norfolk agriculturists would not be com-

plete without mention of Sir Edmund Bacon, the Chairman of the Sugar Beet Corporation. His inspiration and leadership of the whole of this great industry is a real example to many other industries throughout the land. I can say from personal knowledge that he knows the vast majority of research workers, men employed in the factories, fieldsmen and others. Everywhere I go among sugar beet growers, factory workers and others, there is the greatest admiration for the work which he has done to make the industry a very happy one in terms of its relationships.
Before I turn to the Order, I should like just briefly to mention the matter which has been referred to before, and that is the inconvenience of taking agricultural business in the mornings—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We really cannot have any more speeches on that subject. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to come to his observations on the Order.

Mr. Hawkins: I intended merely to draw attention to the fact that demonstrations of sugar beet growing which Members of Parliament like to see are not held in the later hours of the day, which is the only time that we can see them.
Turning to the Order, it asks for another cost increase of 33⅓ per cent.
I agree that sugar beet is a vital crop, particularly to the arable lands in East Anglia. It enables the land to have a proper rotation, though I must say with increasing difficulty. One of the most important features of a sugar beet crop is that it enables one to get away from corn growing, and it results in the land being kept in good heart.
I must add my warning to the Minister that, even in East Anglia, due to increasing costs and the decreased price per ton over the last few years, quite a number of people have gone out of sugar beet growing. On the lighter lands, it returns only two halfpennies for a penny. Aided by research, the growers have done a wonderful job. They have raised the production per acre from eight tons in 1936 to 13½ tons in 1959, which is the last year for which figures are given in the Sugar Beet Corporation's booklet. More has been grown since. Nevertheless, research is vital, and it needs to


be bent particularly towards reducing costs and increasing the sugar content. As the Minister will know, although the tonnage per acre has gone up, the sugar content per ton has gone down a little since the 'thirties. It has not shown any increase over the last ten or fifteen years, on average.
It is vital that we try to increase the sugar content as well as the tonnage per acre. It saves handling costs on the farm, and, in the factory, it saves costs of pulping and extraction of the sugar from the beet. That is a most important feature to which I hope the research section of the sugar beet industry is paying great attention. There are certain diseases on which research should be pressed forward more thoroughly, and I wish to draw attention to some matters on which I believe research should be concentrated.
First, it is essential that as soon as possible we have monogerm seed with as reliable germination, as high a sugar content and as high a tonnage per acre as the multigerm seed. The germination, sugar content and tonnage are not so good as the multigerm seed, yet if we could get as good a monogerm seed we could cut down costs on chopping out and singling, and the many other costs incurred during the spring rush.
Secondly, there must be urgent research into a cure for Docking disorder, which is prevalent on our lightest lands in East Anglia. It has spread from the constituency of the hon. Member for Norfolk, North (Mr. Hazell), and I am very surprised not to see him in his seat because there is a large amount of—

Mr. Webster: Would my hon. Friend suggest that he is probably going to a demonstration on a Wednesday morning?

Mr. J. E. B. Hill: The hon. Member for Norfolk, North (Mr. Hazell) is another Member who is on a Standing Committee dealing with an agricultural subject, and he is probably in the same difficulty about morning sittings.

Hon. Members: Withdraw.

Mr. Hawkins: I merely said that I was surprised to see that he was not here. I would have thought that if my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) could be here he

would probably have been here as well. This area of North Norfolk is an important sugar-beet growing area, and since the crop uses a large amount of labour, I would have thought that he, as president of the N.U.A.W., would have wanted to take part in our debate.
The Docking disorder, which started in North Norfolk around the town of Docking, has spread further south into the lighter lands in my constituency and into Suffolk. The disorder or disease, has been known for many years. About 10 years ago I was the arbitrator in an arbitration when the present Lord Chancellor was on one side and the late Sir Geoffrey Lawrence was on the other. All the argument was on the question of what caused Docking disorder.
I believe that many people on our lightest lands in the brecklands of Norfolk will shortly have to go out of sugar beet production unless that disorder or disease can be conquered. Some of my friends have already stopped growing sugar beet.
Near my home, and in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) is an area of light black land. The greatest trouble with that land is that soon after the sowing of the sugar beet it can be affected very badly with "blow" in March and April. The whole topsoil can blow away, taking with it the seed and the artificial manure, and can fill all the dykes.
The late Alderman Rickwood gave a farm to the nation for research a few years ago, and I hope that whoever winds up the debate will tell us of some of the experiments on that farm concerned with sugar beet growing. At the bottom of the gift of the land was an attempt to reduce the great losses in sugar beet and other root crops by finding some way of stabilising the land.
There is a great deal more to be done in research. I take off my hat to the Research Committee. I know Sir Peter Greenwell well and nobody could be a more able leader on that side than he is. The three matters to which I have referred are very important. They are monogerm seed of high quality and high yield with increased sugar content in the root; research into the Docking disorder; and research into preventing the black land of the fens from blowing. If


we can overcome those difficulties I feel sure that the farmers in my area will support an increase in the levy.

11.36 a.m.

Mr. Peter Kirk: I am glad to have the opportunity to say something on the Order, not only as representative of an intensive sugar beet growing area, which has one of the largest sugar beet factories in the country, at Felsted, but as a consumer not merely of sugar but of sugar beet pulp for calf rearing. I therefore have a considerable interest in seeing that the industry flourishes. Clearly, the increased research forecast by the Order is important to the industry.
My hon. Friends, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill), have gone into the work done by the various establishments in some detail. I have no doubt that that work, particularly the work at Cambridge, is very highly valued by sugar beet producers and manufacturers in that area. I was a little alarmed to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, East (Sir J. Gilmour) suggest that the proportion of contributions might be varied because the factories gain more than the producers. That may be so in Fife, but it is certainly not so in East Anglia.
My hon. Friend gave the example of cleaning. If we would care to stand outside the main entrance of the factory at Felsted and see the amount of muck being washed off the sugar beet, he would realise that we are still a long way from getting the proper development in that connection that we should have. Many of our local farmers work on heavy clay soil and it is almost impossible to get proper cleaning without the use of the high-pressure jets at the factory.
I want to concentrate on the financial aspect. I am certain that neither the producer nor the manufacturer will have any objection to paying the increased levy, even at a time of severe restraint, provided they are certain that it is needed. We therefore need more information from the Minister than we have had. The only figures he gave were the estimated cost for next year, £166,000, and the estimated income on a 3d. levy of £142,000, a short-fall of £24,000 next year. That is a remarkable decline in

the amount of contributions. The product of the levy for the year ending March, 1965 was £155,458. Crop yields have presumably been going up since then, and I had not heard that acreage had declined to such an extent, although I know that people are getting out of sugar beet production. How is it then that we find ourselves faced with a reduction of £13,000 in the product of the levy in two years? It is important that we should know how that has come about.
What worries me much more is that we have not got the figures for the intervening period. We have the figures up to the end of March, 1965—though the Parliamentary Secretary seemed rather surprised to hear them, when my hon. Friend produced them. He knew that there was surplus, but was apparently not certain what had happened to it. We now know that it has gone into local authority grants and the Post Office Savings Bank.
We have no figures yet for 1965–66, and it is high time we had. This is not a very big account—the total overall sum is under £100,000—and in a period of eleven months it should be possible to produce final figures. It should even be possible to produce estimated figures of outturn for this year, though I agree that that would be more difficult. With these figures to hand we could have a clear idea of whether or not an increase in the fund of £50,000 is justified. As I have said, I represent both producers and manufacturers, who are the people who will have to pay—not us, the general taxpayers. It will mean an increase in costs, and life is not easy in the sugar beet world at present.
I hope very much that the Parliamentary Secretary has now had time to get for us at least the 1965–66 figures, so that we can have a fairly clear idea of what the outturn was for that year, and whether the decline in the contributions had started in that year. If the hon. Gentleman looks again at the figures for 1964–65 he will see that there was an increase in the contribution from levy in that year of £24,000, and one therefore needs to be told why this decline is apparently to take place. If we could have that information, I should have though it reasonable, provided one is satisfied that the money was really


needed, to pass the Order. Without that information, I should have thought it very difficult for any responsible House of Commons, in the present economic climate, to allow this Order to go through unquestioned.

11.42 a.m.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: I apologise to the Parliamentary Secretary for the fact that owing to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances I was not able to be present to hear his speech, but I have since heard the majority of the other speeches in this debate.
I find it very difficult to discover what we are spending on the highly laudable purpose mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum, which is said to be for
… defraying the expenditure of programmes in Great Britain for carrying out research and education in sugar beet growing.
I have been looking at the latest agricultural statistics available in the research department of the Library and find that the latest figures we have are for 1962–63. It is shown there that the sugar-beet acreage for the country was 406,000 acres, with an overall yield of 12·7 tons per acre, producing a total yield of 5,146,000 tons. We gather that the amount collected in 1965 on the basis of a 3d. charge was £155,458. My calculations show that on that basis the 1962–63 figures ought to have produced a sum of about £129,000. It therefore appears to have gone up between 1962–63 and 1964.
If, on a 3d. levy, £129,482 was produced in 1962–63 by the growers and the Corporation together, a 4d. levy ought to produce £171,976. Obviously, it is very difficult to play arithmetic in the middle of a debate, but I would ask the Parliamentary Secretary to give us the latest figures on which the Order is based, and what, on those figures, would have been the product of a 3d. levy and what would have been the product of a 4d. levy in the latest year available.
I have been studying, as I do each year, the Report of the Agricultural Research Council. The latest Report is shown as having been ordered to be printed on 9th August last year, and it is for the year 1965–66. In page 56, one

sees that among the outside bodies giving financial assistance to the Agricultural Research Council in its very important work is the Sugar Beet Research and Education Committee which provided grants totalling £96,385
… towards capital and recurrent costs of research into the breeding, physiology, and processing of sugar beet at the National Institute of Agricultural Engineering, the Plant Breeding Institute, and the Rothamsted Experimental Station.
I should like to know the source of this fund. I take it to be completely separate from the contribution made by the British Sugar Corporation under this Order; in other words that we can say that in that case we may now be pouring into sugar beet research something in excess of £200,000 a year—

Mr. Kirk: If my hon. Friend will allow me, it is quite clear from these accounts that the figure is this fund.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will either confirm or deny that that is correct.
I cannot help feeling that there is not enough awareness of the fact that the agricultural industry as a whole falls well within the category of the science-based industry. All too often we talk of the science-based industries as though they had to do only with electronics and the more sophisticated modern technology, but agriculture has a magnificent record, and I do not think that any good agriculturist will ever begrudge making a reasonable contribution towards research in the industry.
This debate has obviously disclosed a rather uncertain position. Exactly what has happened to the carry-over from previous years? What have the funds been used for in the past? It was very disconcerting to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) suggesting that some of the money has been used to help local authorities—

Mr. Hoy: Mr. Hoyindicated dissent.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: I am glad to see the Parliamentary Secretary shaking his head, because that is a very grave charge to have been made. I hope that we shall have it cleared up, because I


can think of nothing more likely to undermine the confidence of those in agriculture who are research-minded than the thought that their contributions are being misused for other purposes.
The Report of the Agricultural Research Council confirms my assertion about the industry's approach to scientific research. I notice in page 3 that reference is made to
… yellows virus of sugar beet, the control of which has probably given the growers an increased yield to the value of some £500,000 a year since 1959; and beet eelworm which, although devastating in some countries, is unimportant to the United Kingdom because the rotation of crops prescribed by research prevents the pest from reaching damaging proportions.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South-West (Mr. Hawkins) made very clear, those are two troubles that have beset the fens in past years, and I agree that money is well spent that is spent on solving them. Growers of sugar beet in my constituency have never been reluctant to take a constructive approach to the matter.
I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South-West said about the involuntary export of topsoil carried downwind from my constituency into his, and I know that in giving this farm to the nation the late Alderman Rickwood had very much in mind the idea of seeking some way of overcoming this appalling tendency of fen soil to "blow"—perhaps over-granulated by excessive use of artificial fertilisers—by being carried up into the sky and deposited in other counties. Strangely enough, it has affected sugar beet more than any other crop. The wind often coincides with the drilling period and, as the seeds start to germinate, up goes the lot and redrilling must take place.
This is a thoroughly uneconomic necessity and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will reassure us that all of this money is being properly used, that none of it has been unnecessarily withheld, and that none of it has been used for any purpose other than for scientific research.

11.50 a.m.

Mr. H. W. Loveys: I strongly support the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely

(Sir H. Legge-Bourke) about the need for those who pay the levy to know exactly how their money is being spent. I declare my interest in this matter in that I am a sugar beet grower and I also declare the fact that, until now, I had no idea that this money was being used for anything other than research.
I, too, apologise to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary for not being in the Chamber throughout this discussion. Like other hon. Members, I am a member of a Standing Committee which is sitting upstairs and throughout the morning I have been trying to divide myself, as it were, between these two commitments. My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) is in his place on the Opposition Front Bench in the House, but he is also supposed to be in the Committee upstairs.
Meanwhile, my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, North (Mr. Hazell) has decided to remain in the Committee Room, although he has a passionate interest in the matter being discussed on the Floor of the House. This state of affairs makes nonsense of our procedure. I am finding myself having to rush from one place to the other, so much so that I did not prepare any notes for this speech because I thought that I would be kept in the Standing Committee.
I am anxious to take part in this discussion because, like many of my hon. Friends, I support and welcome the Order. I understand that it amounts to about 5s. per acre for growers who will pay the levy. This does not seem an excessive amount and I agree that we are getting good value for money. It must be realised, however, that it is because of the work of the Research Committee that the Government have been able to keep down the guaranteed price to the grower. The Parliamentary Secretary cannot pretend that the grower has benefited to the extent of increased profitability. The Minister has not been handing out largesse in any way. He has merely been able to make use of the research that has been going on into this matter, bringing with it increased yields which, in turn, have helped to cover the greatly increased expenses of growing sugar beet.
My hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, South-West (Mr. Hawkins) raised the important question of the sugar con-


tent of beet. What proportion of the research being done is into the importance of increasing the sugar content of beet as opposed to the tonnage output? To what extent does natural sunshine increase the sugar content; or is it increased by fertiliser treatment, methods of cultivation or in some other way? I am sure that my fellow growers will agree that it is all important to increase the sugar content of the beet as distinct from increasing the yield generally. After all, the price of sugar beet is based on the percentage of sugar content, and the more knowledge that growers can have about this aspect the better.
The greatest success story of the Research Committee has been the way in which yellows virus has, to a large extent, been conquered. The early warning system has been of great help because growers know when the virus is in their district and have been able to apply the necessary pesticide to prevent the virus from infecting their crop. We must do everything we can to get genetic monogerm seed on to a proper basis so that we can do more than just grow it experimentally, which, I understand, is the present position. If this seed were more widespread much of the spring work could be reduced.
I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will comment on the future intentions of the Government about the growing of sugar beet in this country, because this is tied up with the question of research and the fact that a great reduction in sugar beet growing has been taking place virtually throughout the country, with the exception of East Anglia. I support and welcome the Order, but regret that this matter is having to be debated this morning, when there is another agricultural Committee in session upstairs.
I support those who have said that that alone is good enough reason to divide the House on this issue.

11.56 a.m.

Mr. Anthony Stodart: We have had a useful debate under conditions which have by no means been made easy by the activities of the Government. I do not want to dwell on this matter, except to reiterate the difficulties which have been expressed by my hon. Friends about the conditions under which they have been working—trying to be in two places at once—in an

effort to do their duty properly. The best I can find to say about this morning's arrangements, is that it is preferable to the Monday morning sitting for which this business was originally planned.
This has been a useful discussion, because we have been talking about the way in which the results of research are being utilised and about how this research is being financed. Not many people get "hot under the collar" nowadays about an increase of 1d. The reason is probably because one cannot buy very much for 1d. However, when one analyses this increase, it is, relatively speaking, a considerable one. An increase of 33⅓ per cent. at this time must be considered considerable.
We have not been given up-to-date figures and I hope that when the Minister replies he will give a good explanation as to why these figures are not immediately available. We were told that there was a surplus in the previous year of £41,000 and we know that this ld. increase will bring in a further £50,000. The suggestion was made that there had been investments in local authority funds, although I observed that the Parliamentary Secretary reacted sharply against that suggestion. I hope that he will clear up these matters and explain why, if such a surplus existed, it is necessary to call for this extra money. Has there been a steep decline in the acreage of sugar beet being grown and thereby a reduction in the number of tons coming off?
An important matter to bear in mind is the value of the sugar beet crop to the whole agricultural structure. It is dependent, to a great extent, on the research that is done on its behalf. Potentially, it is an enormously valuable crop in Scotland, yet the Cupar factory is running at half-capacity and if this trend were allowed to develop and if production were still further to decline this could have consequences right outside the immediate sphere of agriculture, and the Parliamentary Secretary will appreciate my meaning from an employment point of view.
Half the trouble in Scotland is that the yields are comparatively poor. I have the greatest anxiety, as things are going, that one of the very few useful break crops—and this is a problem affecting a great number of agriculturists—might be


taken away from Scottish agriculture altogether. The hon. Gentleman gave us the figures and the increases in tonnage over the United Kingdom during a period ranging from 9·2 tons to the present 14 tons an acre. Can he give the corresponding Scottish figures, because they are nothing like that?
The hon. Gentleman mentioned various organisations engaged in sugar beet work —Rothamsted, Sprowston and Nottingham—and it struck me that none of those research stations are situated very far north. Is enough attention being paid to the conditions under which sugar beet is grown in the northern part of the country? Why are the yields lower there? Is it because the varieties grown in the South are not suitable in the North? Is it because we do not have the number of hours of sunshine that generally speaking the South has? Is it because the spacing between the rows and between the plants is wider in the North and one does not get the plant population? The hon. Gentleman says that this is a factor.
From what I remember of seeing deliveries to factories my impression is that the width of spacing and the width of rows is no wider in Scotland than it is in a substantial part of the northern beet growing areas of England, and yet the yields are substantially less further Scotland. A good deal of work needs to be done and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be to the enormous advantage of Scottish agriculture that research of this kind should be carried out with a view to preserving this most valuable crop. If such research is done, I can see the value of the increase in contribution, but my hon. Friends are entirely justified in asking for a very much fuller explanation than we have had about the necessity for this very substantial increase which seems to fly entirely contrary to the general thinking of the Government about increased prices.

12.3 p.m.

Mr. Hoy: May I thank hon. Gentlemen for the part that they have played in this debate, which has been extremely useful. I am not altogether sure that I cared for the contribution from the hon.

Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster), who introduced an argument which I hope I can show is quite unworthy of the occasion. May I thank the hon. Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) for his contribution. I will not seek to repeat his learned exposition on the intricacies and scientific problems facing the industry. He is obviously tremendously well-informed and I do not seek to compete with him, nor, I imagine, would anyone else.
The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare raised the question of balances which were left over. They were for 1964–65 and not for last year. I did not answer off the cuff because frequently organisations—and I am connected with a considerable number of them—have a balance remaining. I wanted to make sure that the balance was not paid back to anyone, but carried forward, and this I can now confirm. In reply to the hon. Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke), I paid a very fulsome tribute, I thought, to the scientific research which takes place in agriculture which is at least comparable to that in any other industry. I said that before he entered the Chamber, and perhaps I should repeat it so that he may be assured that I had not overlooked it.

Mr. Webster: rose—

Mr. Hoy: Will the hon. Gentleman just let me finish what I have to say? Any money which was left over would not subsidise local authorities or go into other public funds, as the hon. Gentleman suggests. Like many organisations, until such time as the money is required it is invested, so that it is interest earning and not lying idle. I hope that with that assurance, the hon. Gentleman will understand what is happening. Not a penny of the money subscribed is spent in any other way than for the purposes for which it is contributed.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: May I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving us that assurance, and may I also say that I fully support a policy which amasses enough money to do a job properly rather than to spend a little goodness and achieve no result.

Mr. Hoy: I will return now—

Mr. Webster: rose—

Mr. Hoy: No, I will not give way. I gave way to the hon. Gentleman on two occasions before and I have just started my speech. A great deal of fuss was made about the accounts not being ready. The accounts for 1965–66 were sent to the Comptroller and Auditor General by 30th November, as the 1956 Act requires. I understand that the House will, in the next few days, be asked to order a printing. The procedure has been the same since the fund was begun, and I think that that is an adequate reply to those who talk about delay.

Mr. J. E. B. Hill: In this case, when the Government are asking for an increase, would it not have been reasonable to try to expedite the accounts? Have they been held up by the translation of the Comptroller and Auditor General to the post of Ombudsman?

Mr. Hoy: They have not been held up at all. The usual procedure has been followed and we have tried to get them out as quickly as we can. If the hon. Gentleman would like the information, I can give the acreages from 1962–63 to 1965–66. The 1961–62 acreage was approximately 410,000; 1962–63, 409,000; 1963–64, 411,000; 1964–65, 433,000; 1965–66, 438,000.
The income in each of these years was as follows: 1961–62, £148,000; 1962–63, £132,000; 1963–64, £131,000; 1964–65, £155,000; 1965–66, £167,000.

Mr. Kirk: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. This means an even greater decline next year than would have seemed possible from the earlier figures. Is there any explanation?

Mr. Hoy: I am willing to be as helpful as I can, but I can give only an approximate figure. On 5·7 million tons the income would be about £190,000. This is an estimate.

Mr. Kirk: That is on the higher figure.

Mr. Hoy: Yes. I was surprised that the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) complained at our discussing agriculture in the morning. I thought that agriculture was practised in the morning. We had two mornings a week on agriculture for nearly a year. The hon. Gentleman then complained that he could not take part in our deliberations. Now that he has been given an oppor-

tunity, he says that the Government have no right to discuss this subject in the morning. He must make up his mind.

Mr. Stodart: The Joint Parliamentary Secretary must not run away from the complaint in that way. On those mornings in Standing Committee the House was not sitting. The hon. Gentleman must have noticed that my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Loveys) has lost weight recently through going from one place to another.

Mr. James Johnson: Is not the trouble now that we are getting so much agriculture that we cannot get any fishing?

Mr. Hoy: Perhaps no one will now object that on this occasion we have taken the chips before the fish.
I want to associate myself with the remarks that the hon. Member for Norfolk, South-West (Mr. Hawkins) made about his constituent Sir Edmund Bacon, whom I know personally and fairly well. We are grateful to Sir Edmund. I associate myself also with the tribute paid by the hon. Member for Fife, East (Sir J. Gilmour) to those Scottish counterparts who are doing this work.
N.A.A.S. is at present working on the subject of Docking disorder. This has not been overlooked. We, N.A.A.S. and the Corporation work closely together. There is no duplication of effort; or, if there is any, it is small.
The hon. Member for Norfolk, South asked how the work was publicised or if it was publicised. Then in a later sentence he said that no one could say that the result of this work had not been publicised. This was an admission that those concerned are doing a good job. There would be no purpose in the work if at the end of the day the results were not publicised so that farmers could know what was being done.
It is true, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Mr. Stodart) said, that they have difficulties in the North. I interjected in his speech to say that one of the reasons given is the question of plant space. I cannot prove this. This is for the scientists and research workers to study. Various reasons are given—climate, lack of sunshine, spacing, the type of plant. The scientific people have given considerable thought to these


matters. I agree that those in the North can still make a contribution. They must, if the factory at Cupar is to play its part.
This is not something which has happened only in the last few years. It has been a recurring thing. It has had its good periods and its bad periods. If the factory could be used to full capacity, it could make a fairly substantial contribution to the economy of the town in which it is situated.

Sir J. Gilmour: It is true that four years ago the Cupar factory was oversubscribed and had to ration the acreage that growers were allowed. The decline has occurred over the last three seasons.

Mr. Hoy: I am not denying that it has had these periods. Special measures have been taken to assist the factory. Immediately those steps were taken, we received applications from parts of the South that they should be treated as fairly and as equitably as were those in the North.
I have been asked why these balances are needed. If it is any consolation to hon. Members, it is not expected that the full 1d. increase will go on this year. It may be ½d. I have expressed a hope. I trust that no one will assert that I have given a firm assurance.
Every year we must carry forward a balance to make advance payments to the research institutes in March, June and October before a penny comes in from the harvest. A balance must be kept in hand. The money usually comes in from the harvest in the period from December to January. Until such time as the money is required it is invested.
Sometimes there appears to be a substantial balance. This is the very purpose for which it is required. If research is to be undertaken, the institutes must know what they are doing and the money must be there, rather than their living simply from hand to mouth. To correct what the hon. Member for Westmorland

(Mr. Jopling) said, I did not say that there would be no new research work. I said that there would be no major new projects.
We do our best to prevent duplication of research from occurring. N.A.A.S. and A.R.C. are both represented on the Research and Education Committee. This liaison serves to prevent duplication from occurring. N.A.A.S. is undertaking some of the Docking work on its own. There is an active international body concerned with beet sugar research based in Belgium. The United Kingdom is a full participant. We learn and we also contribute. No one is doing more than Britain. Other countries are grateful for the contribution we make.
As the cost of research increases, not only the Government but all the interests concerned agreed that our research work should not be curtailed, but that they should continue making this contribution. It was agreed that this was how the money should be used. This is the sole reason for tabling the Order. Whatever else the objection to the Order is, I am delighted to know that everybody agrees that the Committee and the research people are doing a first-class job. Having looked at it and the work of certain other organisations, I must say that they do the job economically and reasonably, and we ought to be proud of it.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that the funds raised from the levy can be used to assist the national farm to which I referred, the farm which the late Alderman Rickwood gave the country?

Mr. Hoy: I shall look into that specific case.

Question put:—

Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER'S opinion as to the decision of the Question being challenged, the Proceedings stood deferred pursuant to Order (Sittings of the House (Morning Sittings)).

FISHING VESSELS (GRANTS)

12.20 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. James Hoy): I beg to move,
That the Fishing Vessels (Acquisition and Improvement) (Grants) Scheme 1967, dated 8th February 1967, a copy of which was laid before this House on 15th February, be approved.
The House will recall that the White Paper on Investment Incentives, Cmnd. 2874, of 17th January, 1966, promised that grants for fishing vessels would be adjusted to take account of the abolition of investment allowances. On 9th March last year, my right hon. Friend announced what the adjustment would be: an increase of 10 per cent. in the rates of grant, from 25 per cent. to 35 per cent. for deep sea vessels over 80 feet in length and from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. for inshore vessels under 80 feet in length.
In the fishery debate on 29th July last, I told the House that the new rates would apply also to improvements to vessels and that the existing ceilings on grants in individual cases would be removed. I also promised that the Scheme would be retrospective so that the new arrangements would apply to all eligible investment since 17th January, 1966.
The Scheme now before the House gives effect to these undertakings. It amends the existing schemes for white fish vessels, herring vessels and improvements, so that grants already paid can be brought up to the new rates. It then provides for the new rates to be paid on future applications.
We have taken the opportunity to bring white fish vessels, herring vessels and improvements all together into a single scheme for the sake of simplicity. Improvement grants will be available for herring vessels for the first time, and existing limitations on the types of improvements that may be assisted will no longer apply. Grants will be available for all improvements approved as worthwhile. Any expenditure incurred since 17th January, 1966, which was not approved for grant but would have been approved if this Scheme had been in operation will qualify for consideration.
There are three new features of the Scheme. One is that specific provision

is made for cases in which an applicant personally does the work on his own vessel. Second, a new provision has been included for improvements to the safety and seaworthiness of vessels. The third new feature relates to vessels built abroad. Such a vessel will qualify for the full rate of grant unless it appears to the Ministers that the cost compares unfairly with the cost of building in this country.
In such cases, they will attract a grant of 20 per cent. which is the rate for merchant ships. In the past, no grant has been given in such cases. But now that investment allowances have been replaced by 20 per cent. grants for merchant ships, the same should apply to fishing vessels. This is fair and reasonable from the point of view of owners and of British shipbuilders.
Finally, I should mention that the Scheme does not provide for the further increase of 5 per cent. which will be payable on expenditure incurred in 1967 and 1968. Legislation will be needed to enable us to increase the rates provided in this Scheme, which are at the statutory maximum. But we have thought it right not to hold up the Scheme on this account. We want the industry to have the money that is already due to it.
Hon. Members will have noted that the Scheme is to run until 31st December, 1972. This is the end of the 10-year transitional period for which the industry has been promised special assistance. What is to be done after that will depend on developments in the meantime.
Before I leave the Scheme, the House will expect me to say a word about the policy that underlies it. It has been our policy and that of our predecessors that the grants should result not in an increase in the catching power of the fleet but in the replacement of old vessels by new ones.
Since new vessels have greater catching power than old ones, we require two old vessels to be scrapped for each new freezer and the equivalent of one and a half for each new conventional trawler.

Mr. James Johnson: Is the two for one sacrosanct? I understand that the White Fish Authority—perhaps my hon. Friend may care to comment on this—considers that it should depend on merit, ship for ship, so to speak.

Mr. Hoy: I thought that that would be my hon. Friend's question. If he will wait a moment or two, I shall come to it.
I have stated what our policy is, and there is at present some justification for it. We must have regard to the stocks of fish available and the prospective demand; and we want a balanced age structure in the fleet, which, also, is important. Experience has shown the dangers of overbuilding a fleet that is not yet viable. On the other hand, we recognise the contribution the industry has to make to our balance of payments.
The Estimates Committee has asked us to consider the possibility of abolishing the scrapping ratios, and this is being done, I am happy to tell my hon. Friend, in the course of the current review of policy.
The House will be interested to know the results of the fishing industry for 1966, which have just come to hand. Total landings increased from the 1965 level by 25,000 tons to 935,000 tons, the highest figure since 1956. The value increased by £800,000 to £61·8 million, an all-time record. Imports of fish comparable with our own landings declined by 10,000 tons, worth about £500,000. The industry is to be congratulated on these results.
The earnings of the distant water fleet failed to keep pace with rising costs, and this is a matter for concern. We have not yet got all the information to enable us to assess the reasons for this situation. But we shall be looking further into it in the course of the annual subsidy review which is about to start.
With this explanation, I commend the Scheme to the House. It provides a fair measure of assistance to enable the industry to carry on with the process of modernisation that is needed to increase its efficiency and enable it to make its full contribution to the national economy.

12.29 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Wall: As sugar beet had, apparently, to take precedence over this debate this morning, it looks as though fish will again run late. It is likely to run late next week, and I hope that we shall not have to have our debate in the nocturnal hours which are usual for the fishing industry in the House.
I thank the Minister for his explanation of the Scheme. We on this side welcome

it. We are delighted to have it even though it has been a long time in gestation. As the hon. Gentleman explained, the scheme springs from Cmnd. 2874 of January, 1966—

It being half-past Twelve o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

POST OFFICES (LOCHGELLY AND COWDENBEATH)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fitch.]

12.30 p.m.

Mr. Adam Hunter: I am pleased to have the opportunity to raise a matter of great interest to many of my constituents. I am dealing with a purely constituency matter and not complaining about the new national standard hours for Post Office counter services.
To state my case in a reasonable way I must first outline the background of the area concerned. I am talking about the two small burghs of Lochgelly and Cowdenbeath, two towns in central West Fife. The population of Lochgelly is about 9,000 and that of Cowdenbeath is about 12,000. They are separated by a little less than one mile and in that distance a small part of the landward area of Fife county intervenes in the form of a village called Lumphinnans. Therefore, the whole area—the two towns and the intervening part—is totally built-up.
For several generations the area has completely relied on the coal mining industry. Only one small pit is left, and that is near Lochgelly. Therefore, more and more people must travel outwith the town and burgh boundaries. The rundown in the coal-mining industry in 1958 drastically affected the area. Since 1958 14 pits and mines closed in the area and what was once the industrial heart of central West Fife is now almost denuded of industry.
The result has been that miners' jobs are no longer available in the area, and those miners who found jobs must travel much further away from the two towns. There is a little more heartening news now because in Cowdenbeath we have the establishment of a little more industry. But there is no industry in


Lochgelly and almost the whole working population must move out of the burgh every morning to work.
In May, 1966, the Postmaster-General announced changes and new standard hours of business on a national basis. The changes were communicated to the town clerks of the burgh on 13th December and were to become operative from 16th January. Christmas and the New Year come in the intervening period, and the town clerk's complaint was that insufficient time had been given to make objections.
The Head Postmaster of Dunfermline was contacted with the object of postponing the operation of the new hours on 16th January. He had not the power or control to do that. I spoke to him about the matter over Christmas, but this being a national change he could not make any variation in the hours to be operated from 16th January. I also wrote to my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General, asking him to consider postponing the operative date. He refused to do that, and great disappointment was created in the burghs.
The civic heads in those two towns are in the main ordinary working people, councillors who have their ear to the ground and know exactly what the inhabitants require. I think that they reflect the views of the inhabitants.
I also wrote to my right hon. Friend asking him to reconsider the hours for the Post Office counter services in the towns, pointing out the adverse effects they had on many of my constituents. That appeal was turned down.
The reaction of the councils was to ask me to impress upon the Postmaster-General the need for revision of the hours, and also to point out their complete dissatisfaction and consequent desire that I should raise the matter in the House. I assure my hon. Friend the Assistant Postmaster-General that we are not complaining for complaining's sake. This is a sincere effort by the local councillors, because they have the people's interests first and foremost. They are interested in the well-being of those who rely on an efficient and adequate Post Office service.
We realise that economies must be made, but they should not have the effect of restricting a long-standing public service. It was recently suggested to me

that progress in some spheres of social and economic life brings deterioration in others. It has also been said to me that delivery of mail and certain other aspects of the postal services are poorer today than they were 50 or 100 years ago.
A Rotary Club in my constituency recently mentioned that 100 years ago there was a mail delivery four times a day. While I would not advocate that postmen should be asked to return to late afternoon or early evening deliveries, it seems to me that there is a valid reason for adjusting Post Office counter services to suit local conditions. When mining was the main industry of Lochgelly, which now has no industry, men worked on a shift basis and they had ample opportunity to obtain Post Office services because they could go to the Post Office either in the morning or in the afternoon. Many of those men must now go to work outside the town at about 8 a.m. and they do not arrive home until 5.30 p.m.
When I said that many dockyard workers in Rosyth were not getting this facility, my right hon. Friend pointed out that the area of Rosyth, which is part of Dunfermline, had three Crown post offices and a sub-post office. But the dockyard is a mile and more away from Rosyth, which means that only one sub-post office is available for these workers. It is outside the gates of the dockyard and the men are in too much of a hurry for their transport to go to that sub-post office.
Miners' wives also have taken on a new social way of life. For various reasons, they have to work. Miners who left the pits found other jobs with lower earnings, while miners who went to other pits further away from home also found that they had to accept lower earnings. This compelled miners' wives to seek work and they travel as far as Edinburgh and other places, about 10 or 12 miles from home. Cowdenbeath is in a similar position. Although there are some industrial jobs there, the great majority of the working population have to travel far from the town. It means that many are being denied a post office counter service.
Another aspect is that of the lunchtime closing. We feel that the hours during lunch time could be staggered and that this would cause no hardship to counter staff. People employed in shops and


businesses sometimes are able to visit the Post Office only during their lunch hour. My hon. Friend may say that it is not practicable to stagger the hours due to the variety of purchases made in a post office, but these are not large post offices and I am sure that most of the staff can do a comprehensive job—that they can deal with almost any purchase that can be made in a post office.
The Post Office, as we see it, is recognised as a public service and I do not think that it is too much to ask that a similar attitude should be adopted by the postal authorities. The town council of Cowdenbeath gives a full service to its residents. Anyone who has a query or a complaint or business to transact can do so at the council offices during lunch time and surely a similar service could be granted by the Post Office.
This is simply a constituency matter. The town council has no wish to broaden out a complaint in order to question the national standard hours of post office workers, who should certainly enjoy revised hours. It is the opinion of the local authorities concerned that the hours should be revised. But surely it is not outwith the power and ability of the Postmaster-General to devise an arrangement whereby the post offices could be kept open for half an hour at the end of the day and during the lunch hour.
We feel in Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly that we have a special problem, that local circumstances are entirely different from any other part of the country, and I hope that my hon. Friend will consider impressing upon the Postmaster-General the need for some revision of the hours of post office counter service in Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly with the possibility that another half-hour could be put at the end of the day and that the counter-service could be kept open during lunch time.

12.45 p.m.

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Joseph Slater): I am very grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Mr. Hunter) for giving me this opportunity of discussing the question of Post Office hours of business. It is not, of course, the first time the matter has been raised in the House, but in raising

the question in this way my hon. Friend has given me the chance of explaining the background to our policy in rather more detail than has been possible before. I have listened very carefully to what my hon. Friend has said, and I should like to congratulate him on the very fair and courteous way in which he has made his points.
Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly are not, of course, standing alone in this matter of changed hours of Post Office business. As hon. Members will know, we announced as long ago as last May that we should have to make some general changes throughout the country in the times for which post offices were open. Since then we have been busy introducing the new hours and we have almost completed our task. It may help the House if I first explain briefly why we are making the changes.
First, in common with many other employers we have been plagued by recruitment difficulties at many of our offices; and, where counter staff is concerned, these difficulties have been accentuated by the long hours of attendance which our clerks have had to put in as compared with workers in many other fields. In other words, under the old arrangements we were not competing for staff on anything like equal terms with other employers.
Secondly, the postal services are labour-intensive, and we must economise on staff as much as we possibly can if we are going to keep down costs and charges. We are satisfied that the changes in hours of business now being made will be of very great help in dealing with both of these problems.
I might add that our efforts to keep down costs and charges are not confined to the changes we are discussing today. In co-operation with a firm of consultants—McKinsey and Co.—we have been making a thorough-going study of the work at counters and we have high hopes that improvements in procedures and working methods which are coming out of this study will produce substantial dividends.
As hon. Members will know, many different kinds of service are provided at Post Office counters; some of them are simple but by no means all of them are. The more complicated transactions do


not readily lend themselves to mechanisation but here again we are making an intensive study of various possibilities.
Perhaps I might now say a word or two about the changes in hours we are actually making. Up to last year, most of our main post offices, and many sub-post offices, stayed open from 8.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. or later every day of the week except Sunday. Our opening hours were longer than those of the great majority of shops—and considerably longer than those of the banks, local council offices, and many other organisations. These long hours involved late finishing times and a high proportion of Saturday attendances and, as I have said, accentuated our recruitment problems.
We realised, of course, that any curtailment of hours of business would be bound to cause some inconvenience to some people and I should like to make it clear, therefore, that the changes have not been made without a great deal of careful thought. Our aim throughout has been to reduce costs and help recruitment while, at the same time, causing a minimum of inconvenience to our customers.
We found that, generally, business was relatively light at the beginning and at the end of the day—before 9 a.m. and after 5.30 p.m. Moreover, many of our customers who visited post offices before or after these times wanted postage stamps, which can, of course, be obtained from the stamp-selling machines which are to be found outside all main and many of the smaller post offices.
In the event, we came to the conclusion that we could best meet our main objectives—reduced costs and improved staff attendances with a minimum of inconvenience to our customers—by aiming to introduce new standard hours of 9 a.m. 5.30 p.m., Monday to Friday. These new hours have, in fact, now been introduced at the great majority of post offices, including those at Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly.
Before dealing in detail with the situation in Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly, I should like to say a word about the hours of business on Saturday. I realise that in many places Saturday is a busy shopping day; but most other businesses are closed, at least in the afternoon, and I think it true to say that the great majority of

people can get to a post office before 4.30 p.m. without much inconvenience. In our review of the arrangements, we found that most customers in fact visited the post office early on Saturday and that in most offices business was very light in the late afternoon. We decided, therefore, that it would be reasonable and sensible to close most offices at 4.30 p.m.
There is a misunderstanding which I should like to clear up at this point. In some quarters it has been assumed that the shorter hours of business and improved staff attendances mean a shorter working week for our counter clerks. This is not so. They are still working the same number of hours, although it is true they can now get home a little earlier in the evening and on Saturday. But to make up for the earlier finishing times, the clerks will either be putting in time at the counter at other hours of the day, and so enabling us to strengthen the staff where it is needed at busy periods, or, where this is not necessary, they will be doing other work and so enabling us to reduce costs.
I turn now to the particular cases of Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly, on whose behalf my hon. Friend has spoken so persuasively. The hours of counter business in these towns were reviewed towards the end of last year. At that time, the post offices in Cowdenbeath were open from 8.30 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday to Saturday. The Lochgelly office had the same hours of business, except on Saturday, when it closed at 5 o'clock. In these towns, as in so many other places, these long hours were not really justified by the amount of business done; and, after going into the matter in some detail, we felt that the new standard hours could be introduced without inflicting undue hardship on local residents.
The Head Postmaster of Dunfermline wrote to each of the town councils on 13th December, telling them about our proposal to introduce the new standard hours of business. He also told them that we proposed to close the offices at lunch time—I shall say a word about this a little later.
The Cowdenbeath Council made representations about lunch-time closing, and the Lochgelly Council told the Head Postmaster that it was opposed to the suggested changes generally. In the light of the councils' comments, the


matter was very carefully reviewed, but we came to the conclusion that we should not be justified in making an exception to the new standard hours in either town; the councils were informed accordingly by the Head Postmaster and the new hours were introduced on 16th January. I am sorry that there should have been some feeling that the councils had insufficient time to consider our proposals; however, we wrote to them some five weeks before the date on which we proposed to make the changes.
We looked carefully at one problem which the Lochgelly Council raised, when it made the point that most of the working population travelled to other places, outside the town, for their daily work; leaving Lochgelly before 9 a.m., the proposed post office opening time, and returning after 5.30 p.m., when it was proposed to close the office. As my hon. Friend emphasised, many of these people work in Rosyth, where there are four post offices, one of which is quite close to the dockyard and which, to meet the needs of the dockyard workers, stays open at lunch time. Other Lochgelly people, I believe, work in Dunfermline—where there are also a number of post offices. Dunfermline is larger and busier than Lochgelly, and because of the amount of business transacted, the main post office is staying open throughout the midday period.
My hon. Friend made special mention of the lunch-time closing. I should explain that, except in the central areas of the larger towns, we have found that business tends to be light at lunch time. This is particularly true when the main shops close for lunch, as they do in Cowdenbeth and Lochgelly; indeed, in both towns many of the shops close for longer than an hour.
As business at both main post offices was relatively light between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., we felt that lunch-time closing, in line with the main local shops, was not an unreasonable step to take. By closing for an hour, we have enabled the staff to take their lunch at the same time and this means that a better service can be given in the periods before and after the lunch break. Most people combine their post office business with their shopping, and we think that few if any of our customers

will be greatly inconvenienced by the lunch time closing. Some shop assistants may find it a little more difficult to visit the post office, and that is why my right hon. Friend has offered to adjust the time of closing, if either the Cowdenbeath or Lochgelly councils thinks that this would help. If, for example, a closing hour of 12.30 p.m. to 1.30 p.m. would help these people by enabling them to visit the post office before returning to work at 2 o'clock, we should be glad to adjust the closing hour in this way. We should not, however, feel justified in doing away with the lunch-time closing.
We have considered very carefully the request that the post offices should stay open until 6 p.m., but I am sorry to have to say that we should not feel justified in meeting it. As I have already mentioned, stamp selling machines are available outside both the main post offices. To help firms with large postings who use postage meters, we have made special arrangements for their mail to be accepted at the postal sorting offices, in both Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly after the counters have closed. In addition, by arrangement with the Head Postmaster, these firms can also post a limited amount of meter franked mail in street posting boxes. The mail has to be enclosed in a special "late posting" cover. We are at present considering whether we can do any more to help our customers in this direction.
I hope that from what I have said hon. Members will be better able to
understand the problems which have faced us, and will realise that we have done what we can to keep to an absolute minimum any inconvenience to our customers. This was a reluctant step which was not taken lightly, but it was essential if we were to contain our costs and compete on anything like equal terms for staff.
The main post offices in Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly are remaining open for 44 hours a week, and I think that it is true to say that we are still giving a very good service. So far as hours of business are concerned, we still compare favourably with other organisations serving the public. We in the Post Office are anxious to give as good a service as possible, but we have to balance the reasonable needs of the public against costs. It has always been our


aim, in doing this, to strike a fair balance, and I think that we have been reasonably successful.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for giving me the opportunity to put the case in answer to the application which

he has made and for the reasonable manner in which he has presented it.

The debate having been concluded, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER suspended the Sitting till half-past Two o'clock, pursuant to Order.

Sitting resumed at 2.30 p.m.

PRIVATE BUSINESS

GLASGOW CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL

Considered; to be read the Third time Tomorrow.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Royal Air Force Aircraft (Ground Support)

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what aircraft of the Royal Air Force will be available for the close support of ground troops in the 1970s.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): A combination of Phantom and V/STOL P1127(R.A.F.) aircraft will be used initially in this rôle. A strike version of the Anglo-French Jaguar will be introduced subsequently to replace the Phantom. The primary rôle of the Phantom will then become air defence, in replacement of the Lightning.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Can the Secretary of State say how these aircraft will get to overseas theatres when they are needed?

Mr. Healey: Some of them will fly direct, without in-flight refuelling; others will have in-flight refuelling.

Defence Expenditure (Gross National Product)

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of the gross national product it would be necessary to spend to give Great Britain adequate forces to meet existing commitments.

Mr. Healey: At present 6·6 per cent., though I hope shortly to reduce it to about 6·5 per cent.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Can the Secretary of State say why and how he feels that he can pin the defence spending to an exact percentage like that,

regardless of the commitments with which he may be faced?

Mr. Healey: It has been the practice of every Government to make Defence Estimates just before a financial year, to give the best estimate that they can of the cost of the forces required to fulfil their commitments during the following year. This Government is no exception to the rule.

Mr. Goodhew: How can the right hon. Gentleman suggest a particular percentage when he does not know what will happen to the gross national product?

Mr. Healey: I take the best estimate that I can get from my colleagues in other Departments.

F.111 K Aircraft (Cost)

Mr. Goodhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the current estimate of the final cost of each F.111 K aircraft to be purchased for the Royal Air Force.

Mr. Healey: I have nothing at present to add to the Answer I gave to the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) on 18th January, 1967.—[Vol. 739, c. 59.]

Mr. Goodhew: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has been discussing this matter now for nearly 12 months and that it is somewhat suspicious to some of us on this side of the House that he has not been able to supply the information in time for the debate on this matter?

Mr. Healey: I am sorry about the suspicions of some hon. Gentlemen opposite. I shall give the House details of the cost at which we place the order for the following 40 aircraft.

Mr. Powell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we are all rather sorry for him today after his fiasco last night? Will he indicate firmly whether he will place this contract before the end of the month irrespective of whether a ceiling has been agreed, or will he only place it if a ceiling has been agreed?

Mr. Healey: Let me first say that my sorrow for the right hon. Gentleman is continuous, irrespective of the incidents of previous days. On the second part of his question, we shall not place a


contract until we have the ceiling price agreed.

Mr. Lubbock: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the whole of my party and a large number of hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House are opposed in principle to the ordering of the F.111 K, which we only see as having any use in theatres outside Europe? Is not this inconsistent with the declared aim of the Defence White Paper, that we shall never again have to undertake operations outside Europe on the scale of the Indonesian confrontation?

Mr. Healey: With respect, if that is the view of the hon. Gentleman he is mistaken. As I made clear in my speech last night, we shall need a replacement for the Canberras, the tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, whether we are east of Suez or not. This aircraft replaces the cancelled TSR2, designed by the previous Government primarily as an aircraft for use in the European theatre.

Mr. Dalyell: Does the Secretary of State take the view that every aircraft has the right to reincarnation, and should there be a follow-up to every aircraft, regardless of rôle?

Mr. Healey: No, of course not, but at the same time there are certain basic functions which any aircraft must be able to fulfil, and reconnaissance and strike are among them.

Anglo-French Variable Geometry Aircraft

Mr. Goodhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has now agreed with the Royal Air Force the requirements to be incorporated in the specification for the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft; and what representations he has received as to its acceptability to the German and Dutch air forces, both of which have expressed an interest in purchasing some of them.

Mr. Healey: Agreement has already been reached with the French on the operational requirement for this aircraft and we are in the process of completing the specification. We are, however, anxious to interest a number of other countries in the project, and will be giving them information about it soon and discussing the aircraft performance in relation to their future requirements.

Mr. Goodhew: Can the right hon. Gentleman help the House? In April, 1965 he said that it would take five Buccaneers to deliver the same load of bombs as one F.111 A. Can he tell us how many of these A.F.V.G. aircraft are likely to be required to deliver the same load of bombs?

Mr. Healey: Not without notice, but I would imagine about two.

Mr. Atkins: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the agreement to proceed with this aeroplane which is to be made with the French in April will depend on the number of export inquiries received?

Mr. Healey: No, not at all.

Mr. Rankin: Would the number of Buccaneers required to deliver the bombs not depend on the place where the bombs were to be delivered? Could my right hon. Friend guide us on that point?

Mr. Healey: The range-payload of aircraft is something which can be quantified, irrespective of the scenarios which one has in mind.

Mr. Marten: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if there will be a review of the Anglo-French variable geometry project in December, 1967 to decide whether or not to go ahead with it; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Healey: My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Technology, in an Answer yesterday, has already given the time-table for the development of this aircraft. It is normal practice to review development projects on completion of the project study but, subject to the satisfactory outcome of this study, we shall go ahead with the aircraft.

Mr. Marten: In a reply earlier this afternoon, the Minister said that the project did not depend upon exports. If we do not get the export orders, does it mean that the cost will rise? If the cost rises, and the French unhappily decide not to go on with it, have we a contingency plan to take its place, as the French have?

Mr. Healey: The costs of this aircraft agreed by the British and French Governments are not calculated on the basis that there will be export orders, but on the basis of the British and French orders


alone. On the second question, we have contingency plans for all circumstances.

Mr. Dalyell: Can the Minister say anything about the visit of General Steinholz and his German colleagues to negotiate about this?

Mr. Healey: I am not aware of any such visit. What I can say, and as I have indicated earlier this afternoon, is that a joint British and French team will be visiting Holland and Germany in the next few days to discuss the possible operational requirements of those countries to see if any adjustments can be made in the agreed specification in order to maximise the sales prospects.

Mr. David Howell: Would the Minister not agree that if the Germans are to produce this aircraft, it is absolutely essential that they should participate in the benefits of development as well?

Mr. Healey: That is not absolutely essential. That is, in any case, a matter for the German Government, if I may say so, and not for me. We would welcome participation by other countries in the development and possibly production of the project. But it is a very nice question of judgment at what stage in development the participation of third parties would be to the advantage of all. This is a matter on which the French Government and ourselves must keep a very close watch.

Mr. Hamling: asked the Secretary of State for Defence the present estimated cost to the British taxpayer of the joint Anglo-French project for a variable geometry aircraft.

Mr. Healey: It is too early yet for decisions to be taken on the number of aircraft to be ordered.

Mr. Hamling: Would my right hon. Friend tell the House the terms of the mathematical law of progression in relation to contracts of this type?

Mr. Healey: All I can assure my hon. Friend is that whatever the law was under the Conservative Administration, it will be very much more satisfactory to the taxpayer under the present Administration.

Mr. Kershaw: Would the right hon. Gentleman accept the figure given in

newspapers of £1½ million for each of these aircraft?

Mr. Healey: I would say that that is broadly the right order of cost, though it would not be right for me to give a specific estimate at this stage.

Frigate (Ghana)

Sir G. Nabarro: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what arrangements he has now made for acceptance of the frigate built on the Clyde for Ghana

The Minister of Defence (Equipment) (Mr. Roy Mason): None, Sir.

Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that this frigate was ordered by the then President Nkrumah as a status symbol for Ghana, like his bullet-proof car? As the frigate is being financed by British aid to Ghana, why should British taxpayers be called upon to finance what is virtually a floating gin palace?

Mr. Mason: The question that the hon. Gentleman poses is not at the moment in question. It will be another seven or eight months before the vessel is completed. Meanwhile we are trying to interest other countries in buying the frigate on behalf of the Ghana Government.

Sir G. Nabarro: I thought that it was a gin palace.

Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve

Sir G. Nabarro: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the strength and cost of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve, operational from 1st April, 1967, for the year 1967–68.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army (Mr. James Boyden): The gross cost of an estimated strength of about 72,000 is about £18½ million, excluding the cost of the Regular Army permanent staff.

Sir G. Nabarro: Has the Minister observed that the Treasury has now ruled that Selective Employment Tax is to be paid by these men on the Volunteer Reserve while they are serving with the Colours? Is this not a monstrous imposition on the patriotism of volunteers? Is the Secretary of State for Defence incapable of standing up to the Treasury


these days, as was manifested by the demonstration last evening?

Mr. Boyden: As to the first part of the question, I have. As to the second part, it does not affect the actual costing of the situation.

Helicopters (Search and Rescue)

Mr. Monro: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many helicopters, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, respectively, fully equipped for search and rescue are stationed in Scotland and ready for immediate use.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Merlyn Rees): During daylight there is a Royal Naval helicopter standing by at Lossiemouth and an R.A.F. one at Leuchars.
There are other helicopters at these two airfields at lesser degrees of readiness; there are logistic arrangements to enable helicopters to operate in emergencies in the North West of Scotland, the Hebrides and Orkney; and helicopters based outside Scotland, for instance at Acklington and Ballykelly, are available for operations in Scottish waters.

Mr. Monro: Is the Minister aware that the people of Scotland greatly appreciate the work of these aircrews at times of distress? Would he confirm that to have only one helicopter ready for action in Scotland is quite insufficient for the possibilities of rescue?

Mr. Rees: No, Sir. I would not agree. We are quite satisfied that the helicopters we have deployed are sufficient. In the very north of Scotland we are providing further logistic arrangements. The hon. Member must not forget that the Shackleton also plays a part in this.

Mr. Hamling: Is my hon. Friend saying that the cost of these helicopters which are for rescue operations is borne by the Defence Vote?

Mr. Rees: They are borne by the Defence Vote, but very gladly the R.A.F. does this on civil occasions at no cost.

Polaris Submarines

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what delays have taken place in the completion of each of the four Polaris submarines; what is the estimated revised date of completion of trials; and what modifications are being made to their armament.

Sir Knox Cunningham: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the rate of construction of Polaris; and what delay there has been in the timetable.

Mr. Will Griffiths: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he is satisfied with the progress being made with the construction of a Polaris submarine at the Birkenhead yards of Cammell Laird; and whether the date scheduled for the submarine to be operational will be adhered to.

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made in the construction of the Polaris submarine fleet for the Royal Navy.

Mr. Mason: On the building programme, I have nothing to add to my replies to the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Goodhew) on Monday, 13th February, and the hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galbraith) on Wednesday, 15th February. The only major item we plan to add to the armament is an extra navigation equipment. [Vol. 741, c. 35; Vol. 741, c. 113.]

Mr. Wall: Is the Minister satisfied that there is now no longer any trouble over the hull welding, and can he confirm that the A3 missiles will be fitted with antiballistic missile counter measures or decoy devices?

Mr. Mason: The answer to the first part of the supplementary question posed by the hon. Gentleman is "Yes". On the second part, this is a matter of deployment, and I would require notice of the question. The original Question was to do with constructional matters and the operational date.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Does this mean that Her Majesty's Government's policy is to maintain and increase the British nuclear deterrent? If that be the case, is the hon. Gentleman aware that they


will have the support of the vast majority of this House regardless of the stabs in the back from his hon. Friends?

Mr. Mason: The hon. and learned Gentleman is going beyond the terms of the Question, which concerns construction and operational dates, not policy and deployment.

Mr. Blaker: As our allies regard the proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force as having been abandoned, whatever the Government may pretend, is it still the Government's policy to internationalise these submarines and, if so, how?

Mr. Mason: As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said on Monday, when the four Polaris submarines become operational towards the end of 1969 they will displace the V-bombers and, therefore, will be part of the Western European strategic deterrent.

Mr. Brooks: Referring to Question No. 26, is my hon. Friend aware that, following certain Ministerial criticism voiced at Cammell Laird's shipyards, the managing director of that company, in a Press statement made on 31st January, stated that the "Renown" contract had turned out to be twice as big as was first expected? Would he say, therefore, why I was informed in a Written Answer last Friday that no major additional work had been necessary?

Mr. Mason: No major work has been necessary. I must inform my hon. Friend and the House, and those responsible for defence contracts outside, that if in future they are undertaking major contract work for Her Majesty's Government or military contracts there will be the most stringent scrutiny, even more than there has been hitherto, and that they should estimate at the outset the size of their contract and be able to carry out the date of delivery which they promised.

Mr. Wall: Did the hon. Gentleman read the Question? What modifications have been carried out to their armament? The difference between the A3 missile and Poseidon is that the latter is fitted with these devices. Can they, and will they, be fitted to the A3 missile?

Mr. Mason: I said in my Answer that navigation equipment was the only additional feature. The question of further development of the atomic warheads

is under continuous review and we have full co-operation with our American allies.

Mr. Heffer: Is my hon. Friend aware that his one-day visit to Cammell Laird's shipyard, which was followed by a severe criticism not only of the management but of the workers, was deeply resented by the workers in the Cammell Laird shipyard and that it was not in any way helpful as far as the workers were concerned?

Mr. Mason: I am sorry that my hon. Friend feels like that, but I must emphasise that if we are embarking on on a programme whereby Her Majesty's Government, as the customer, are purchasing from British shipyards complex weapons systems which may be costing £50 million each, we expect them to deliver them on time. Therefore, I felt that I was right to talk to the management more harshly than I did to the men. They are responsible for the project. They are responsible for having a project manager on the job and for seeing that it is delivered on time. I thought that my remarks were necessary at that time.

Mr. Powell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what weapon system he envisages will succeed Polaris as the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Healey: I have nothing to add to the replies which I gave to the hon. Member for Merton and Morden (Mr. Atkins) on 22nd June, 1966, and to the hon. Member for St. Albans (Mr. Good-hew) on 13th February, 1967.—[Vol. 730, c. 554. Vol. 741, c. 35.]

Mr. Powell: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it clear that he has not closed his mind to further development of the British warhead to the Polaris missile in order to improve its penetrating possibilities?

Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Does the Minister agree that by the time these Polaris submarines are supposed to come into action they will be obsolete, since the Russians can now bring them down? Does this not mean that £350 million of the nation's money will be wasted?

Mr. Healey: I have the greatest respect for my hon. Friend's opinions on defence


matters, but I regret to say that his information in this regard is inaccurate.

Sir T. Beamish: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise the Polaris weapon system as independent, British, and a deterrent?

Mr. Healey: We have discussed this many times. What I can say is that we regard our Polaris system as a valuable contribution to the collective deterrent forces of the West.

Mr. Brooks: Since it was the express policy of the Macmillan Government to develop Polaris as a contribution to Western deterrence, would my right hon. Friend explain in what way that policy differs from the policy now being pursued by the present Government?

Mr. Healey: Probably the most important distinction is that the previous Administration maintained that the possession of nuclear weapons in itself would guarantee this country a position at the top table on all issues, a claim that we have always rejected. The second big difference is that the previous Administration seemed to imagine that circumstances would or might arise in which it would make sense for this country alone to use these weapons.

Mr. Powell: Have the present Government given up the right, which this nation reserved for itself under the Nassau Agreement, of independent use of these weapons?

Mr. Healey: The right exists, although we cannot conceive of any situation in which we would need to exercise it.

Type 82 Destroyers

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether it has now been decided to complete all four Type 82 destroyers; when the first ship of this class will be completed; and what is her estimated cost.

Mr. Mason: The further programme of Type 82 destroyers has not yet been settled. The first ship will be completed in 1971; it is too early yet to forecast the cost.

Mr. Wall: If the carrier is to be phased out, surely these vessels will have no positive rôle? Would the hon. Gentleman confirm that Sea Dart, which they were

built to accommodate, has not yet been ordered by any foreign country?

Mr. Mason: The hon. Gentleman is quite right: Sea Dart has not yet been ordered by any foreign country, although we hope that at the price which we hope to achieve from the contractors concerned, it will have great export potential. The Type 82 destroyer will be a testing bed for that type of missile.

Mr. Powell: How could the Government in the Defence White Paper a year ago talk about "shortly ordering the first of a new, more powerful class of guided missile ship" when they have not decided whether there are to be any more after the first?

Mr. Mason: As the right hon. Gentleman will have noticed from Chapter 1 of the Defence White Paper, this is under review, and the size and shape of the future fleet has not yet been decided.

British Forces (Aden)

Mr. Marten: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give the date by which British forces will be withdrawn from Aden.

Mr. Powell: asked the Secretary of State for Defence on what date in 1968 he now anticipates the evacuation of Aden and Southern Arabia will be complete.

Mr. Kershaw: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will now give a firm date for the British withdrawal from Aden.

Mr. Colin Jackson: asked the Secretary of State for Defence on what date the last British Service man is due to leave the Aden base.

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects that all British troops will have left South Arabia and Aden.

Mr. Stratton Mills: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give the date by which British forces will be withdrawn from Aden and the South Arabian Federation.

Mr. Dickens: asked the Secretary of State for Defence by what date he expects to complete the evacuation of Aden and Southern Arabia.

Mr. Healey: The withdrawal of our forces in Aden will be completed in 1968, by when South Arabia will have achieved independence; the precise date for the latter has still to be negotiated.

Mr. Marten: In view of the Foreign Secretary's remark yesterday that Britain cannot let others exploit the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of British forces, does not the Aden policy mean that the Government's defence and foreign policy are at variance? Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman recall the statement by the Foreign Secretary that the United Nations and the Arab League would not regard Aden as independent if we had a defence agreement? Would they regard it as independent if Nasser occupied Aden?

Mr. Healey: The answer to the first question is "No, Sir". The second question is not for me.

Mr. Powell: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that "we cannot just clear out of Aden automatically and leave the situation in the kind of mess which could arise"? If he agrees with that, how can he possibly now give a firm date regardless of the circumstances?

Mr. Healey: I have not given a firm date for withdrawal from Aden. What I have said is that we plan to withdraw in 1968, and we are still negotiating about the precise date of independence which will precede our withdrawal.

Mr. Kershaw: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall writing in the 1965 White Paper that it was politically irresponsible and economically wasteful to withdraw from bases while they were still able to promote peace? Is he entirely satisfied with the situation in Aden today?

Mr. Healey: I do not think that any of us is entirely satisfied with the situation in Aden today, but it is clear that one of the basic conditions which the Government have set for the maintenance of a base on foreign territory is not met in Aden, namely, to have the full support of the local population.

Mr. Colin Jackson: What would be the attitude of the Ministry of Defence if it were suggested on the withdrawal of the British troops that a United

Nations presence might be established there?

Mr. Healey: Speaking for myself, I would be absolutely delighted.

Mr. Blaker: On whom is South Arabia to rely for its defence after we have withdrawn, bearing in mind that the Secretary of State said about a year ago that the United Nations is not capable of taking over our peace-keeping rôle in Asia?

Mr. Healey: I did not say that it was not capable of undertaking any rôle. It is performing some very valuable rôles in the Middle East.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, with the acts of terrorism having doubled since this announcement was made in February last year, our officers and men in Aden feel absolutely let down by Her Majesty's Government? Does he realise that there would be no loss of face if the Government looked at this again, particularly the question of a defence agreement?

Mr. Healey: I cannot agree that the officers and men in Aden feel let down. On the contrary, every Member of Parliament I have talked to who has been there recently has found, as I found when I was there, that morale was never higher.

Mr. Heffer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a recognition on this side of the House that the objections of the Opposition to this policy indicate that the Tories would increase defence expenditure and that on this matter the Government have the fullest support of everyone on these benches?

Mr. Healey: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his support. I hope that it will be expressed in practice on future occasions.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does the right hon. Gentleman's reply mean that we shall leave Aden next year regardless of circumstances, and even though it means leaving to their fate the many people in Aden who have worked with us and served us?

Mr. Healey: The statement means precisely what it says.

Mr. Sandys: Does the right hon. Gentleman still maintain that no pledge


was given to retain some British forces at Aden for the continued protection of the Federation after independence?

Mr. Healey: Yes. This was dealt with at great length by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, and that is what I maintain.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: Would the right hon. Gentleman consider seriously reversing the procedure he now proposes and giving Aden independence before the British troops withdraw? I believe that this would make a great difference to the situation. I am sure that the Federal Ministers now discussing this matter with the Government would give support to this idea.

Mr. Healey: With respect to the right hon. Gentleman, this is precisely what I said we should do, namely, withdraw our troops after Aden had received independence.

Sir T. Beamish: When the right hon. Gentleman says that he would be delighted to see a United Nations presence in the Federation, is he saying that he recognises that there is a serious threat to the Federation from Egypt?

Mr. Healey: I am recognising that this is an area of instability where I believe the United Nations could properly play a rôle.

Defence Budget

Mr. Evelyn King: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proposals he has for the defence budget in the light of Government policy in Rhodesia and Southern Africa.

Mr. Healey: My proposals for the defence budget are made in the light of Government policy world wide. In short, they are to achieve efficiency and economy whilst continuing to meet our defence obligations.

Mr. King: Would the Minister reveal to the House the full and accurate cost of maintaining aircraft carriers and other military and air force expenditure opposite Beira during the past year? Would he give an undertaking that no provision has been made for any future military adventures in that area?

Mr. Healey: On the first question, all I can say is that the additional costs

arising specifically from the Beira patrol are estimated at about £100,000 a year.

Dockyard Workers (Pay)

Mr. Judd: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what priority is being given to pay increases for low-paid Government workers in Her Majesty's Dockyards and other Admiralty establishments.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. Maurice Foley): The new wages structure for Government workers will cover all grades and operate from the same date.

Mr. Judd: Would my hon. Friend agree that the pay of many workers in Admiralty establishments has fallen far below that of others in outside industry, and that it must be looked at urgently if the labour force is to be retained?

Mr. Foley: Yes.

Dame Joan Vickers: When the hon. Gentleman says "all grades", will he tell us if this includes the victualling yards and the armament depôts as well?

Mr. Foley: It means all industrial grades.

Mr. Judd: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what further progress has been made on the implementation of proposals for a new pay structure in Her Majesty's Dockyards; and when the next general increase in pay can be expected.

Mr. Foley: Discussions on a new wages structure are proceeding with the trade unions with the aim of making it effective next July.

Mr. Judd: Would my hon. Friend agree that there has been far too much reliance in the past on ineffective so-called incentive schemes such as job price contract schemes, and that we must have an adequate and suitable basic pay structure for the future well-being of the dockyards?

Mr. Foley: The National Board for Prices and Incomes has recognised that the industrial workers in the dockyards were out of line with the current rates outside. The question of an incentive scheme is something different.

Mr. Hamling: Would the hon. Gentleman tell the House what proportion of the Defence Estimates is taken up by wages and salaries, and what offers of


support he has had from his right hon. and hon. Friends for increases in the Defence Estimates to take account of increased wages?

Mr. Foley: With respect, I will deal with this matter later on under the Naval Estimates.

United States Offset Purchases

Mr. Cronin: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will give figures indicating to what extent British orders for aircraft and missiles in the United States of America made since October, 1964, have been offset by orders of British equipment by the United States Department of Defence.

Mr. Healey: I have included a statement of the contracts we have won so far in Chapter VII of the Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1967 (Cmnd. 3203).

Mr. Cronin: Has not the time come to renegotiate these offset purchase agreements so as to ensure that British exporters either have a fairer deal or, alternatively, there is a cut in defence expenditure in the United States by the British Government?

Mr. Healey: With respect, I would have thought that we had done very well. In 12 months we have already covered 40 per cent. of the target for direct sales in order to offset costs which we have to pay over a period of 12 years.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Can the right hon. Gentleman say, apart from the very welcome order placed with Rolls Royce from the United States, what is the value of other orders? Is he aware that the cost of submitting tenders to the United States is very high indeed for many British firms, which are not being successful?

Mr. Healey: I am very well aware of these difficulties, but British firms at the present time, alone in the world, other than some Canadian firms, are now free to tender for American contracts without any artificial discrimination in terms of tariff and surcharge. I believe that British firms could make very good use of this opportunity if they attempted to do so. I hope the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that they should not make that attempt.

Attachés (Selection)

Mr. Cronin: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what consideration is given to their capacity for promoting British exports when naval, military, air and defence attachés are selected; and what instruction is given to them with regard to increasing British exports when they are appointed.

Mr. Healey: Defence and Service Attachés are selected on their all-round suitability for such posts. Their capacity for promoting British defence exports is a major consideration. Attachés are given appropriate briefing, both oral and written, and also visit manufacturers before taking up their appointments.

Mr. Cronin: While I appreciate that there has been a very big improvement in the situation since the appointment of Head of Defence Sales, nevertheless is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are still some Service attachés who appear to be unaware of their potential contribution to British exports? Will he see that they receive suitable guidance?

Mr. Healey: I am not aware of any such attachés, but if my hon. Friend has details of any, I will look into the matter.

Sir G. Nabarro: Is the Minister aware that the statement which he has just made in referring to the Defence Estimates for 1967—[Interruption.]—showing our purchases from the United States of America is utterly obscure—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The question concerns attachés.

Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not the responsibility of attachés in the United States of America to deal with these matters, Mr. Speaker? Cannot we have the statement of traffic both ways, our purchases overseas and our sales overseas, set out as a balance sheet in a form which is comprehensible to this House instead of the obscurity—

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a Question about attachés.

Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not the fact that half way through my supplementary question, when I was being interrupted from the benches opposite, I referred to attachés


and their duties in the United States of America? Is that not directly related to the Question?

Mr. Speaker: The mere mention of the word "attachés" did not bring the hon. Member's question into order.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Whilst one can understand there being some reluctance to accept the length of that supplementary—

Sir G. Nabarro: What about the length of the Minister's?

Sir Harmar Nicholls: —is not my hon. Friend entitled to a reply from the Minister?

Mr. Speaker: I have ruled on this. The hon. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) accepted my Ruling and the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) should do the same.

Barrack Accommodation

Mr. Onslow: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he is satisfied with the standards of barrack accommodation being taken back into use for units withdrawn to the United Kingdom from stations overseas; and whether he will make a statement.

The Minister of Defence (Administration) (Mr. G. W. Reynolds): Yes, Sir. Accommodation will be available in camps and barracks which have been held in reserve against emergencies. These are being renovated for occupation until new or modernised barracks are ready.

Mr. Onslow: Can the Minister give the House a positive assurance that none of the accommodation to be taken back into use is of a lower standard in living, messing and sanitation respects than barracks which have been demolished in the last two years?

Mr. Reynolds: I think that I can give such an assurance. Barracks which have been demolished over the last two years include, however, a wide number, some of which have been demolished to make way for the permanent building programme of brand new barracks which we must provide as soon as we can for units and homes for those coming back.

Mr. Ramsden: Is the Ministry contemplating reactivating Fort George, as reported in the Press? This fort was regarded as no longer suitable for troops some years ago.

Mr. Reynolds: I can only say that the right hon. Gentleman does not seem to be aware of the amount of money spent on rehabilitating Fort George when he was Minister of Defence for the Army. It is in very good condition. I visited it about eight months ago.

Transit of Firearms (Theft)

Mr. Onslow: asked the Secretary of State for Defence under what circumstances firearms are consigned to military establishments in the United Kingdom by rail and without guard; and in how many instances in 1966 such consignments were lost or stolen in transit.

Mr. Reynolds: Firearms are normally consigned to establishments in the United Kingdom in sealed goods wagons, although small consignments are sent by passenger train. There was one instance of theft in 1966; the article stolen was recovered by the police. I am looking further into this matter.

Mr. Onslow: Is the Minister aware that the incident in question was probably that of an Army F.N. machine gun stolen from a railway delivery lorry by three boys in my constituency? Does he regard this situation as satisfactory? Will he promise that he will do something about it?

Mr. Reynolds: That is the incident to which I am referring, in Woking. As I said at the end of my Answer, I am looking further into this matter.

Mr. Powell: Apart from the individual case, is the Minister reconsidering the wisdom of sending certain types of armament, as at present, by passenger train?

Mr. Reynolds: I will say for the third time that I am looking into this matter.

Military Medal

Mr. Farr: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if, in view of the fact that holders of the Military Medal gained in the Second World War are entitled to a gratuity of £20 or an addition of sixpence a day to their pension, he will make


a similar award to those who are still alive who won this medal in the First World War.

Mr. Boyden: I refer the hon. Member to the reply given to the hon. Member for Bothwell (Mr. James Hamilton) on this matter on 13th February, 1967.—[Vol. 741, c. 36.]

Mr. Farr: As that was a thoroughly unsatisfactory reply, will the hon. Gentleman agree with me that it is disgraceful that a Government who are prepared to spend another £600 million in the public sector next year will do absolutely nothing for this handful of old veterans, to compensate whom would cost only a relatively very small amount? Cannot he look into the matter again?

Mr. Boyden: The objections are financial and administrative. I refer the hon. Member to the reply given on 3rd June, 1960, by his right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser).

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: Will my hon. Friend deal with this matter with generosity? Will he bear in mind that the Conservative Government failed to grant anything to these men who have served in the Forces, and will he please deal with them generously?

Mr. Boyden: It is not a matter really of generosity. The expense, effort and thorough investigation in tracing former Military Medal holders would be out of all proportion to the benefits that people who were in poverty would get under the social security arrangements.

Mr. Ogden: If it is a question of expense and effort in tracing these people, will my hon. Friend give the grant to those who apply for it?

Mr. Boyden: We cannot differentiate between one person and another.

European Economic Community

Mr. Roebuck: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what are his contingency plans for reintroducing conscription in the event of the United Kingdom joining the European Economic Community.

Mr. Reynolds: None, Sir.

Mr. Roebuck: Unaccustomed as I am to abstaining, may I ask whether my hon. Friend is aware that his Answer renders me almost speechless? Has he given no consideration to the fact that each of the Common Market countries has conscription? Does he not regard it as a possibility that, if we enter the European Economic Community, pressure would be brought upon us to do likewise?

Mr. Reynolds: No, Sir.

Mr. Shinwell: May I ask my hon. Friend whether, in the probings that are taking place in connection with our suggested entry into E.E.C., there is no question of defence arising? Are we to understand that in these discussions and, possibly, in negotiations, we shall discuss economic, agriculture and other matters but no question of defence?

Mr. Reynolds: It was my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) himself who started this hare running on 17th November last when he was fully answered by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at columns 659, 770 and 771, to which I have nothing to add.

Mr. Shinwell: There are some hounds as well as hares.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Is the Minister aware that Labour Governments are well experienced in introducing conscription?

British Forces (Malaysia and Singapore)

Mr. Luard: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what will be the total number of British forces, and their cost in sterling and foreign exchange in Malaysia and Singapore at the end of 1967 and the end of 1968, respectively.

Mr. Healey: I would refer my hon. Friend to the information in the Statement on the Defence Estimates.

Mr. Luard: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is great disappointment that the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Malaysia over the past year has resulted in such a small saving in foreign exchange? Can he say whether the withdrawal which he contemplates during the next year, together with the examination of the question of locally-engaged


staff at the base, will result in a greater saving in foreign exchange?

Mr. Healey: As my hon. Friend will know, in the later stages of the Defence Review and since its end I have twice discussed our further plans concerning that part of the world with the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore. I will soon be consulting them about reductions in our base facilities following the cuts which we have already announced in our combat forces. As I said on Monday, I hope that over the next financial year further cuts in the Far East as a whole will amount to between 5,000 and 10,000 men. This will bring a substantial saving both in the defence budget and even more in foreign exchange costs, although all these reductions will not, of course, be made simply in base facilities in Malaysia and Singapore.

Mr. Humphrey Atkins: Reverting to the Minister's statement in Monday's debate, can he say when he will be in a position to give the House more information about reductions in base facilities in Singapore?

Mr. Healey: As soon as possible.

Mr. Dickens: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the only significant cut which he can make in defence spending east of Suez is to leave the base in Singapore altogether over the next four years and to start now to renegotiate the Anglo-Malaysian treaty of 1963? Cuts in the base facilities of themselves make no significant impact.

Mr. Healey: My hon. Friend will find out that he is wrong about that.

Mr. Lubbock: Can the Minister explain how, in a year when we are making these reductions in the number of our troops overseas and in Singapore in particular, the cost of air mobility of the Forces is stated in the Defence White Paper as being increased from £135 million to £140 million?

Mr. Healey: The hon. Member should realise that if we are moving a lot of people whom we were not moving last year, the cost of moving them will go up.

H.M.S. "Tiger"

Mr. Pardoe: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why 20 officers of H.M.S. "Tiger" were put ashore at

Gibraltar before Mr. Smith came aboard; and what were their countries of origin.

Mr. Foley: To make room for the three delegations of the Prime Minister, the Governor of Rhodesia and Mr. Smith. The 20 officers who were disembarked included all 12 midshipmen then serving in H.M.S. "Tiger", two of whom were Ghanaian. All the other officers were British.

Mr. Pardoe: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that reply, may I ask whether he can now deny that in fact Ghanaian and Nigerian midshipmen were put ashore for the reason which is implied in his answer, that they were coloured?

Mr. Foley: I can certainly deny it. There were 12 midshipmen serving on board this ship. They were all put ashore because a classroom which they used was required as a temporary wardroom. It just so happened that two of them were Ghanaian. [HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."]

Mr. Pardoe: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I asked the hon. Gentleman to deny it, he has denied it, and I accept his denial.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Does the hon. Gentleman recall that, during the 1964 General Election campaign, in his now infamous speech at Plymouth the Prime Minister criticised the previous Administration for having allowed H.M.S. "Tiger" to become nothing more than a floating office? Did it not have its uses for him?

Mr. Foley: It was a very good floating office. It is a pity that the conclusions were not better.

British Army of the Rhine

Mr. Kershaw: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he is satisfied that the number of troops at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, is enough to enable that officer to discharge satisfactorily the tasks given to him; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Healey: There are aspects of the N.A.T.O. Commanders' missions, originally defined many years ago, which they have never been in a position to carry out with the forces available to them.


That is one reason why N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers decided last July to prepare a new strategy—and thence new missions—more appropriate to the forces which Governments were prepared to make available. Her Majesty's Government believe that the forces at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief B.A.O.R. are fully adequate for the real needs of the Alliance.

Mr. Kershaw: Did the right hon. Gentleman happen to see the television programme called "24 Hours", in which the Commander-in-Chief spoke? If he did, does he agree with what the Commander-in-Chief said?

Mr. Healey: On this particular matter, I think that the Commander-in-Chief, who perhaps allowed himself more precision than would be wise for a military commander on a matter of this nature, was talking in the same terms as I have myself many times in this House.

Mr. Dobson: Would not the Minister agree that there are too many troops in B.A.O.R. at present, and that he should start negotiations to begin the withdrawal of some of them if he cannot get the offset agreement?

Mr. Healey: There is a good deal in what my hon. Friend says, as I hope I made clear in my speech on Monday.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the cost across the exchanges of the British Army of the Rhine in the financial year 1967–68.

Mr. Healey: As stated in Annex H, page 97, of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967 (Cmnd. 3203), no estimate of net foreign exchange expenditure on the forces in Germany can be given pending the outcome of discussions with the United States Government and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Are preparations now being made for rehousing up to 20,000 or 30,000 troops and their families from Germany? If not, does not the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement last weekend about balancing the exchange costs amount, as he said, to an idle bluff?

Mr. Healey: It has been made clear by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minis-

ter, and by myself speaking on Monday, that preparations are being made for the scale of withdrawals which might be necessary if our needs are not met.

Mr. Powell: If the right hon. Gentleman cannot answer my hon. Friend's Question—[HON. MEMBERS: "He did."] he said that he did not know; that was his Answer—how can the Prime Minister assert that the savings undertaken in July, 1966, will be obtained in 1967–68?

Mr. Healey: We have made clear in Annex H of the White Paper that, excluding the possible effect of offset payments by Germany, or, alternatively, of reductions in British forces in Germany, we shall achieve a rate of saving of £75 million a year by the end of the next financial year.

Mr. Powell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is not the saving which the Prime Minister foreshadowed in July, 1966?

Mr. Healey: Not at all. The Prime Minister was talking about the total foreign exchange saving in Government overseas expenditure of £100 million. I am referring to the defence component.

High Ercall Airfield (Sale of Land)

Mr. Fowler: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why the sale of land at High Ercall, Shropshire, Airfield was advertised in the local Press before negotiations had begun with certain former owners for the repurchase of their holdings.

Mr. Reynolds: The part of the land which was advertised is being sold by public auction, and the results will be helpful in assessing the current market value for the remainder of the land at High Ercall, which is being disposed of by private treaty sale to former owners.

Mr. Fowler: Is my hon. Friend aware that the adoption of this procedure has caused great worry to many local farmers about whether the Ministry will honour the pledge to resell this land? Can he give an assurance that the price will not be artificially inflated in consequence of the adoption of this procedure?

Mr. Reynolds: The landowners are aware of what is happening, and negotiations will start with them after the


auction has taken place. The auction will give us the true value of the land, which will be one of the items to be considered in deciding the price at which to sell it back.

Mr. More: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of other disgraceful cases such as the notorious case of Ditton Priors in my constituency? His Lands Branch is grossly dilatory and inefficient. Will he order an immediate public inquiry into all the cases in which it has been involved in Shropshire during the last four years?

Mr. Reynolds: I am aware of the case and the grossly exaggerated remarks which the hon. Gentleman has made about it.

British Forces (Persian Gulf)

Mr. Colin Jackson: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what is the purpose of the planned increase in British forces in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Healey: To fulfil our remaining obligations in the Middle East when we leave Aden.

Mr. Jackson: Does the Minister agree that, with regard to the responsibility towards Kuwait, a solution might be better found along the lines of the Arab League and the United Nations? Secondly, is he aware that there is considerable objection to the increase of British forces in the Persian Gulf by many Arab nations?

Mr. Healey: The nations in the Gulf seem very satisfied and happy that we are making this small increase in our forces there.

Mr. G. Campbell: Will the Government inform the United Nations of any plans about this, since a large majority at the United Nations passed a resolution calling upon Britain to withdraw her forces from Oman, and the Government have, rightly in my opinion, said that that resolution was not consonant with the principles of the Charter?

Mr. Healey: That is a question for my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: While these forces in the Persian Gulf would be welcome and of great assistance in stabilising the situation there, does not the Minister consider that they will be

in a very isolated position without Aden behind them?

Mr. Healey: Not at all. As the hon. and gallant Gentleman will recognise, it is a very long way from Aden to Bahrain.

Defence Equipment (Export Policy)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Secretary of State for Defence, in view of the fact that the export of all types of hovercraft and components is now subject to licensing control and that any applications for an export licence will be considered in the light of Her Majesty's Government's policy on the export of defence equipment, if he will now state that export policy as regards defence equipment in general and hovercraft in particular.

Mr. Healey: The policy continues to be as stated by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten) on 13th July, 1965, and applies equally to hovercraft as to other items of defence equipment. [Vol. 716, c. 276–7.]

Mr. Allaun: Does the Minister admit that three British hovercraft with U.S. armour added have been used in Vietnam? Is this not a breach of the Prime Minister's promise that Britain would not send, directly or indirectly, British weapons for use in Vietnam?

Mr. Healey: As I told my hon. Friend on 2nd February, 1967, the hulls of certain hovercraft which were not specifically designed for military use were supplied to Bell Aero Systems under a licensing agreement for which Government approval was not required and before licensing control was introduced.

Mr. Marten: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether they are with the Americans or Commonwealth forces in Vietnam?

Mr. Healey: All I know is that they are not with British forces and, therefore, not my responsibility.

Mechanic Examiners (West Midlands)

Mr. Christopher Price: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many mechanic examiners are employed by his Department in the West Midlands region; how this figure compares with


the full establishment; and how many have been recruited this year.

Mr. Boyden: Ninety six mechanic examiners are employed by the Ministry in the Birmingham and Coventry areas; there are 12 vacancies. One has been recruited there since 1st January, 1967.

Mr. Price: Is my hon. Friend aware how badly the wages and conditions of these Ministry of Defence mechanic examiners compare with those of their colleagues in private industry? How many of them, because of the shortage which has been described, are having to live away from home compulsorily on a ridiculously small living-away allowance? Will he look at the allowances, in view of the very serious shortage, which is getting worse?

Mr. Boyden: Yes, Sir, and I am in process of writing to my hon. Friend about this matter.

Civilian Employees (Malaysia and Singapore Nationals)

Mr. Mayhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many nationals of Malaysia and Singapore are employed by his Department.

Mr. Healey: I would refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 10 of Chapter III of Part I of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966.

Mr. Mayhew: What studies has my right hon. Friend undertaken with the Singapore Government of the economic consequences of withdrawal from Singapore, or is he assuming that there is no chance of withdrawal within the next four or five years?

Mr. Healey: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I think that I answered the wrong Question. I am sorry to say that my hon. Friend did not notice it.

Mr. Reynolds: The Answer—

Sir Harmar Nicholls: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Sir Harmar Nicholls.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: Mr. Speaker, in order to protect hon. Members, ought not Ministers, in giving replies, to answer the Questions instead of talking in the sort of shorthand which the Minister

adopted, which made it impossible for other hon. Members to recognise whether or not he was answering the right Question?

Mr. Speaker: We have enough confusion in the fact that the Minister answered the wrong Question. Will the right Minister now answer the right Question?

Mr. Reynolds: The Answer to Question No. 44 is that about 37,000 non-European personnel are locally employed in Malaysia and Singapore. I am unable to say how many are nationals of these countries.

Mr. Mayhew: Now that my hon. Friend has had time to consider my supplementary question, will he answer it? What studies are the Government making about the economic consequences of withdrawal from Singapore, or are they assuming that there is no chance of withdrawal within the next four or five years?

Mr. Reynolds: The Government as a whole and the Departments concerned are aware of the economic difficulties of many places where British military personnel are situated at present. We are aware of those difficulties, and, as was stated in the defence debate yesterday, we are looking at the base installations in Singapore. Not until we know what we may require in the future can we be certain how it will affect the area.

Mr. Shinwell: Since my right hon. Friend has given a number of 9,000 Malaysian and Singapore people, may I ask whether he is aware that 36,000 German civilians are assisting our troops in Germany?

Mr. Reynolds: I am sorry, but I did not mention 9,000. I said that there were about 37,000 non-European people employed in Malaysia and Singapore.

Fll1 Aircraft (Purchase)

Mr. Mayhew: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many F111 aircraft Her Majesty's Government propose to purchase.

Mr. Healey: I would refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 10 of Chapter III of Part I of the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966.

Mr. Mayhew: Would it be necessary to purchase as many as 50 F111Ks and 100 A.F.V.G.'s were it not for the Government's insistence on remaining east of Suez in the 1970s?

Mr. Healey: I cannot conceive of fewer than 50 F111Ks as being a replacement for the Canberras when they are phased out in a few years' time. Since my right hon. Friend supports a British presence in Australia for the defence of Australia, he must admit that, just as the Australian Government believe that the F111K is essential for its defence, so the British Government, in a similar situation, would be likely to take the same view.

Mr. Hastings: Apart from the tactical use of the aircraft and its requirement in future, can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House anything about maintenance hours? For instance, how many hours maintenance are likely to be required per flying hour compared with other aircraft in R.A.F. service? I know that this is a difficult question to answer on the spur of the moment, but can the right hon. Gentleman tell us anything, as rumour has it that this will be an extraordinarily high commitment?

Mr. Healey: That is a totally different question, which was, I believe, answered yesterday. Certainly, the hon. Gentleman can raise it in the debate on the R.A.F. Estimates next week. But the maintenance costs of the F111K will be very much lower than those estimated for the TSR2.

Mr. Edelman: Is it not the case that the efficiency of this aircraft is at present under investigation by a United States Senate Committee? In those circumstances, will my right hon. Friend delay taking up his option for 40 more until the Committee has reported?

Mr. Healey: A party from the R.A.F. and the Ministry of Aviation which went to the factory recently and to Washington to investigate some rumours which had been passed came back satisfied that the aircraft was likely to meet all the requirement needs of the R.A.F.

Mr. Kershaw: Is it, then, at the request of the Australian Government that we have bought this aircraft? How many does the right hon. Gentleman think will be operational in about 1974?

Mr. Healey: It is not at the request of the Australian Government that we have bought this aircraft. I was pointing out to my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) that if he wants us—as he says he does—to have a presence in Australia to take part in its defence, we should be likely to require these aircraft. The Government require them for a wide range of purposes, which I described in detail in my winding-up speech last night.

Mr. Michael Foot: Would it be one of the requirements of these aircraft that they shall carry nuclear weapons, and, if so, where?

Mr. Healey: The rôle of this type of aircraft is as a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, carrying conventional weapons.

Mr. Peyton: I had almost abandoned hope, Mr. Speaker. When are we likely to have to pay the bill for these aircraft and by how much will the bill have increased?

Mr. Healey: We have started paying a very small amount of the bill. The bill, as the House has been told many times, is spread over 12 years. The total cost of the three aircraft from the United States and the P1127 over 10 years, compared with the total cost of the previous Government's programme, is £1,200 million less.

Mr. Paget: Would my right hon. Friend tell us what one will find on page so-and-so, paragraph so-and-so of Command Paper so-and-so? In other words, how many of these are we going to buy?

Mr. Healey: My hon. and learned Friend, who I thought was a serious student of these matters, will know that we propose to buy 50 of these aircraft.

Defence Expenditure (Aden)

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of the cuts made in United Kingdom defence expenditure in Aden will be made in the next two years.

Mr. Healey: Nearly all of it.

Mr. Goodhart: Is it proposed that British officers should still be seconded to the South Arabian Federal Forces after


1968? Will we still be making the very substantial contribution which we make at present to the East Aden Protectorate Forces, such as the Hadrumati Bedouin Legion?

Mr. Healey: All British forces will be withdrawn after independence, as has been made clear to the House in the defence debate, but, of course, very substantial financial assistance is being given to the Federal Government to enable it to equip and train forces of its own.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the only basis on which British troops could remain in the Federation or in Aden in future is as participants in a United Nations force?

Mr. Healey: There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says.

Civilian Employees (Terminal Gratuities)

Mr. Hugh Fraser: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether, in accord with Territorial Army regulations and individual contract, he will reconsider his ruling by which expected terminal gratuities to civilian employees are to be treated as severance payments with serious financial loss to individual employees.

Mr. Boyden: Gratuities will always be paid in full. They are often much larger than the sums due under the Redundancy Payments Act.

Mr. Fraser: Surely the hon. Gentleman fully knows that the servants of the Territorial Army expected to receive both, as they would expect from any good employer. He knows that he is behaving shamefully.

Mr. Boyden: That is a mistaken concept.

Northern Thailand (Airfield)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Defence why Her Majesty's Government have built an airfield in Northern Thailand and gifted it to the Thai Government; and whether the gift was intended for use by the United States forces in launching direct bombing missions against North Vietnam.

Mr. Healey: The gift of the airfield was a gesture of solidarity with Thailand,

our ally in S.E.A.T.O.; specifically it will help to improve communications in North-East Thailand. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear in answer to a Question on 7th July, the use of the airfield is for the Thai Government to determine.

Mr. Rankin: But is my right hon. Friend aware that I am asking him whether or not this new airfield in Thailand is being used by American troops to bomb North Vietnam? Would he answer that last part of the Question before I have the opportunity, perhaps, to put a supplementary question?

Mr. Healey: I am pretty sure that it cannot be being used for that purpose—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—because it is suitable only for medium-range transport aircraft and not for the use of strike or bomber aircraft.

Sir G. Nabarro: Is it not a fact that this airfield is being used by the Australian and New Zealand Air Forces as part of their association with the supply of British equipment to them? Has the right hon. Gentleman noticed that a Distinguished Flying Cross was recently awarded to a Royal Australian airman for service in this part of Asia?

Mr. Healey: I do not know what concatenation of events the hon. Member is trying to establish, but the airfield is not suitable for use by strike or combat aircraft.

Mr. W. Baxter: If my right hon. Friend is likely to be giving away any more gifts of runways, would he remember that Edinburgh is very much in need of another runway and that the Provost of Edinburgh was unable to fly down here because of the cancellation of services caused by their not having that other runway?

Mr. Healey: If my hon. Friend will make the necessary arrangements with the trade unions, I shall see whether we can afford some help of this nature under the peaceful use of military forces in the United Kingdom.

Sir F. Bennett: Reverting to the airfield in Thailand, is the Secretary of State merely saying that in his opinion this is not suitable for the war in Vietnam, or is he giving the House a


categorical assurance that it will not be so used?

Mr. Healey: I cannot give such an assurance. As the Prime Minister made clear, it is not for us to decide how this airfield is used, but we do know something about how it can be used.

Mr. Russell Kerr: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, whatever may be his information as to the likely use of the airfield, his view is not shared by those responsible for its construction?

Mr. Healey: No, Sir.

Mr. Goodhart: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some of us are glad that the Royal Engineers who were building this inadequate airfield are now engaged in road building operations which will help the Thai Government?

Mr. Healey: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Crawshaw: Is my right hon. Friend aware that any activities that might involve our troops in ground operations in this part of South-East Asia will be deeply resented by hon. Members on this side of the House? Is he further aware that, as one of the few hon. Members who supported him last night, I am certainly looking for a lessening of our commitments in this area, and not an increasing of them?

Mr. Healey: I am aware of both these facts. I certainly agree that we do not want our forces engaged in operations in this part of Asia to which he refers. May I thank him very much for supporting me last night—it has done something to expiate what he said when we had the debate on the Territorial Army a year ago.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Lord Balniel—Private Notice Question.

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am not very sure whether or not Question No. 53, which is consequential on Question No. 52, was called with No. 52.

Mr. Speaker: I can enlighten the hon. Gentleman. It was not called.

Mr. Rankin: Further to that point of order. May I say that I postpone Question No. 53 to another occasion?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a matter for me now.

ADEN

Lord Balniel (by Private Notice): asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on Aden.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): Since I reported to the House on Monday, terrorist attacks in Aden have caused yet more casualties. In one particularly deplorable act of violence a bomb was planted in the flat of one of our officers, as a result of which the wives of two British officers have been killed and others are seriously ill. In addition to this senseless and cowardly outrage, a good deal of strife has taken place between the rival terrorist groups.
I equally deplore the senseless act of violence which killed the sons of Abdul Qawee Mackawee. As the House knows, there were further acts of violence at the funeral of these Arab victims which led to two further brutal deaths.
I assure the House, in the most solemn terms, that the Government will take all necessary measures to discharge our obligations to maintain law and order in Aden.
Meanwhile, the House will, I know wish to join me in deploring this pointless violence and send understanding and sympathy to the relations of the victims.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Lord Balniel: May I express the sympathy which we all feel for the relatives, be they Arab or European, of all those who were killed or wounded during these last two days of bloodshed, and also express support for the way in which the British troops are handling an increasingly difficult situation in Aden.
But do the Government now realise that the consequences of their policy in Aden are becoming more serious every day? Is the Foreign Secretary aware that these troubles flow, in some measure at least, from the fact that the steps taken so far to provide the Federation with a proper sense of security against external aggression or internal subversion until


such times as the Federation is able to do the job itself are, in our opinion, quite inadequate?

Mr. Brown: I agree with what the noble Lord said in the first place. But I do not accept what he said after that, and I must say to the House that if he thinks that an announcement by us that we were to stay on longer would lead to less terrorism, he is very far from the mark.

Mr. Shinwell: In view of this succession of terrorist attacks, which have been going on for quite a long time and to which hon. Members and myself have frequently referred, is it not obvious that the sooner we get out of Aden the better? As it is the avowed intention of the Government to provide independence for Aden at a certain date, must not the responsibility for protecting the lives of the people in Aden after our forces have left—in addition to any security we can provide either unilaterally or through the United Nations—be left for the new Government that is formed in that country?

Mr. Brown: I am much obliged to my right hon. Friend. I agree with what he has said. As a matter of fact, a very great deal of this trouble, I am pretty sure, stems from the ambiguous way in which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) left it when he signed the White Paper.

Mr. Goodhart: Does the Foreign Secretary appreciate that the last remaining hope of stability in South Arabia lies in an early and orderly hand-over of responsibility for internal security in Aden to the Federal forces?

Mr. Brown: Yes. That is exactly what we are ourselves trying to arrange.

Mr. Lipton: Is there any likelihood of law and order being maintained by whatever Government succeed after the British troops evacuate Aden?

Mr. Brown: As I said yesterday, and as has been said by my right hon. Friend before me, we are arranging for assistance, monetary and other, to ensure that when the Federal Government take over they shall have forces at their disposal to look after their own security and internal and external relations. I am

sure that this is the right thing to do, and I am certain that any suggestion that a continued British presence there would help is absolutely wrong.

Mr. Powell: Is the Foreign Secretary aware—and I ask him this question particularly in view of the remark he has just made about my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) —that this sequence of terrorism took a marked and unmistakably upward swing in February of last year, and that there is here a connection of cause and effect?

Mr. Brown: That was exactly what I said.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Is it not the fact that the origins of the present tragic situation in Aden lie in a series of blunders by Conservative Governments over many years, and that, in particular, the use of force by Nasser was following the precedent set at Suez in 1956?

Mr. Brown: A long chain of blunders in this and other parts of the Arab world was made by our predecessors, for which we are now paying. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] When I said that it was cause and effect, the cause rests with right hon. Gentlemen opposite—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—and the effect we are now trying to cope with.

Mr. Peyton: Did the right hon. Gentleman really mean what he said a moment ago, that he agreed with his right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who was counselling our immediate evacuation from Aden in the face of terrorism?

Mr. Brown: Mr. Brownindicated dissent.

Mr. Peyton: That is what the right hon. Gentleman said.

Mr. Brown: No.

Mr. Peyton: Does not the right hon. Gentleman really think that his last contribution, in sharp contrast to the way in which he started this exchange, was something of which he should be thoroughly ashamed?

Mr. Brown: I will always respond to the way in which I am treated. I believe that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite have a good deal themselves, if not to be ashamed of, then at least to be quiet about.

Sir A. V. Harvey: The right hon. Gentleman is passing the buck.

Mr. Brown: My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) did not say what was imputed to him. It is our view that we should go through with our plans for an orderly withdrawal from this area; and despite the imperialist ambitions of hon. Gentlemen opposite we believe that this is the right thing for us to do.

Mr. Bellenger: Does my right hon. Friend really believe that the task of our forces out there in trying to cope with the difficulties facing them is helped by hypothetical remarks made by hon. Gentlemen opposite about the way in which we leave Aden in future?

Mr. Brown: On the contrary. I am fairly sure that the difficulties of our troops there are made much worse by the kind of remarks and comments being addressed to me from the other side of the House.

Mr. Maudling: As the Foreign Secretary agreed with my right hon. Friend that the present wave of increased terrorism started with the Government's announcement of withdrawing from Aden, how can he possibly blame this on us?

Mr. Brown: I did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend.

Mr. Maudling: The right hon. Gentleman did.

Mr. Brown: I did not, and if I were thought to have agreed with him may I now make it quite plain that I did not agree? I agreed with the right hon. Gentleman that there was a sequence of cause and effect. I said that the cause was the right hon. Gentleman's the Member for Streatham and that the effect is what we are having to cope with now.

Mr. Ogden: Would my right hon. Friend agree that the British forces and their families who live in the civilian areas are particularly vulnerable? If so, would he ask the Minister of Defence to consider withdrawing them into more secure areas?

Mr. Brown: We have a job to do there. We must do it, our forces understand this job and they are doing it. They are facing up to the consequences of

it in a manner which we would expect of our forces. What we have to do now is to assure them of our support and understanding, and we must maintain the policies that would seem to be right in the circumstances.

Mr. Lubbock: While it is reasonable to expect the Service men to face these appalling risks as a result of terrorism in Aden, is the right hon. Gentleman really saying that, in this situation, the families of our Service men must put up with this sort of thing for at least another year? Would it not be better to bring the wives and families home while these terrorist attacks are continuing?

Mr. Brown: I wish to make the position absolutely plain. We are bringing the families out now. They will all be home by the end of July.

Mr. C. Pannell: Reverting to yesterday's HANSARD and my right hon. Friend's reply concerning paragraph 38 of the White Paper, can we now know what the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) promised the Federation during his term of office? Did he promise a defence agreement after independence? If so, did he have his Cabinet's agreement to take that decision, since the wording of paragraph 38 is so ambiguous that we do not know about the decisions which were taken by the then Conservative Administration?

Mr. Brown: Obviously, I cannot answer for a previous Conservative Government, although I agree with my right hon. Friend that the wording of paragraph 38 is exceedingly ambiguous. I have no doubt that it is part of the trouble at the moment.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I ask the right hon. Gentleman this question in all seriousness: when will he stop playing party politics over this issue? When will he rise to the high level of the responsible office which he holds and realise that the lives of innocent people are at stake?

Mr. Brown: I not only realise that, but I am doing my utmost to see that we protect those lives. One of the tragedies is that the Opposition, which created this mess, are playing party politics with it.

Mr. Colin Jackson: When does my right hon. Friend expect the United Nations


mission to arrive in Aden? Would not he agree that there would be more sympathy in this House for the Opposition if they showed as much concern for the trade unionists and people of Aden as they did for the Sheikhs and Royalists?

Mr. Brown: I am glad to tell my hon. Friend and the House that the mission, after a lot of delay, has now been appointed. I believe that, given good will, it can play a very considerable rôle in changing this present unhappy situation. I understand that it will arrive in the Colony by the middle of March. As I said yesterday, we will give it every facility we can to enable it to fulfil its terms of reference. I only hope that those others who are playing around in this scene will do the same.

Mr. Heath: The right hon. Gentleman must realise that he and the Government bear a tremendous responsibility in this situation and that, far from the withdrawal from Aden being orderly, as he just said is his desire, there is every indication at the moment that this deteriorating situation will end in chaos.
The right hon. Gentleman himself said that our forces will do everything possible to maintain law and order, but what further measures will Her Majesty's Government take? Why are we not able to maintain law and order at the moment? Is not the answer because of the general belief that the Government will withdraw without leaving effective means for law and order, internally and externally, to be maintained in Aden?
That being so, will not the right hon. Gentleman reconsider this matter from the point of view that it must be made clear to those who are causing the trouble in Aden, both from inside and outside, that Her Majesty's Government will ensure that our withdrawal does not take place until there are effective means of maintaining law and order, both internally and externally?

Mr. Brown: The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues were responsible for announcing 1968 as the date for independence. [HON. MEMBERS: "With law and order."] Paragraph 38 of the White Paper says nothing of the sort. It left the matter totally open. I have little doubt

that the Federal Ministers were told one thing while others were told another. This is a very large part of the problem. We intend to adhere to 1968 as the date for our withdrawal.
I am fairly sure that I said at the beginning that any announcement about our intending to stay beyond then would worsen the situation and would not improve it. I invite the Opposition to help us in this business of getting out of this area in an orderly way and in making it clear to the Federal Government, who will then take over, that, with all the aid we can give them, it will then be their business to look after security from then on.

Mr. Heath: We do not accept the right hon. Gentleman's interpretation of either the White Paper or the treaty. We have made that plain. However, in this situation, about which he has extended an invitation to my hon. and right hon. Friends, I put a similar request to him: will he make it plain to the Federal Government that they will be given what is necessary to maintain law and order, internally and externally, since that is what is required from Her Majesty's Government?

Mr. Brown: What is the use of the right hon. Gentleman making speeches attacking us for spending more than—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] I am answering it—more than we have, when he is now asking us to give an open-handed commitment in this area? The two things do not go together. We have, in fact, made available to the Federal Government large sums of money and resources, which will give them a force at least as large as they can sustain—some might think even larger than they can sustain.
The right hon. Gentleman's present proposition is not only totally contrary to what the Opposition has said on other occasions, but it would place so strong a strain on the resources of the Federal Government that it would destroy them from the start.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Victor Yates. Private Notice Question.

RAILWAYS (ACCIDENT, STECHFORD)

Mr. Victor Yates (by Private Notice): asked the Minister of Transport whether she will make a statement about the crash which occurred at Stechford, Birmingham, on Tuesday 28th February.

The Minister of Transport (Mrs. Barbara Castle): Yes Sir. I was deeply shocked to learn of this tragic accident, in which nine people lost their lives. The tragedy is the more harrowing in that it follows a year when there was not a single passenger killed in a train accident. It also happened on the new London Midland electrified line, which is the pride of British Railways.
The facts are that at 15.40 yesterday the 13.15 4-coach electric multiple unit express passenger train from Manchester to Coventry, running at 60 to 70 m.p.h. on the up main line approaching Stechford, collided sidelong with a diesel engine at a junction just short of the station. For some reason at present unknown, the engine was moving from the branch line across the path of the express. The four coaches of the passenger train were derailed and two of them turned over onto their sides across the down main line.
I must inform the House with the deepest regret that the accident resulted in the deaths of eight passengers and of the driver of the express; other passengers were injured and taken to hospital where three were detained. The emergency services were called for at once and arrived on the scene within five or six minutes of the accident, a very creditable performance.
The cause of this tragic accident has yet to be established and my Chief Inspecting Officer of Railways, who has already visited Stechford and made an on-the-spot preliminary investigation last night, will be holding a public inquiry into it on 9th March.
I know that the House will join with me in expressing sincere sympathy with the relatives of the deceased and with the injured.

Mr. Yates: In thanking my right hon. Friend the Minister for that statement and associating myself with her expres-

sion of sympathy, may I also associate my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins), in whose constituency this disaster occurred, and who is unavoidably absent? He asked me to convey a tribute to all who assisted, the doctors, nurses, members of fire brigades and others who rendered valuable services.
May I ask that at the inquiry, as so many of the travelling public are deeply concerned about this, she will see that the automated signalling system will be thoroughly examined so that the new electrified system will be seen to be working without any doubt whatever?

Mrs. Castle: I associate myself, as my hon. Friend has asked, with his tribute to the wonderful rescue work that was done by all concerned. I referred to that in my original statement.
On the question of the signalling service, I can assure him that the Chief Inspecting Officer, from his preliminary investigations, has established that the fact that the express train was an electric one had nothing to do with the accident. His preliminary inquiries also indicate that the new signalling was not at fault. He has already provisionally approved the signalling and it is due to be officially inspected in April.

Mr. Peter Walker: Will the right hon. Lady accept that we on this side of the House would very much like to be associated with the expression of sympathy to the dependants of those killed and injured and in the tribute to those who helped in the rescue work? Will she also express to all concerned in British Railways with the magnificent modernisation of this line, who must be very disappointed at this happening, our complete confidence in its future success?

Mrs. Castle: I thank the hon. Member for that expression of opinion, which, I know, will greatly hearten the British Railways Board. Of course, we are all deeply disappointed that this tragic accident should have taken place in this way, but I believe, as I said in my reply, that we shall be able to establish that the fact that this was an electric service had nothing to do with the accident.

Mr. Christopher Price: May I associate myself with the tributes to the rescue


workers and the expressions of sympathy with the relatives of those who have been killed? In view of the great deal of publicity that has been given to the starting of the new passenger service and of the fact that it is to start on Monday, will she do all she can to hasten this inquiry so that the maximum reassurance can be given as soon as possible to the new travelling public which we hope to encourage to use these trains?

Mrs. Castle: As I have said, the inquiry will start on 9th March. We are anxious to press ahead with it although we would not want to do anything to prevent it being an extremely thorough one.
I repeat that the preliminary investigations by my Chief Inspecting Officer show that the fact that this was an electric line had nothing to do with the cause of the accident, so I am sure that passengers can be reassured.

Mr. Edelman: In regretting this tragic accident which resulted in death and injury of some of my constituents, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether she would say, in spite of what she has said already about the electrification question, that in the event of electronic failures the new system admits of correction by human intervention? In those circumstances, what margin of time is there for manual intervention of such a kind?

Mrs. Castle: I should not like to try to answer my hon. Friend's very detailed technical question without notice. I can only repeat that preliminary investigations show that the new signalling equipment was not at fault in this accident.

Mr. Manuel: My right hon. Friend said that the preliminary investigation by the Chief Inspecting Officer has established that there was no signalling failure. Would she agree that we ought not to be too definite on that, because it could cause a reflection on the drivers, one of whom was killed?

Mrs. Castle: I do not want to anticipate the full inquiry, or to cast a reflection on anyone, but we face the fact that the new service is to start next Monday and I think that those intending to travel on that service are entitled to have the results of the Chief Inspecting Officer's preliminary inquiries. If these results

had not been what they are I should take steps to prevent the new service coming into operation, but I want to assure the House that there is no danger of it not coming into operation.

Mr. Mapp: Without prejudice completely to the full exploration of the circumstances, and having regard to the loss of life, which is rather unusual in an accident of this kind, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether the Chief Inspecting Officer might particularly look at the result of the impact in terms of the vestibule or compartment type of vehicles involved in this accident? There are different reactions in this field in regard to the ultimate injurious effect, and so on. I hope that that will be borne in mind.

Mrs. Castle: I am sure that the Chief Inspecting Officer will bear that in mind. I will draw it to his attention.

QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS

Sir Harmar Nicholls: On a point of Order, Mr. Speaker. I did not pursue my point of order on Question No.45, because it would have impinged upon Question Time. May I pursue it now?

Mr. Speaker: Yes.

Sir Harmar Nicholls: The Secretary of State for Defence answered a Question by referring to paragraph and subparagraph which it was almost impossible to identify. It was quite clear that the Answer was not understood, because the hon. Gentleman who asked the Question then asked a supplementary to which the original Answer bore no relation. My hon. Friends and the Liberal Chief Whip tried to follow the answers given by the Secretary of State in the documents that we thought he referred to. The Question semed to refer to the repair of accommodation stores, which bore no relation to the supplementaries which followed it.
It is obvious that we were wrong in thinking that it was that particular paragraph, but this points to the fact that that type of Answer, which merely gives index numbers and figures, is not a fair way of keeping the House of Commons informed. Have we any defence at all to make certain that, when Questions are answered, they are not smothered round


with this type of camouflage figure, which merely means that it is no answer?

Mr. Speaker: I am sure that the Ministers will take note of the hon. Gentleman's observations. It is not a matter for the Chair. A Minister can reply in whatever way he chooses. I believe that occasionally Ministers' replies are unsatisfactory in various kinds of ways.

BILLS PRESENTED

DECIMAL CURRENCY

Bill to provide for the introduction of a decimal currency in the year 1971; and to regulate the constitution and functions of the Decimal Currency Board, presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; supported by Mr. Michael Stewart, Mr. Roy Jenkins, Mr. William Ross, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Mr. John Diamond, and Mr. Niall Mac-Dermot; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 199.]

SPOILHEAPS

Bill to provide for the speedy removal of spoilheaps; and for connected purposes, presented by Mr. John Cordle, supported by Mr. Robert Cooke, Mr. Richard Body, Mr. John Osborn, Mr. David Gibson-Watt, Mr. Peter Mills, Mr. R. Gresham Cooke, Sir Eric Bullus, Mr. Baker, Mr. W. H. Loveys, and Mr. John Farr; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday 14th April and to be printed. [Bill 198.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[10TH ALLOTTED DAY] [2nd Series],—considered.

Orders of the Day — DEFENCE (NAVY) ESTIMATES, 1967–68, VOTE A:

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That 100,500 Officers, Ratings and Royal Marines be maintained for Naval Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1968.

4.2 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. Maurice Foley): It is my honour and pleasure to introduce the Navy Estimates to the House. The Estimates for the coming year total just under £621 million, which is about £24 million more than for the current year, 1966–67. However, pay increases since the 1966–67 Estimates were prepared account for about £4 million of the difference, price increases for a further £14 million, and Selective Employment Tax for £6 million.
This brings the 1967–68 Navy Estimates to the same level as the current year's Estimates. Moreover, because of the new arrangements for bringing to account receipts from sales of defence equipment, described on page 16 of the Estimates, appropriations in aid of Navy Votes are about £2 million less than they would otherwise have been. This £2 million appears as appropriations in aid of the central Vote.
Within the total there are a number of ups and downs compared with the current year. The aircraft and air weapons programmes are £6 million higher, mainly to provide for engines and weapons for the naval version of the Phantom. Expenditure on R & D is £4 million higher than in 1966–67 and on weapons £2 million higher. On the other hand, we shall be spending £8 million less on the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, £3 million less on food, and clothing, £2 million less on naval pay and allowances, and £10 million less on new construction.
This is the money side of the Estimates—an important aspect but, after all, only one side of the Navy's expenditure. There are others equally important—the men


and the hardware. I hope, in winding up the debate this evening, to go more fully into both recruitment and the re-engagement position. Enough for the present to say that in this most difficult of all markets we are holding our own. There are some areas of particular shortage, but, generally, recruitment to the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines is running at a fairly steady rate.
The re-engagement position has caused us considerable worry. It still worries us, but this year we seem to have halted the downward trend, I hope permanently, and we can now fight back to regain lost ground. The re-engagement rate for men on nine-year engagements fell from 33 per cent. in 1964 to 23 per cent. in 1965, and to as low as 21 per cent. later in that year. It rose to 25 per cent. in 1966. That is where we are now. The rate for men on 12-year engagements fell from 54 per cent. in 1964 to 45 per cent. in 1965. It has remained at that level during 1966.
During this financial year seven new warships will have joined the Royal Navy. H.M.S. "Intrepid", the second assault ship, will shortly be aded to our amphibious forces. H.M.S. "Fearless", the first of this class of assault ships, has been in service on station now for some six months. She has amply proved her worth. H.M.S.s "Fife" and "Glamorgan", County class destroyers with advanced guided missile systems, have been commissioned. "Valiant", the second of our Fleet submarines, but the first with an all-British nuclear propulsion system, was accepted into service last summer.
Three new Leander Class frigates—"Sirius", "Minerva" and "Phoebe"—have been added to the 10 already in service. During the coming year, therefore, the Fleet will consist of 138 ships of various types in the operational fleet or prepared for service with it, and 34 engaged on essential trials and training. together with the very important Fleet support ships and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.
This force is in a state of constant readiness to meet the many demands which are made on it. It has to spend much of its time in training and in sea practice in order to be at the required state of readiness. Little time is spent in

harbour during the ships' active employment. In fact, the level of activity and training now regarded as routine throughout the Navy is higher than in any peacetime force, certainly in the history of this country.
Even a cursory glance at the number and scope of the Royal Navy's engagements during the last year is sufficient to make this point. In the Far East three years of intensive and continuous day and night activity in connection with the confrontation were brought to a close by the ratification of the Bangkok Agreement. During that time a number of actions were fought by our ships at sea where, in the narrow waters of the Singapore and Malacca Straits, our frigates and minesweepers, together with those of our Commonwealth allies, were constantly vigilant.
Both in the Far East and nearer at hand the Fleet has been employed in operations which, though less prominent than those associated with confrontation, have been equally vital to the maintenance of our foreign policy and as taxing and as arduous for all those concerned.

Captain Walter Elliot: The hon. Gentleman said that there were 138 ships at sea. Is he able to tell me offhand how many of those ships are capable of anti-submarine action?

Mr. Foley: I cannot give the answer offhand. I will certainly give it when I wind up the debate, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman is willing to stay to the end.
I was referring to the varied rôle of our ships. I referred to the Far East. Equally, I could refer to the Middle East and to the ships in the Persian Gulf which are active in patrol tasks which prevent the smuggling of arms to the States which border the Gulf. This is a powerful contribution to stability and peace in that area.
Our patrol off Beira, which was referred to at Question Time earlier, is maintained and has been in operation for almost a year since it was instituted to give effect to the Security Council Resolution of 9th April, 1966. Our frigates have been constantly patrolling the Mozambique Channel to prevent the arrival at Beira of ships suspected of


carrying oil bound for Rhodesia. In this long and demanding task they have been entirely successful, as is amply demonstrated by the closure of the Umtali refinery. Since the inception of this patrol, no oil has reached Rhodesia by this most direct route, and I have no doubt that the effective interception of the tanker "Manuella" in the early days of the patrol by H.M.S. "Berwick" has had a considerable deterrent effect.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Can my hon. Friend tell us whether there is any estimate of the cost to us of this blockade, and by how many times it exceeds any additional cost the Rhodesians may have to meet on South African oil?

Mr. Foley: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for that question. If he had been here at Question Time, he would have heard the answer. Perhaps he will look it up in HANSARD tomorrow. It was, in fact, £100,000.
This work, in terms of the effectiveness of the Beira patrol, demonstrates once again the versatility of the Royal Navy and its willingness to support and enhance our country's foreign policy.
In other parts of the world, too, we have been busy. H.M.S. "Fearless", the first of the Navy's new assault ships, demonstrated the flexibility of our operational forces by effecting the withdrawal of about 400 men of the 1st Battalion of the Irish Fusiliers, stationed in Swaziland, together with all their stores and ammunition. To indicate the state of readiness, I can tell the House that the decision to use "Fearless" was made on 16th November. The following day she left Aden, and 12 days later she had sailed from Durban with all the troops and stores embarked—a remarkable feat which demonstrates the speed and flexibility of the Navy today.
In June, at the request of the Governor of the Seychelles, H.M.S. "Carysfort" arrived, and her presence helped significantly to restore law and order after a dispute. More recently, H.M.S. "Salisbury" played her part in assisting the police in Anguilla in the West Indies. These are specific examples of the continuous and wide-ranging readiness of the Royal Navy to give help and assistance when required.
In addition to these policing rôles, the Navy plays a considerable part in other ways to help civilian authorities. Perhaps the most widely known of these rôles is that of the Fishery Protection Squadron. The four frigates and five minesweepers which make up the squadron have continued to provide excellent service to the British fishing industry both on home fishing grounds and in far distant waters. The squadron has a wide area to cover extending from fishing grounds off Newfoundland to the West to the Norwegian areas in the East.

Mr. James Johnson: Before he continues, will my hon. Friend either confirm or deny the rumours which have been reported in the Yorkshire papers, for instance, the Yorkshire Post, and Humberside papers, that, as a result of the recent change, there will be a diminution or lack of efficiency in the protection given to our trawlermen and fishing fleets moving out of the Humber.

Mr. Foley: I take this opportunity to deny the rumours, which were referred to in one newspaper at the week-end. The position is that on 1st February this year we brought the Fishery Protection Squadron within the compass and competence of the Home Fleet. It is not the fact—I deny it at once—that the frigates on far distant patrol have all been withdrawn to home station. It is not true that the specialist officers who have been manning the Fishery Protection Squadron are being lost to this work. They are being incorporated in the new command. They are still there. It is true that the trawlermen's association, which seems to have been rather vociferous on the subject, was not consulted. It was not consulted because there is no diminution in the Royal Navy's effort throughout the whole field of this protection.

Dame Irene Ward: It is a great pleasure to hear what the hon. Gentleman has to say, but the report in the Press was very dogmatic on the subject, and there was a report, also, of what the chairman of the British Trawler Federation had to say. May we take it as right to assume—not only on the Humber but on the Tyne, in Scotland and all round—that there is no


diminution in the services? Further, may I know whether we are to have an increase, because that is what we have been pressing for for a very long time?

Mr. Foley: I am sure that the hon. Lady herself needs no protection, but I can give her the assurance that the protection afforded to the trawlers both inshore and far off shore will be exactly the same as it has been in the past. If the need is there, it will be increased.
Instances of this service are known. The fishery protection vessels patrol the six-mile and 12-mile limits. They check international vessels, they check the size of nets, and so on. Because of their vigilance, there have in the past 12 months been 18 arrests and successful prosecutions. This is all part of the service which the Navy has in the past supplied.

Mr. Patrick Wall: I want to have it absolutely clear. Although ships will be available for fishery protection, does the hon. Gentleman deny that the Fishery Protection Squadron as such has been disbanded?

Mr. Foley: Yes. The Fishery Protection Squadron as such has now been incorporated within the Home Fleet, which, as the hon. Gentleman will readily understand, makes it possible to deploy more ships if they are needed in this work. But the expertise and personnel engaged on the work are not lost. They are there and they are still doing the job. Far from there being a diminution, the possibilities are there to enhance the rôle of fishery protection within the broader framework of the Home Fleet.
There are numberless other activities in assistance to civil authorities. There are the search and rescue exploits in which men of the Royal Navy, sometimes at considerable risk to themselves, are ready to do what they can to help civilians in difficulties, or at times of national disaster. For instance, quite recently Oxfam had organised food supplies for India and there was difficulty in getting transport. It was the Royal Navy which quickly responded and made it possible to bring succour in an immediate way to certain famine areas in India.
There is also the assistance given by the Navy to local authorities with an oil

pollution problem. There is the way in which the Navy's survey and hydrographic service continues to widen its scope and, apart from its normal activities, indulges, with other European countries, in special sea-water analysis work. Similarly, by other research work, the Navy assists the passage of large ships in the Thames Estuary. There is the dredging section. This is all part of the continuous work which the Navy has done day in and day out.
I come now to the subject of new construction. By 1st April this year, 16 of the 21 major warships on order will have been laid down. Four large Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels and an exercise minelayer also will be under construction. The ships on order include two guided missile destroyers, a Type 82 destroyer—this was referred to in the debate yesterday and in Questions today—nine "Leander" class frigates, two Fleet replenishment ships, the last of the "Oberon" class submarines, and, last but by no means least, four Polaris submarines and three Fleet nuclear submarines.
I take this opportunity to clear up some confusion which may have arisen over the Fleet's nuclear submarines. There are two in commission. One is due in commission in April. Orders for two more have been placed during the past 12 months. Work on these two is well in hand, and we have today placed the order for the sixth nuclear fleet submarine. As is stated in the White Paper, it is expected that, later this year, we shall place the order for the first of a new class of Fleet nuclear submarine which will incorporate a number of improvements over the "Valiants" which are now entering service.
I come now to the Polaris programme. It has its critics, I know, but its justification is clear and, in my view, incontrovertible. These submarines will take over from the V force in 1970, and they will make the United Kingdom contribution to the Western and international nuclear deterrent. That is the simple and compelling reason both for the importance of the programme and the importance we attach to keeping to the programe's timetable.
The achievement so far has been very considerable and I have no hesitation in saying, and I say it having visited both the base now being constructed at Faslane


and the submarines now being built at Vickers and Cammell Lairds, that I am full of admiration for the way in which that most difficult technical task has been pushed forward.
This year has seen significant progress. The construction of all four Polaris submarines is well under way and the first two have been launched.

Mr. William Baxter: I understand that the Polaris submarines are to take the place of the V-bombers. Are they then to be handed over to the control of the United States and become part of their Polaris fleet of 34 submarines or are they to be kept independent of America and under the control of Britain?

Mr. Foley: My hon. Friend will be aware that that point was raised several times in the past two days and in Questions today. The answer is very simple. It has been our policy, which is referred to in the White Paper of 1965, that we would build four—not five—Polaris submarines and that they were our contribution to an international nuclear deterrent. My hon. Friend and others of my hon. Friends voted for that policy in the House in 1965. That was in the early stages of the programme. It would seem that now, as the programme develops, they are geting cold feet on the project. I cannot see the logic of that kind of attitude.

Mr. Baxter: My hon. Friend's efforts to try to by-pass the substance of my question are understandable when he cannot give us a very clear answer. But I must press him on the subject. Irrespective of what people have said in the past—and I could quote a lot of speeches on the subject—let us know now what the Government's policy on it is. Shall we keep full control of the nuclear submarines that we are building or are they to come under the control of America and become part of their Atlantic nuclear fleet?

Mr. Foley: Neither, we shall not keep them, nor will they go to America. They will become part of the N.A.T.O. force, they will be assigned to N.A.T.O.

Mr. Baxter: Under what agreement will they be assigned to N.A.T.O., when at the moment there is a committee of inquiry investigating whether N.A.T.O. should have a nuclear fleet? Why should

Britain be committed to the vast expenditure of public money on a nuclear submarine fleet—whether of four or five? It may be four, but my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary at one time said that six would not be sufficient if we were to be a nuclear power on our own. We as a nation incur the cost of building those nuclear submarines. What will other nations in N.A.T.O. contribute?

Mr. Foley: Let me first make clear that there will be four. There will not be any permutations on that.

Mr. Baxter: We are not quite sure.

Mr. Foley: I can put my hon. Friend's mind to rest. They will be assigned to N.A.T.O. in exactly the same way as the V-bombers were assigned in the past, and that was the policy presented in the 1965 White Paper. It might be unpalatable, but it is a fact on which my hon. Friend's voted to support the Government.
It is also a fact that since 1965 two of those submarines have been launched and that the other two are well on their way to construction. That is an inescapable conclusion of a decision taken and endorsed in the House by the Labour Government in a vote in 1965. All I am doing is to give a progress report on the development and construction of those four submarines.
It is anticipated that "Resolution", the first of those Polaris submarines, will start her trials this June and be operational by mid-1968, and that each of the other three will come forward at roughly six-monthly intervals. There is no doubt in my mind that the tightness of the programme has placed a considerable burden on the two shipyards concerned. There have been Questions and statements about that. On the whole, I believe that both yards have responded well and have undoubtedly benefited by the new and progressive techniques and methods. The experience they are gaining in the construction of those modern and complex vessels should be of great value both to the management and work force, and therefore to the country in general.
On the support side, the Clyde submarine base, which will support not only Polaris, but Fleet nuclear and conventional submarines, is proceeding to programme and is due to commission in the


autumn of this year when most of its major elements will be complete. Eventually, over 2,500 naval and 1,600 civilian personnel will be employed there. We hope to recruit over half the civilians locally.
The Polaris school, which is a mass of complex technical equipment, was commissioned on 30th June and is now training the weapon system crews of two further submarines, "Repulse" and "Revenge".

Dr. Reginald Bennett: I do not wish to intrude on what is from all appearances a private fight, but does the programme of which the hon. Gentleman is so proud happen to be the same as that referred to by the present Prime Minister on 27th September, 1963, as the Conservative pursuit of the nuclear illusion?

Mr. Foley: I am not particularly interested in delving into the past in relation to something with which—

Mr. John Horner: Would not my hon. Friend agree that whereas the Conservatives wanted to build five submarines Labour is satisfied with four?

Mr. Foley: As usual, my hon. Friend is quite correct.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: In answer to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) on Question 19 today, I understood my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence to say something new about the British warhead and its penetration possibilities. Could my hon. Friend expand on that?

Mr. Foley: I am sorry. I cannot. But I shall look into the matter and if there is anything new to say I shall deal with it in winding up later.
I have attempted to describe how the Fleet will develop in the immediate future. But we must look much further ahead. During the past few years the foundations have been laid for naval planning of the shape of the Fleet in the 1970s and into the 1980s. The problem has not been simple. It is not simply one of re-providing the capabilities of aircraft carriers in the middle 1970s, but of designing a completely new Fleet for the

tasks it is expected to perform in later years.
In that context, we have had to plan the ships and weapons system simultaneously. The day has gone when one could design a weapons system independently of the ship to carry it. They now go part and parcel together. The weapon must be designed in relation to the ship; the ship in relation to the weapon; both in relation to the shape of the Fleet; and the Fleet in relation to its Service commitments and the financial resources the country can afford to make available. All that must be projected forward. The ships we must plan now will not come into service before the early 1970s, and they will still be in service in the early 1990s.
The Statement on the Defence Estimates explains that final decisions for the Navy as well as the Army and Air Force must await the outcome of the N.A.T.O. discussions now in progress. Two aspects of the current study were mentioned during the previous two days' debate. One relates to the aircraft carrier decision and the second, raised constantly by hon. Members opposite, was the question of a surface-to-surface weapons system. I have no intention this afternoon of going over the ground fully covered in last year's debate on the question of the aircraft carrier. I can do no better than to quote again the words of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence when he opened last year's Defence Review debate. He said:
We shall keep our existing carrier force as long as possible into the 1970s, but we shall not order a new carrier. In the light of the military tasks we envisage, and of the operational return we can expect from its cost of £1,400 million over the next 10 years, we do not believe that we should be justified in keeping a carrier force indefinitely. A new carrier could not become operational until 1973, when the rest of our carriers would be in the last phase of their active life. But by the mid-1970s we should be able to re-provide the necessary elements of the carriers' capability more cheaply by other means."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd February, 1966; Vol. 725, c. 241.]
In other words, we envisage the carriers continuing through into the 1970s.
The House will be pleased to know that already the first of the naval Phantoms is flying. They will be in commission in 1968. So the question that was raised so often by the Opposition—that


there will be a tremendous gap—is invalid. The carriers will continue. This does not mean to say, however, that we do not need some form of surface-to-surface weapons system. We need a form of light tactical strike capability to introduce into our ships to complement the long-range strike power of the R.A.F.'s aircraft in support of future maritime operations and the anti-surface ship capability of our fleet submarines.
We have been studying various alternatives. This year's White Paper, good as it is, does not and cannot cover all the work we are engaged in. Our studies of a light tactical strike capability range from ship-launched missiles with a capability comparable to that of the Norwegian "Penguin" and from surface-to-surface guided weapons of greater ranges to air-to-surface missiles launched from helicopters and vertical take-off aircraft.
In deciding which alternative to adopt, we have to consider not only the capability provided, but also the relative costs, which include not merely the cost of development and production of the missile but also that of the vehicles to carry it and the effect of these on the shape and size and therefore the cost of the ships required to deploy it.
These issues are highly complex and, therefore, at this stage we cannot anticipate the final solution to the problem. I can say, however, that our extensive studies have shown three things. The first is that maritime forces can provide a particularly appropriate and flexible element in the British military presence overseas. Our ability to possess a local deterrent and to contribute to peace-keeping operations will be considerably enhanced by a capability to hold commandos ready for action by means of amphibious forces.
Secondly, air power will continue to be as important to the Navy of the future as it is to the Navy of today. The future fleet must, therefore, plan to take the fullest advantage of the R.A.F.'s land-based aircraft deployed in support of our ships and also to exploit the full potential of the helicopter as a maritime weapon. Thirdly, the importance of the nuclear-powered Fleet submarines in the 1970s will be greatly increased and will, in addition, through the anti-submarine role, provide the main offensive arm of

the Navy. This is reflected in the buildup of our nuclear powered submarines.
I have talked a little about the Navy's finances, its manpower, its present strength, its taxing and worldwide role and have said, not perhaps as much as hon. Members would wish, but as much as I can now about its development in the future. I shall deal more fully at the end of the debate with the subjects of recruitment and engagement and with some, at least, of the many important factors in the officers' and ratings' conditions of service. I hope, also, to touch on the subject of Her Majesty's dockyards and the labour force, without which the Royal Navy could not hope to hold itself in continual readiness to meet its responsibilities.

Mr. Dalyell: Many of us have constituency and other interests in the dockyards. Would it not be more sensible for my hon. Friend to deal with that aspect now rather than keep it until the end of the debate, when we hope that points we raise during the debate will be answered?

Mr. Foley: I have spoken of the size of the present Navy. Part of the new construction to be undertaken will be in Her Majesty's Dockyards. In addition, many ships will be coming in for refitting. There is sufficient work at the moment and in the foreseeable future to keep all the naval dockyards at full strength. If this is any comfort to my hon. Friend, I am delighted. If it is any guide to him in terms of his contribution to the debate, I am happy to be able to assist. Clearly, there are many other questions which hon. Members will wish to put and these will be answered at the end of the debate when I reply.
The great lesson I have learned in my short time in this office is a realisation—one which perhaps I should have grasped more fully before—of the immense range of activities which go to make up this great fighting Service.

Dame Joan Vickers: Will the hon. Gentleman say something now or later about possible changes in commands in the Navy? This is worrying a lot of us very much.

Mr. Foley: I can tell the hon. Lady now if she likes.
Commanders-in-chief have been consulted and asked to give their opinions


with a view to trying to determine what should be the command structure at home and abroad—for the teeth and the tail, as it were. We shall make an announcement on these discussions in the near future. I regret that we have moved out of phase with the other Services in this matter. The Royal Air Force has already indicated its intentions, but we are still having these consultations with the commanders-in-chief and in the light of that I cannot make an announcement today.

Dame Joan Vickers: May I take it that the report in The Times the other day is not necessarily accurate?

Mr. Foley: Reports one sees in the newspapers, no matter how eminent, are not necessarily accurate.
From my first day in this office, I have had a sense of a common and strong sense of purpose in the Royal Navy, a loyalty to the Service and its ideals. I have found this to be so in Whitehall and in the few visits that I have managed to make I have found it in the naval establishments. Each part of the Service knows and plays its part.
I should pay tribute to the Wrens and the nurses—with proper naval courtesy, I put them first; to the officers and men of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines; to the specialist branches, like the doctors, the dentists and the instructors; to the industrials and non-industrials—a horrible term. They are all part of a big team which is at once a big business and a big Service. It is on them, first and foremost, that the success of the Royal Navy depends. To the limit of my power, I will not let them or the Service down.

4.37 p.m.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: My first task is the pleasant one of congratulating the hon. Gentleman on his first appearance at the Dispatch Box as the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Navy has usually been very lucky in its First Lords. I wish the hon. Gentleman a happy and very active time in office, although I am sure that he will understand if I cannot wish him a long term of office.
No one can serve for 30 years and more in the Royal Navy without having a

tremendous affection and respect for it, so I would like at once to join in the tribute that he paid to the officers and men of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines who work cheerfully and happily and willingly for seven days a week without overtime and very often in conditions which would be a revelation to most civilians.
But the old prayer,
The Royal Navy, upon which, under the good providence of God, the safety, honour and welfare of this nation do most chiefly depend".
must not be invoked today as evidence that we need any particular size of naval forces in today's context. From this side of the House, therefore, we shall not be talking about Nelson, or rum, or quarter decks, or beards, but taking a cold and analytical look at the tasks which are likely to confront the Navy in future and the extent to which the plans of the Government appear to us to provide for an adequate supply of officers and men, ships, weapons and equipment for these tasks.
Let me summarise these tasks. First, we have what I suppose in present conditions is one of the most important tasks of all, which is to provide an independent British nuclear deterrent of sufficient size to be credible. I should like to add to the congratulations, already offered by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), about the recent launching of H.M.S. "Renown". It is no secret that we on this side of the House would have preferred five of these submarines, but meanwhile we agree with the Secretary of State that four make a most massive contribution to our deterrent.
The second main task of the Royal Navy is to make a fair contribution to the forces of N.A.T.O. and our other military alliances and to support our Commonwealth partners. But this support of the Commonwealth is mutual, and I should like to take the opportunity to congratulate the Royal Australian Navy on its new White Ensign which has been hoisted for the first time at noon today in Australia House. I am confident that the next 57 years of co-operation with the Royal Australian Navy will be as close and as fruitful as have been the last 57 years.


The third major task is to be able to defend Britain's seaborne trade, wherever it may be threatened, and particularly our Atlantic lifeline. This is a task of which it is very easy to lose sight, and it involves an enormous amount of antisubmarine training, a skill, almost an art, in which this nation is superlative. It also involves providing enough frigates and enough aircraft to keep up our expertise and to train men in the Navy in this absolutely essential task, which is really an attitude of mind as much as anything else.
The fourth task is to bear our fair share of peace-keeping whenever and wherever the peace of the world is threatened. I should like to make it clear that these are as much peace-time functions as war-time functions. To those hon. Members who abstained in last night's Division on the Defence Estimates, I say that it is not right necessarily to think that arms and weapons lead to fighting and to bloodshed, which every sane man deplores. It is an essential part of the functions of our Forces that they should help to maintain peace, and this they are doing every day, all round the clock, all day and every day.
I want now to refer to money. The Opposition do not argue for unlimited money to be spent on defence, as hon. Members opposite and even the Secretary of State himself have so often implied. No country can afford to do that, and, of course, I agree with last year's Defence Review that military strength is of little value if it is achieved at the expense of economic health. That is plain commonsense.
We think that enough must be spent to ensure that the country is adequately defended and that the provision of adequate defence is the first and most basic responsibility of any Government. There is nothing more important than that. We also believe that military support in time of need is often the most valuable form of aid which can be given to developing countries. Neither side of the House can claim a monopoly of concern for the problems of developing and recently independent countries, and it is a valid point that often these people run out of law and order before they run out of any other commodity. Law and order is a basic commodity and we have been able, and no doubt will be able

again, to assist them militarily in this way.
Equally, I am not today seeking particularly to defend the previous Conservative Government's financial policy on defence. Personally, I think that they spent little enough. Evidently, that view was shared by the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Prime Minister, because in his now notorious speech at Plymouth on 27th September, 1964, he said:
The Royal Navy is not adequate for our needs in the 'sixties. It has been run down to a dangerous extent.
I hope that the Secretary of State remembers that speech. If that were so, how can the remedy be to make further cuts now? The cuts which are now proposed in the White Paper are just sufficient to ruin the Navy's effectiveness.

Mr. Dalyell: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman read on what the Prime Minister said at Plymouth? He said:
It has been run down to a dangerous extent. We have 101 ships in commission. We have, of course, plenty of admirals, 85. Our admiral-warship coefficient is 0.851.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I do not see the relevance of that.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Denis Healey): What is it now?

Dame Joan Vickers: Does not my hon. and gallant Friend appreciate that although we have that many admirals —and one is nearly 100—it is because admirals are always admirals, although not necessarily employed.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I am sure that nothing personal was intended by that intervention.
These cuts are just sufficient to ruin the Navy's effectiveness, particularly that of the Fleet Air Arm. The law of diminishing returns begins to apply very forcibly when one cuts down to an arbitrary figure.
The irony of all this is that the actual defence savings are illusory, as has been pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West; and even the savings which the Government claim are chicken feed as compared with the huge and ever-growing Government expenditure. Our accusation is that the Government are spoiling the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar.


My first and foremost criticism of Vote A, which is concerned with just over 100,000 officers and men, is that the White Paper gives very little information about future prospects in the Navy. The Secretary of State is, of course, a very clever man and he has had great fun juggling with statistics and drawing little squares in Annex D in the White Paper and shopping from out-of-date price lists.
In his speech on Monday, he seemed suddenly to remember that he was dealing with 100,000 men in the Navy. He ought to have realised it before. He ought to have realised that these people have hopes and fears and ambitions and loyalties like anybody else. They are dedicated people, but they must not be taken for granted. They are accustomed to direct orders, but they are deeply suspicious of double talk. They must be told in explicit terms in what sort of Fleet they are to serve and what sort of weapons and equipment they are to have.
It is well known that the report of the Future Fleet Working Party was in the hands of the Admiralty Board as long ago as 12th September, 1966. Why has it not been possible to produce something other than last year's cold potatoes in this document? Why, as we were told by the hon. Gentleman this afternoon, is it necessary to await N.A.T.O. decisions? That might be so for the Army, but I cannot see why it is true for the Navy.
The one thing which would cheer up the Fleet more than almost anything else would be to publish a programme for the size and shape of the future Fleet. This is what all are waiting to hear. Why do the Government not publish such a programme? Is it because the size and shape of the future Fleet is so small that it would dismay the Navy, or, on the other hand, is it that it is so big that it would dismay hon. Members below the Gangway opposite?
I turn now to a new piece of jargon which has crept in in recent years. This is the subject of over-stretch. Over-stretch is a very real difficulty. Its effects were, to be fair, brought out very well in last year's Defence Review. For the men in the Fleet over-stretch means too much work and too little play. It means what they call "drafting turbulence" and

"pierhead jumps". It means the problems which were well set out in a report sent in by the captain of an aircraft carrier a year or two ago which bore the title "Always on Sunday".
It means that the Government are hoisting Nelson's signal "England expects …" and so on but are not providing the men with the necessary gear. The White Paper says that the Government's aim has been to reduce this overstretch of our Forces. That is fine. It goes on to say that this is now being achieved. The plain fact is—ask any serving officer or rating—that the overstretch in the Fleet continues and is as bad as ever. It is sheer humbug to claim that this over-stretch has now been reduced, or that it can be reduced by cuts in naval Votes. That is not the way to reduce it. What it comes to is that many people feel that the Government's bland statement in the White Paper
… that the defence review must be a continging process and a permanent part of our policy making.
is merely a cover plan. What they fear is that this conceals the Government's real intentions to "bring the legions home" and then to demobilise them.
The subject of east of Suez has occupied our debates for a good deal of time. Under the headings "Redeployment of Forces", "South East Asia After 'confrontation'", the White Paper pays a well-deserved tribute to the achievements of the British and Commonwealth forces, and I join very heartily in that tribute. The White Paper continues:
There can be no certainty—so long as threats to stability remain—that those forces will not be required to give help to friendly Governments.…
I agree with this emphasis on the peacekeeping rôle, and I feel that this is a job which mobile task forces of the Royal Navy are very well fitted to carry out. A moment ago the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy made the point that maritime task forces are the way to carry out this job.
Having stated this commitment overseas, the Government's Defence Review deprives the Royal Navy of the one type of ship which above all others would enable it to make this rôle a reality, that is to say the aircraft carrier. I want to deal with the aircraft carrier in its own


right. The decision to phase out the aircraft carrier force is a catastrophic mistake whichever way one looks at it How can it possibly be reconciled with the Prime Minister's remarks in Plymouth in 1964:
We believe that in the present condition of the world we need a stronger and more effective Navy."?
This subject has been so much discussed that I will not take up the time of the House in making the case for seaborne air power all over again. I would like to emphasise one or two points. In the Defence Review last year it was stated in page 10 that:
… aircraft operating from land bases should take over the strike-reconnaissance and air-defence functions of the carrier…
One must ask the Government where these land bases are to be.
The Government have scuttled out of Aden, and the island strategy about which we heard so much seems to have been dropped, because there was no mention of it in the White Paper. The island-based strategy was a conspicuous omission from the White Paper, and we should like to hear more about this. The Defence Review also says:
Strike capability against enemy ships will be provided by the surface-to-surface guided missile mentioned in paragraph 2 above".
Here we come to the crux of one of the most important arguments about the aircraft carrier, because at least 15 years ago it was known to British naval intelligence that the Soviets were developing a surface-to-surface guided missile. At that time the Royal Navy took a definite and conscious decision not to go ahead with the development of such a missile, but to depend upon a much more effective strike capability of the Fleet Air Arm.
The position is that the Russians have certain types of surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 15 to 300 miles and they have supplied other navies, notably the Egyptians and the Indonesians, with these weapons. Still for understandable reasons, the Royal Navy has no such missile. The proposal to start now at this late stage to develop such a missile is patently absurd. It will be infinitely expensive and will take many years to perfect. The Government have belatedly realised this, because there is no mention of it in the White Paper. Is it still being

developed? Can we be told specifically how much money is being allocated and what is the time-scale, or has the project been cancelled? If not, what will its range be?
To sum up the technical arguments of the aircraft carrier, the Navy would be hamstrung without it and would be unable to operate safely anywhere outside the range of shore-based fighters, not just aircraft but fighters. The best proof of this professional opinion was provided by the resignation of the First Sea Lord, Sir David Luce, last year. T am sorry to say that the Secretary of State made light of this at the time with some rather cheap remarks.
Everyone in this House should recognise Admiral Luce's honesty and integrity and purpose, and certainly the Royal Navy understood what he did. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew), who also resigned at the same time, said this:
But it is the considered professional view of the Navy, and the unanimous opinion of the Board, that the carrier plan in the White Paper is unworkable."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd February, 1966; Vol. 725, c. 259.]
I see that he is in his place. No doubt he remembers saying this. I emphasise that I am not trying to criticise the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, who clearly sees it as his duty to try to run the Royal Navy to the best of his ability under the directive which he has been given.

Mr. Healey: It was certainly the considered professional view of the Admiralty Board at the time and the Chairman of the Board, but that was based on the belief, which turned out to he mistaken, I am glad to say, that Fleet Air Arm recruiting would collapse when C.V.A.O.1 was not ordered. The Fleet Air Arm recruiting is almost embarrassingly high, too high for the training establishments to cope with. In other words, the reason on which this view was founded has turned out to be mistaken.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I quite agree with what the Secretary of State says about recruiting, and that is a tribute to the Fleet Air Arm. What wonderful chaps they are, even under this fantastic political directive, they still keep going and realise that somehow there will be some hope for them.


The new First Sea Lord is loyally trying to carry out the political directive, but it is fundamentally mistaken. I emphasise that I am not trying to "knock" the morale of the Fleet Air Arm which in all the circumstances has borne up wonderfully well. Surely the remedy is to look again at the whole question with an unprejudiced eye. I am convinced that we could get away from the traditionally very elaborate and sophisticated aircraft carrier and that it will be possible to develop a new type which, for ease of reference, I will call the "harrier carrier" because that is the type of aircraft which might be embarked. I would not mind calling it the "Healey carrier", as long as we could have some! She would be basically a large commercial tanker-type hull with a relatively unsophisticated aircraft embarked.
These would be the VTOL or short take-off type of aircraft and, in my opinion, they could be flown by the Royal Air Force or the Royal Navy, equally and absolutely interchangeable. Such a ship would be just a mobile landing strip. I am the first to admit that naval opinion is not unanimously in favour of this type of ship. I know that there are arguments that the cost will escalate, and that it will cost as much as the traditional type and so on.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Could the hon. and gallant Gentleman give an approximate estimate of the cost?

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: It would be appreciably less than the traditional type of aircraft carrier, and that should please the hon. Gentleman. Such a ship would be cheaper, although not necessarily very much cheaper. The point is that it would provide air support on the spot and on the dot, which is an essential requirement for any task force commander. Would the Secretary of State genuinely consider this possibility? Without something like this, the Royal Navy will be sunk, and the Government's declared overseas policy will sink with it.
Will the Ministry of Defence look again at the strategic aspects of Malta as a matter of urgency?

Mr. Healey: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman has left the question of the rôle east of Suez, would he confirm what

he said on Monday, that we should give a helping hand in Vietnam?

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: If I were to start discussing in a debate on the Navy Estimates where Army battalions should be located, I should soon be ruled out of order.
May I go on to the question of Malta?

Mr. Tom Driberg: rose—

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I will just get started on Malta and then I will give way.
Would the Ministry of Defence look again at the strategic aspects of Malta as a matter of urgency so that they might be taken into account in the present discussions with the Prime Minister of Malta? There are various reasons for keeping a military presence in Malta. There is the importance of guarding the flank of N.A.T.O. There is our defence treaty with Libya. For this, one must have acclimatised troops somewhere in the area. The Secretary of State knows that if troops are not acclimatised they are liable to be prone to an undignified disease known as "dog" which is so debilitating that they would not be able to dig their own latrines for the first few days. If we fly troops from Salisbury Plain to Malta or Libya, they will be useless for the first vitally important week.

Mr. Driberg: The hon. and gallant Gentleman said on Monday that he thought that we should play an active part in helping the Americans physically in Vietnam. The Americans are now shelling the coast of North Vietnam. This is a naval debate, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman says. Does he suggest that we should send our ships there?

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I will not be drawn into a discussion of military forces in a debate on the Navy Estimates. I would see nothing inappropriate or objectionable if such units of the Far East fleet which can be spared from the patrol off Beira, which I do not agree with and which is using up a great many of our spare ships, were sent to assist our Commonwealth partners who are already operating in Vietnamese waters.

Mr. Horner: rose—

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I will not give way again.

Mr. Driberg: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is speaking from the Opposition Front Bench.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: The second point which I emphasise about the strategic importance of Malta is as a training area. The Government always pay lip-service to cost efficiency, and cost efficiency in training is obviously better done in the clear, fine weather in the Mediterranean than in the difficult conditions of the United Kingdom which we know so well.
Thirdly, there is the business of Malta becoming a Mediterranean Cuba, which it very easily can if we do not keep a reasonable military presence there. I ask the Minister to say what our N.A.T.O. partners are saying to us about our proposal to reduce our forces to nothing in Malta. Would they be happy if we were to leave Malta?
On 2nd March, 1964, the Minister of Defence (Administration) said:
Look at the 'Med'. The Med. Fleet, once said to be the proud emblem of British supremacy in the Mediterranean and one of the largest fleets in the world. Under the Conservative Party it has been reduced to four frigates, two submarines and six minesweepers." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1964; Vol. 690, c. 1069.]
Look at what it has been reduced to under this Government.
I should like to make a constructive suggestion about the use of Malta. One of the Secretary of State's greatest difficulties must be where he is going to put the troops and families who come home from various stations overseas. Would it not be possible to look upon Malta as part of the United Kingdom base?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Sydney Irving): Order. The hon. and gallant Gentleman is getting rather far from the Navy Estimates if he is talking about troops in Malta.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Then I shall confine myself to the naval men being brought home who need to be accommodated. Would it not be possible to use Malta as part of the United Kingdom base? If it is possible to fly men out there in a hurry, is it not pos-

sible to fly them home equally quickly? This would make an enormous saving in barracks and married quarters and should be very good for training. It would also be a spur to recruiting and the Secretary of State would be able to continue the fascinating and glamorous advertisements which he had in the Press until recently about the delights of serving overseas.
What has happened to the A.N.F.? Is this project still alive, or has it at last been recognised as being what The Times called the "conning tower of Babel".
I come now to H.M.S. "Fearless" and H.M.S. "Intrepid". These are most valuable ships and are very much the shape of things to come. But surely their essentially peace-keeping rôle is not well explained by calling them assault ships. "Assault" is the one thing which the Secretary of State says we shall not do. Would it not be better to call them commando cruisers?
Would the hon. Gentleman, when he winds up, make a further statement about the Service colleges? The White Paper and the Minister's quick-fire explanation on Monday were very unclear on this subject. Would the hon. Gentleman answer these questions about Greenwich? Is it true that the Chiefs of Staff and the Howard-English Report separately recommended that the Defence College should be at Greenwich rather than at Shrivenham? Secondly, is it a fact that no detailed costings have been done to enable a comparison to be made? Thirdly, if the move is made, what will happen to the Jason nuclear reactor, which was specially installed at Greenwich for training officers and artificers of the Polaris fleet? How much did this cost, and could it be moved?
Why has the Naval Staff College been moved to Minley Manor?

Mr. Christopher Mayhew: Referring to the Naval College at Greenwich, is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that costings have been made which show that there will be a very serious waste of public money if the Royal Defence College is sent, not to Greenwich, but to Shrivenham? Nearly £1 million will be wasted.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: I did hear something to that effect, and then I heard a rival argument that it would be


very marginally more expensive to run at Greenwich than at Shrivenham. Shrivenham is a dreadful place, with groups of buildings separately located and red brick in outlook as well as in construction. It would be dreadful if the college went to Shrivenham.

Mr. Dalyell: I took the trouble to visit Shrivenham. I was impressed with the whole situation there. Perhaps it is not difficult to impress me.

Read-Admiral Morgan Giles: If the hon. Gentleman went to Greenwich, he would be even more impressed.
Is it not a fact that the Minister of Defence (Administration) has been trying for years to get his hands on Greenwich? Did he not say to the House on 3rd April, 1963, that there was terrific wastage at Greenwich and that it would be put to far better use as a university? If so, should not the hon. Gentleman, now that he is in office, show a wider and more responsible outlook? Should he not show some regard for Service traditions and for the morale of the young officers of all three Services for which he is responsible? I have covered a great many points. I should now like to refer to dockyards. In view of the heavy load of refit and modernisation work, will the Minister say why new frigates are still being built at the Royal Dockyard instead of being put out to contract?
Housing loans for ratings are an excellent idea, and I am sure that everybody welcomes them, but why are they not being provided for officers, even officers from the lower deck? How can this distinction be reconciled with the Government's talk about social justice? The First Sea Lord's recent News Letter to Flag and Commanding Officers says—
In the present financial climate the chances of persuading the Treasury to agree to a scheme of this sort are, regrettably, very slim, and it would be a mistake to press our case too hard at the present time.
Would it be a mistake? I cannot imagine any more necessary task for the Minister to undertake in his new job. Will he say what he has done about this, what approach he has made to the Treasury, and what has been the result? I am sure that he will understand if I say that the Navy expects its Minister to stick up for it.
Regarding recruiting, Table 4 in Annexe A of the White Paper gives a disturbing picture of a short-fall in the recruiting of artificer apprentices. What remedies do the Government propose in this direction? It is a real difficulty in the modern scientific Navy.
In view of the remarks of the Secretary of State yesterday about overall manpower difficulties, which he indicated might be a bottleneck or limiting factor, will he say what approach he has made to the Secretary of State for Education about explaining to schoolchildren the opportunities which are offered by a career in the Services? My information is that last year Service career officers were denied admission to no fewer than 648 schools.
To conclude, the Minister will realise that the general air of uncertainty and indecision about the future of the Navy, which has been conveyed by this White Paper, must inevitably act as a great discouragement and is bound to be reflected adversely in the morale of the Navy.
I do not wish to say anything that would add to the loss of morale. I believe in the future of the Navy. It has weathered worse storms in the past than just a Socialist Government. If I had 10 sons they could all happily go into the Navy. Nevertheless—and I say this very seriously indeed—after talking to serving ratings and serving officers, I am left wondering whether those politically responsible for the present retrenchments really do understand what is happening to the morale of the Fleet. I direct this particularly to the Secretary of State. Does he really understand this?
I promised not to quote Nelson, but I will quote another great man, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham, whose memorial will be unveiled in Trafalgar Square next month. In a very dark period of the war he said:
It will take only three years to build more ships, but it will take 300 years to build a new tradition.
The Navy has served the nation well in the past, and beyond doubt it will have to do so again in the future, but I urge the Secretary of State and all those politically responsible for the Navy to pay heed to Lord Cunningham's words.

5.14 p.m.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: We could agree that the officers and men


of the Royal Navy have rendered a great and distinguished service to Britain. As one who, during 18 months on a ship's school, came in contact with officers and ratings of the Navy both in home ports and the Mediterranean. I have come to have a high regard for naval personnel. In particular, as a result of the experience of a day spent on board ship in the Malacca Straits in the congenial company of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles), in September, 1965, I know how difficult was the Navy's task in South-East Asia, particularly those of us who know something about the 3,000-mile coastline around Malaysia.
All this is not in question. The trying conditions of the odious, nerve-racking war, the great difficulties, for example, in searching sampans, the dangers involved, the midshipmen who lost their lives in this operation, and the strain of continuous day and night operations—all this is not in doubt.
What I question is whether it was necessary, whether it was right, and will we ever have to do it again? The purpose of my speech is to deploy the argument that the naval operations during confrontation were needlessly brought about, as was the entire campaign, in the first place, by the actions of a former Administration. They were not justified, on this occasion, and such operations outside European waters will never be justified again, in my view.
The navy Estimates should be framed in anticipation of an India-type operation, in which we bring our forces back from the Far East and the Middle East. This is a minority point of view, but it is fair, in the Navy Estimates debate, to go into some detail as to why this minority point of view should be put.
The first argument why the Navy was out in the Far East in this arduous campaign—and we do not disagree about this—was to uphold the political stability of South-East Asia. Here a great deal depends on the particular view of history that one has.
The White Paper presents a certain view of history. No great purpose would be served in delving into this view of history, were it not for the fact that, on page 6, a false view, a mythical view, is being used to create a basis for misleading

conclusions about the future, particularly about the future strength of all Forces including, not least, the Navy.
Those who appeal to history to support their argument about future policy would be well advised to consider the full history and to survey all the facts before jumping to conclusions about future policy about the size of future Forces, and any other matter. The official view of this—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman is getting a little too far into a debate on general defence policy. He may adduce some of these arguments as incidental or he may refer to them, but he should not extend his speech to general comment on general defence policy.

Mr. Dalyell: I am seeking to point out that it is argued in the Defence White Paper that confrontation, which was as much a naval war as it was a military war—there is no doubt about this—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are not discussing the White Paper. We are discussing Vote A. The hon. Gentleman must come nearer to Vote A.

Mr. Dalyell: This is a vital issue, because the assumption here is that the size of naval forces has to be determined by particular commitments. In my view, it does not make very much sense to argue about the size of naval forces unless they can be related to a view of commitments.
I will not go into the matter in great detail, but simply say that the official view claims that without the contribution of the Commonwealth effort, much of South-East Asia would have collapsed into disorder, perhaps inviting competitive intervention by other Powers, with the consequent risk of general war and that, to use the words of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, millions of people in South-East Asia have cause to be grateful to us.
Another view of history would come to a very different conclusion, namely, that had there not been ships manned by white sailors in Singapore and had there not later been white soldiers in Borneo, the circumstances that brought about confrontation would never have arisen.


Can it be denied that Malaysia was one of those absurd federation concepts dreamed up in Whitehall in the 1950s? There may be reasons for this—complicated reasons would be out of place here —such as maintaining the superiority in numbers of the Malays over the Chinese. All these details, I agree, are not relevant to this argument. What is relevant, however, is that the fact remains that the union of Malaya and Northern Borneo was a European creation. The fact is that the Conservative Administration did not consult the Indonesians in the setting-up—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is getting into a general debate on defence policy That is not admissible in this debate, which is dealing with the administration of the Service in Vote A. The hon. Members must come more narrowly to Vote A.

Mr. Dalyell: I will base my remarks on Vote A, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
No one likes a war with the unpleasantness of gelignite and sampans and all that our sailors went through in the Malacca Straits. But it is absurd for a Labour Defence Secretary and Labour Front Bench spokesmen to base an argument for planning east of Suez-size forces on experience of a war that would never have started but for the lack of understanding of a Conservative Administration.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is proceeding merrily on his way. These are important matters, but this is not the occasion to debate them. He must stick to the Estimates.

Mr. Dalyell: I entirely accept your Ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I come back to Vote A.
We are concerned with granting vast sums of money. This is not in doubt. What appals me is the contrast between the sums of money that we are discussing in this sparsely-attended debate and the fairly modest sums for which some of us have been asking in vain in terms of E.C.G.D. cover, for example, for tin dredgers for the islands off Sumatra and for E.C.G.D. cover for trucks and tractors, crucial for Indonesian development, made by the British Motor Corporation. It is the contrast between these vast sums and the modest sums that some of us have been

refused by the Board of Trade for development purposes, the real source of stability that should concern us when we are discussing these vast sums of money.
I have to draw other contrasts because it should not be done in terms of particular schemes. What about the contrast of the vast sums of money involved in these Estimates and the money which we have to raise in terms of fees for overseas students? When we are discussing this kind of money, it is meaningless unless one puts it in perspective.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We discussed the general commitment of the Navy on Monday and Tuesday of this week. We are now discussing how the Navy can play its part in its allotted rôle. The hon. Member must come more narrowly to the Estimates, or he must resume his seat.

Mr. Dalyell: I do not know whether it is in order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to refer to a defence debate speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Roebuck). It may sound strange that I refer to that speech. The accents may have been those of Harrow, East but the trend of my hon. Friend's thoughts reveals his intellectual debt to a much more formidable figure in the military and naval affairs of this Administration, namely, my right hon. Friend the Paymaster-General. No one else talks about Kipling's Tommies around here.
I am a sincere admirer of the Paymaster-General. He was the one man who had the prescience to forecast in the 1950s the troubles that would arise from the setting up of Malaysia. That is to his credit, as are many other things, too. He was, perhaps, the most effective backbencher of the last 10 years. At all times his views are to be taken seriously, and not least his views on Singapore.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I do not think that the Chair would wish to dispute the submission that we ought to take the Paymaster-General seriously. The debate today, however, is on Estimates, on Vote A, on the administration of the Navy. The hon. Member must come to the Estimates or I must ask him to resume his seat.

Mr. Dalyell: I would like to concentrate for a moment on the question


of Singapore Dockyard, which comes under Vote A. I admit straight away that Singapore certainly has its problems. It has its economic problems. The question which we have to look at, however, is precisely what are our obligations concerning the Naval Dockyard and to Lee Kuan Yew. If it is a justified proposition that we should give aid to Lee Kuan Yew, are we really sure that continuing a naval presence on this basis is the way in which we should do it? Is this the optimum way?
If the argument which is deployed is that we have obligations to Singapore, obligations which I would not care to deny, there are many better ways of fulfilling them than continuing a naval presence.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Member is still discussing general defence policy, which is out of order in this debate. I must ask him not to proceed in this way.

Mr. Dalyell: I think that it will be in order to discuss the Australia argument, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because this involves naval help to Australia and New Zealand and the terms of our obligations. Here I deny that we have obligations, since Australia has opted for A.N.Z.U.S. and did not invite us to be members of A.N.Z.U.S.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. These are general and defence policy questions which are out of order in this debate.

Dame Irene Ward: That is six times.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Before the hon. Member has to leave the question of the Australian and New Zealand Navies, I would like to emphasise, if he was referring to the point which I made about them, that I would like to see our Forces co-operating with the Australian and New Zealand Navies and giving them any help we can in consideration of the effort that they are making in Vietnam.

Mr. Driberg: In Vietnam?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) is hardly being very helpful. I am trying to be as patient as possible with the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), because I realise his difficulties, but this cannot

be a general foreign affairs or defence debate.

Mr. Dalyell: I respect the Chair. On purely naval matters, may I ask what are our naval obligations to Fiji and express the hope that we will not meddle in the affairs of Fiji?
You have been very patient, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I will now come on to the questions which, I am sure, are of an unexceptionable nature. Could we know something of the maritime rôle of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft? In the defence debate, we were told that its radius of action was enormous. I would like to know how enormous it is. May we have some facts on the maritime rôle of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft, during the wind up?
May we also have some facts on the supposed lifetime of Polaris? How many years is a Polaris supposed to last? Is a Polaris supposed to be less effective than the nuclear strike Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft which is to follow it? Why do we need both Polaris and A.F.V.G.? What discussions are taking place at Geneva on the Polaris? Can the Minister tell us anything about the discussions which the Minister for Disarmament is conducting at present in Geneva?
May I then refer to paragraph 44 of the White Paper, where it says that extensive studies have been made of all possible ships and weapons systems which the Royal Navy will require as replacements in the middle and late 1970s? Could we be told why those replacements are needed, in the light of the question which was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer) about the 7,000 missiles which were supposed to be based in the N.A.T.O. area in Europe? If the 7,000 already exist, it is legitimate to ask why we want a new series of sophisticated and expensive naval weapons systems. Are these new naval weapons systems to have a deterrent rôle?
Then I am a little mystified about dockyards. At the invitation of my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Mr. Adam Hunter), with my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Central (Mr. Oswald) I met a delegation from Rosyth. Its members were very much


concerned about their employment prospects. Some of those who work in Rosyth are my constituents from Queens-ferry, and I would like to put to the Under-Secretary the speech which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made at Plymouth, when he said:
… there is one thing that I want to add—the greater use of Royal dockyards, as well as Royal Ordnance Factories, for civil work.
He went on:
I believe the tasks facing Britain—modernisation of our industrial plant, building up of our exports, and the contribution it is our moral duty to make to under-developed countries—these tasks are so great that we shall need all our capacity and more, all our skilled workers, and we shall have to train more. I believe there will come a time when Plymouth's dependence on the Admiralty side of the Ministry of Defence will be matched by a growing interest in the work of the new Ministry of Overseas Development we are going to establish.
It seems to me that here is the basis of a very constructive and practical suggestion, and, if work becomes a bit tight, I should like to know whether the ideas of the Prime Minister at Plymouth on 27th September, 1964, will be put into operation.
I should like to know also what steps are being taken for naval personnel to be transferred to the Merchant Service should naval ships be withdrawn. My hon. Friend knows very well that there is a terrific problem. The Merchant Service is becoming desperately short of ships' engineers, and one would have thought that there was some scope for placing men who may be made redundant from the Royal Navy.
Then I want to go on to the subject of costs. I do not know whether it will be in order to say this, but the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) said in the defence debate that he had no responsibility for estimating the cost of the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft. I want to make the general point that, in presenting their plans, the Opposition have an obligation to look at costs—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. This is not relevant to the Navy Estimates at all, I am afraid.

Hon. Members: Eight.

Dame Irene Ward: Seven, I think.

Mr. Dalyell: There was an exchange between the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester and my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) on precisely that question. I would say to hon. Gentlemen opposite that those who were responsible for the escalating costs of Seaslug and many other matters which the Public Accounts Committee looked at, should bear in mind this fact. Part of my motivation in all this comes from three years spent in Room 16 as a member of the Public Accounts Committee looking at escalation. Before any policy is put forward by any political party, it would at least be wise to do a cost analysis as far as one is able. I marvel at the way politicians, in a light-hearted way, make statements about expenditure in these matters—

Mr. Wall: May I ask the hon. Gentleman if he has got these cost estimates from his own Front Bench? After all, they have the facilities, and the Opposition have not.

Mr. Dalyell: It is not for want of trying. In my view, the Government Front Bench have been more reasonable than the previous Administration, when it was really hard work getting cost estimates. I freely concede that those who are confident about cost estimates in these matters run the very grave risk of being proved wrong. Over the past 20 years, estimate has been exceeded by reality by a factor, on average, of two and a half to three. In the case of Fire Streak, Thunderbird and Seaslug, there were grotesque excesses, and these matters are extremely relevant to those which we are discussing.
Frankly, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I think that you would rule out of order the rest of what I intended to say, which I consider to be dealing with extremely important matters. It would be an abuse of the House, in those circumstances, if I were to continue, and I should not like to vitiate my argument by doing that.
It is the contrast between the vast sums with which we are concerned today and our inability to get small sums for our worthy purposes—and I do not want to ride my own particular hobby horses—which causes me to be extremely disconsolate about the total policy.

5.38 p.m.

Dame Joan Vickers: I am pleased to be able to follow the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) on one point, which is the subject of South-East Asia. I, too, spent a day with the Navy on a patrol boat and saw the excellent work which was done. If it had not been for the Royal Navy, we should not have had peace in that part of the world now. Indonesia would not only have over-run Sarawak and Sabah, but perhaps Singapore and Malaya itself. One has only to look at the White Paper to see the thanks which Tunku Abdul Rahman gave to our troops. Moreover, it should be emphasised that they were not only white troops, because Malaya also played a great part in the Royal Malaysian Navy and in the Malayan Army, and the White Paper draws attention to the way that British troops fought alongside Malay troops. In that connection, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will realise the tremendous part played by the Royal Navy.
I want to mention H.M.S. "Ark Royal" and H.M.S. "Eagle", both Devonport ships, and pay tribute to the part which they played off Beira. The length of time which both ships were at sea is a record. The "Ark Royal" was not in the best of health and is at the moment undergoing a refit. It is a tribute to her engineers that they kept her going for so long. The Navy has a tremendous part to play in future—in Aden, for instance. Even after Aden gets independence, I am sure that we shall need to have a Navy patrolling the seas to stop gun running and the entry of dissidents.
It is the future we must think about. The Estimates are vague about how big a Navy we need and about what type it should be. The White Paper says:
The Government remains committed to its policy of working towards general and complete disarmament.
But this is contrary to what we have been hearing today. I am glad to see the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy in his place, as he has been very helpful in answering Questions which I have put. Perhaps he can give some indication of the type of Navy which is intended for policing the seas in future.
Even if there is no future war, we must still give official protection to such places as the Falkland Islands. We should congratulate the Royal Marine detachment which recently acted so swiftly there, and H.M.S. "Tuma" and H.M.S. "Protector" which have played a very big part in keeping the peace which we all desire. Until a situation is accepted like Motion No. 415 on the Order Paper which is headed by the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Handsworth (Sir E. Boyle), dealing with the "Defence of peace in the minds of men", we must have a practical means of keeping the peace.
I should therefore like to draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the expenditure and ask whether he does not feel that the Royal Navy, although its Estimates are higher than those for the other two Services, is in fact the least expensive in overseas currency. The Secretary of State is reported in the Daily Telegraph as saying:
The intention is to prolong the Navy's aircraft carrier force beyond 1975 and possibly to 1980.
This is very different from the previous policy. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could tell us whether it is the intention to keeping the existing aircraft carriers on until the 1980s.
The Fleet Air Arm was to be run down about 1975. If this is still the intention, how will the right hon. Gentleman get a sufficient Fleet Air Arm to make these carriers useful? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could co-ordinate these two statements about aircraft carriers and the Fleet Air Arm.
The Estimates are very vague also about the kind of ships which we shall have to the middle 1970s. We are told that the carrier force will continue to he a component of the highest importance. But what will take its place when it is finished in the 1980s?
We are told, too, that N.A.T.O. must be ready at sea as well as on land to demonstrate its will and ability to respond promptly to active aggression. Paragraph 42 says:
Since Britain's contribution to N.A.T.O. will have a critical influence on the composition and deployment of all three Services, final decisions on the shape and size of our defence forces in the 1970s must await the outcome of the N.A.T.O. discussions.


Can we be given a firm date for the N.A.T.O. Conference and when we may have any idea of the plans for laying down of ships in future?
We were told that, in a recent exercise, the Royal Naval Squadron was the largest contingent. Shall we be able to play our full share in future? I am sure—the hon. Gentleman mentioned this —that extensive studies have been made of possible ships and weapons systems which would be required in the Fleet in the middle and late 1970s, but these things take a considerable time to come to fruition. If we still do not know what type of ships we will have, how can we know what type of weapons we want to supply them with? This is what is worrying me.
We have the idea of the Sea Dart—I do not know how it has progressed—and the Seaslug. If we are to have no idea of the size of the Fleet and the type of weapons, it will make things extremely difficult for the future.
Present day ships are mentioned. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has had time yet to visit some of these ships, but I consider that the conditions on some ships are certainly not as modern as they should be. For example, many in the tropical waters of the Middle and Far East are still not air-conditioned. If the hon. Gentleman ever saw H.M.S. "Verulam", which is one of the scientific ships, and the conditions in which her seamen have to live, he would agree that this is not a credit to the Navy. Engineers, of whom we are very short at present, have to work overtime in many cases to keep the ships going.
In referring to the dockyard in Singapore, I should like also to draw attention to the Navy in Singapore, as the two subjects are tied together. I hope that, until the Royal Malaysian Navy can be adequately trained, we will not remove our forces from this part of the world. I consider that east of Suez is still our most important rôle, but I cannot go into details. The political situation is such that we shall need to keep our forces there for some considerable time.
We had the confrontation with Indonesia, which entailed sending our ships and men in great numbers to Singapore, but we may also have confrontation with

China when she has settled her internal problems, which may result in further ships being needed to patrol those waters. As we have been saying today how successful our Navy was in keeping the peace in the Indonesian confrontation, perhaps we should consider not running it down too quickly in the Far East in case we face this difficulty again—

Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order. Without being unjust, is there a feminine advantage in this House? It seems that the hon. Lady is raising matters in the same way as I sought to do.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Gentleman may have observed that I was sitting anxiously on the edge of my seat, wondering at what point in time I ought to intervene to stop the hon. Lady from proceeding in the direction that she was going. I was hoping that she would conclude on that sentence. I would point out to her that she is now getting into a much wider field than the Estimates.

Dame Joan Vickers: I was actually concluding on that point, and was mentioning the Royal Navy, for which we are asked to provide these Estimates. We have in the Estimates to pay for these ships in the Far East. My point was that the Estimates should be very much smaller if we are not to keep our Navy in the Far East. We might halve them if we decided to move everything back from the Far East as our presence there is one reason why the Estimates are so large.
I should like to refer now to the Templar Committee. There are several working committees and I should like to know what they are doing. It is extremely difficult to find out. We are told, in regard to the Templar Committee, that the system for logistic support in aircraft and guided weapons is continuing to receive detailed studies. The difficulty is to find out what these detailed studies are, and I should be grateful for some help.
I gather that the integrated system is being re-assessed in the light of the reserve plans for re-equipping the R.A.F. and Royal Navy with certain guided weapons which will have common support. We should be very interested to know what these guided weapons are.
I was interested also in the Howard-English Report and tried to get a copy


from the Library, but was told that it was an inter-Departmental report, and so could get very little information. Could the hon. Gentleman place it in the Library? It affects the Navy very much and I should like to know the effect, particularly, on H.M.S. "Britannia". Will it have any effect on the cadets in H.M.S. "Britannia" from overseas and the Commonwealth, because of the different type of education which they may need to have in future? I gathered that from what his right hon. Friend said in opening the debate on Monday. Will the hon. Gentleman also tell us how the Joint Synopsis Scale Committee does its work? We have various committees dealing with the Estimates, but we do not have any idea of the progress they are making. Has the Defence Research Committee, which is mentioned in paragraph 2 of page 44, yet made a survey of the defence research programme?
We have an admirable gentleman, Mr. Raymond Brown, who is apparently selling equipment, but it seems difficult to sell naval equipment. When I came back from New Zealand, where they wanted to buy a naval ship, I put down Parliamentary Questions to the Prime Minister and it was months before a ship was sold to the New Zealand Navy. We have quite a number of mothballed ships which we might be able to sell to offset expenses.
The Hydrographic and Oceanographic Survey, which is mentioned in the Estimates, is a service that could probably be expanded very quickly. We cannot in our present economic state do very much in relation to space, but I understand that we are in advance of the world in this type of work. We shall have many more men from the Royal Navy back in this country in due course, and this might be one of the jobs they could do. It is vastly important that we should do more about mapping the seas, and know what is happening under the water. Such work might even help in connection with food, as mentioned by the Under-Secretary—taking food to India, for instance. This is extremely important work, and I hope that the Minister will agree to look at every suggestion.
I should have thought that recruitment figures would have been very much better because of the present rate of unemployment. Unemployment in Plymouth runs at 3·7 per cent., and when there is un-

employment in a Service town men are more likely to turn to the Service connected with that town. But the fact is that we are terribly short of artificers, mechanicians, apprentices and engineers. This is not the first debate in which I have taken part when mention has been made of shortage, particularly of artificers and engineers. What special programme has the hon. Gentleman in mind for trying to recruit to this branch? Do men want more pay, or are they not getting adequate training, or are they not really interested in life at sea? Are individuals being kept too long overseas because of the present shortage? I think that in many cases they are.
I am glad that the Under-Secretary paid tribute to the women's services, where recruiting figures keep up very well, except for nursing sisters, and we know there is a demand for nursing sisters the world over. There is also a shortage of doctors, though not of dental mechanics. I hope that the Minister will see that far more use is made of the naval hospitals for civilian purposes. We have very good co-operation of this kind at the Royal Naval Hospital at Devonport. Most naval patients, however, are in hospital as a result of accidents rather than disease, so that the naval doctors do not get sufficient practice of the sort they would like. If we could have more civilians in these hospitals, where there are quite a number of empty beds, it would give the doctors greater scope. There might also be some interchange between naval and civilian doctors in the local hospitals so that they all got more experience.
Turning to recruitment and re-engagement, I understand that the Secretary of State has received from the National Council for Civil Liberties a very interesting memorandum on teen-age Servicemen and provision for their discharge from the Services. I will not go into details, but I should have thought that this type of document would be extremely helpful in finding out the reasons for people joining or not joining the Services. Research of this kind might be undertaken by the Department. We might have some personnel research to find out why people join the Services, and what they feel about the environment and stresses and strains of Service life. We talk a lot about mechanical equipment and armament but very little research is done into


the human side, yet the happiness of the Service depends so much, especially in peace time, on seeing that the people working in it have the right environment.
I notice that cadets or junior ratings between the ages of 15 and 17½ years are coming in very satisfactory numbers. A study there might show how and why they are coming in, why they leave—and why they so often leave before they reach pensionable age. That information would be of enormous assistance to the Service in future, and it would also mean a saving of money.
In page 72 of the Statement, one reads:
The time when standards ashore could be ignored in the interests of maintaining the ships afloat is past.
I agree to some extent with that statement, but men often have to remain on board for considerable lengths of time, and the actual comforts provided—I have mentioned air conditioning— when they are at work must not be overlooked when we are considering the type of accommodation they are to have ashore.
I was rather disturbed to hear about the mobile houses and caravans, because in Plymouth I have seen very poor caravan sites for naval personnel. I also got in touch with the hon. Gentleman's Department and with the Minister of Public Building and Works with regard to future accommodation. I was asked to send them lists of accommodation that might be available, but when I did send lists they were rejected as containing accommodation of too high a standard. Perhaps we may be told what standard the Department intends to observe.
As to the dockyards, we were told by the Prime Minister in his celebrated speech in Plymouth:
We believe in fair wages, fair conditions. Under the Tory pay pause (which they would now like you to forget) it was public servants. Government employees who got the rough end of the policy.
It fell on me as Labour Party spokesman to lead the attack on the Government's pay pause policy and to censure their wanton breach of national agreements, agreements to which their word and honour were pledged, in respect of a whole range of Admiralty employees, here and elsewhere.
We are still waiting for that pledge to be honoured, because wages and conditions

in the dockyards are still anything but satisfactory.
In this leaflet "Industrial Civil Servants' Pay—A New Deal" we find, when we work it out, that the new deal means that a number of men still take home less than £10 a week. That is not an adequate living wage. Whichever scheme is used, I trust that the wages paid under it will apply to all people employed by the Department, and that apparently is not the case at present. I also hope that it will be ensured that nobody has a basic wage of less than, say, £13 a week. No worker should be expected to try to keep a family on £10 or less a week. I have a number of details with me showing what is happening under the present system. I will give the figures to the Minister later and not delay the House by quoting them now.
If one is a pensioner of the Royal Navy and wishes to work in a dockyard after the age of 60, one is allowed to receive one's Navy pension. On the other hand, if one is an established industrial worker in a dockyard and has to retire at the age of 60, then, on being re-employed as a non-established worker, one cannot draw one's dockyard pension until the age of 65. Many of the dockyard workers must go on working because they do not receive their retirement pensions until they are 65 and their dockyard pensions are certainly not sufficient on which to live. I hope that the Minister will consider this matter and ensure that those civilians who work in the dockyards are placed on the same footing as Royal Navy personnel in this matter.
I hope that—from the point of view of Plymouth—we will be told what decision has been arrived at about the question of command, and also whether a change is proposed in the date when H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" will come from Londonderry. Previously the date 1970 was given. I hope that these matters will be finalised soon, because it helps with planning to know as far in advance as possible about these important matters.
The question of apprentice group instructors is of great importance and has been raised by several hon. Members. As a deputation went to see the Minister's predecessor about this matter, I will not go into the details of the issue now. It is very much regretted that what we


thought would be a satisfactory agreement is apparently not working out satisfactorily. It is unfortunate that those teaching apprentices in the Royal Naval dockyards are not, even now, on a par with those who work in H.M.S. "Fishguard" and similar establishments elsewhere. This state of affairs exists, despite the attempts of the Minister to get an agreement in January. If he cannot answer this question tonight, I hope that he will forward details to me because, as he is aware, I have been fighting this case, not only with the present Government but with previous Administrations, for about 10 years. It is time that we had a settlement and it is a pity that one was not reached recently, particularly since the Minister appeared to be so close to reaching one.
I thank the Minister for the courteous way in which he has answered my questions in the past and I trust that he will consider the points I have put today, because there is real concern that the Navy is at present in such an uncertain state about its future that this uncertainty may affect not only recruitment but the whole idea of what I believe the Minister is trying to achieve—a Royal Navy which can play its part, if necessary in war, but certainly in peace.

6.4 p.m.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: The Under-Secretary made a remark when opening this discussion which I must take up straight away. He said that certain hon. Members on this side of the House who were now complaining about the tremendous expenditure on Polaris voted for the Government in the two previous Defence Estimates debates, in which the question of Polaris was discussed.
I wish to make it abundantly clear that we were told at that time that the four Polaris submarines were an essential part of our Atlantic Nuclear Force. In voting for the Government on those occasions we were giving them the benefit of the doubt. We believed that they would bring about an Atlantic Nuclear Force. That being so, we must now be told what has happened to that concept. The answer to that question will be relevant to future discussions about Polaris submarines.
If we are not to internationalise the Polaris submarines and if they are part of

N.A.T.0.—which is not exactly the same thing—we should be told. Are we now to believe in the independent nuclear deterrent, with Polaris as the weapon involved? If so, the Government should state so openly. Do not let us slide into anything. In the debate on the 1966 White Paper— although on that occasion it was a red paper—the question of the A.N.F. was raised. That whole issue had been completely dropped.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: Sunk.

Mr. Heffer: As the hon. and gallant Gentleman aptly puts it, it has been sunk. As I say, we gave the Government the benefit of the doubt, but that, even though we had a majority of only three, was given with a heavy heart. On the first occasion the Labour Party had just been elected to office. On the second we were going into a General Election. We gave the Government the benefit of the doubt, but now, with a majority of 94, we appear to be saddled with this independent nuclear deterrent and it no longer appears to be the case that the A.N.F. is involved. This raises the whole question of whether or not we need this vast expenditure on Polaris submarines, and I shall concentrate my speech on this issue. At the beginning of 1963 my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said:
Let me again state our position. We on this side of the House have not been arguing either for Polaris or for Skybolt. We support neither.".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 1239.]
On 27th September, 1964, my right hon. Friend said in that famous speech from which hon. Gentlemen opposite so often quote:
The commitment to spend hundreds of millions of £s more on an all-American British deterrent, the Polaris programme, has pushed back for five years the important programme of nuclear-powered Hunter-Killer submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines we need. Nuclear vessels carrying missiles add nothing to Western strength and simply mean more and more pressure from other countries to become nuclear powers. Does anyone here view with any peace of mind the possibility of Germany as a nuclear power, for that is the logical conclusion of Tory policies?
My right hon. Friend was talking about the British independent nuclear deterrent developed by the Polaris submarine. I do not see any difference between what is now being done and what was being


done then. The only difference is that we have four in the programme whereas hon. Members opposite had five in the programme. So we are to save a certain amount of money because we cut one submarine out, but the basic strategy and policy are obviously the same.
Last Saturday the second Polaris submarine was launched at Birkenhead. In my mind I can still see the picture on television of the Minister's very charming wife allowing the bottle to go down—[An HON. MEMBER: "British wine I hope."]—and saying, "God bless her and all who serve in her". What was she blessing? According to a very interesting article this is what we were blessing:
Each submarine is costing an estimated £45 million to build and equip and each packs an awesome punch. With a range of 2,500 miles, the missiles it carries can reach anywhere on land, world-wide, and the explosive content of the 16 warheads carried in this one submarine is equivalent to more than the explosive content of all bombs dropped by both sides in the last war, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.
I do not know whether that statement is true, but it is what was said in an article in the Liverpool newspaper in relation to the launching of that vessel. We were blessing a destructive machine whose 16 missiles could produce more destructive bombs, including the nuclear bombs, dropped in the last war.
This is a Socialist Government. I am not a pacifist; I believe in defending our country, very much so. I spent four-and-a-half years in the last war playing my part in the defence of my country. But I see no point in accepting the tremendous financial cost for this sort of destructive weapon, particularly because it may not be absolutely correct that it has a world-wide range. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said in the defence debate on 4th March, 1963:
Now we are committed by the Nassau Agreement to buy four or five Polaris submarines, one of which will always be in dock and the others, in a crisis, will be lurking around in easily identified and restricted areas in inland waterways, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Baltic and the Barent Sea because their missiles cannot reach Soviet targets if they are put anywhere else.
Of course this is a different opinion from that in the newspaper article. Perhaps we can be told tonight whether these missiles have a worldwide range or would have to be in inland waterways.

It is an interesting point. My right hon. Friend went on to say:
Surely one major fact stands out a mile. It is that the American thermonuclear capacity for deterring aggression is infinitely more than sufficient of its rôle.… It is ludicrous in the face of this American capacity to talk about any need for a contribution from America's allies in this field.…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 4th March, 1963; Vol. 673, cc, 50, 57, 58.]
My right hon. Friend said that in March, 1963. If it was true then, is it not equally true now? Why must we be spending this enormous amount of money, £370 million, for these four vessels in total while at the same time my city and Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester and London are crying out for houses required by their people? Is it not recognised that every £100 million spent in defence expenditure means so many fewer houses, so many fewer universities and schools?

Mr. Horner: Has my hon. Friend not heard the most despicable argument yet profounded, namely, that the four submarines which are to be launched were allowed to stay in the programme of development because it was cheaper for the Government to allow them to be launched rather than to compensate the manufacturers for cancellation?

Mr. Heffer: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. I was coming to the question of whether we had always to continue with a programme with which we were saddled by the previous Government. It is very difficult to explain this, but the same argument can apply in relation to our commitments overseas.

Sir Douglas Glover: And for houses.

Mr. Heffer: We still built more houses than the party opposite. My argument is that we are not building more than we are building because of the wasteful expenditure on missiles and submarines such as the Polaris.
I do not want to take up the time of the House for very long, but I have been in my place for two-and-a-half days trying to take part in the debate. I wanted to develop points in relation to defence expenditure in general, but that I am not permitted to do in this debate; I have to confine myself now to remarks on the Navy Estimates. I wish to quote from a poem which I hope my right hon.


Friends on the Front Bench, particularly the Minister of Defence, will bear in mind. It was written by C. Day Lewis:
who raised his hand to brand the Cain
And blessed a submarine?
Time is up,
The medicine man must take his medicine.
That is an apt poem in these particular circumstances. The submarine at Birkenhead was blessed by the Bishop of Chester, who incidentally made quite clear in the process that this was a tradition and it did not mean that he accepted the expenditure on the submarine and the fact that it was for destruction. That was not said by anyone on our side of the fence, unfortunately.
In the context of the present political situation, when it is recognised that there is a déetente in Europe, when it is recognised in the White Paper that the possibilities of a war breaking out in Europe have diminished and under existing circumstances that is practically impossible, and that we have 7,000 nuclear weapons at our disposal now as part of the alliance, my argument is that these four Polaris submarines are totally unnecessary.
It is true that we inherited the programme. It is true that hon. Members gave the Government the benefit of the doubt on the basis of the A.N.F. In these new circumstances, now that 600,000 people are unemployed, now that we have a wage freeze and increased taxation, which is due to a large extent to the high level of military expenditure, we cannot afford this expenditure for the future. Let us cut our losses and let us not go ahead with at least two of these terrible weapons of destruction. Turn the other two into something else, if that is possible. That is my plea.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: Before my hon. Friend leaves the point about the disposal of the submarines and the difficulty of cancelling the programme once it is started, is he not aware that a prominent member of the American Administration was here not long ago canvassing the proposal that the whole programme might be sold to the United States?

Mr. Heffer: I am all for selling them to the United States, but I would be much happier if we could reach a situation in the world where the whole idea of Polaris

submarines was abandoned. This is more easily said than done.

Mr. F. A. Burden: The hon. Gentleman said a short time ago that nuclear defence would be available to us if we abolished our own. Presumably he was referring to the American nuclear defensive umbrella. If that is so, I find it very difficult to follow the argument of some hon. Members opposite who do nothing but denigrate America and curse America's policy in Vietnam and elsewhere but yet expect the Americans to support us if we are in need and are attacked and have no weapons with which to defend ourselves.

Mr. Paget: Do you really defend yourself?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The debate is getting a little outside the Navy Estimates. I think that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) should not reply to the intervention.

Mr. Heffer: It is a little difficult not to reply when someone alleges that I am denigrating America. For the hon. Gentleman's information, may I point out in passing, and without going too wide of the debate, that I have never attacked America? It is American Government policy that has been under attack. That is a very different thing. I was associated with and attached to the Eighth Army Air Corps during the last war and have many American friends from that time and since. A criticism of America's policy is very different from attacking America. I am sorry, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I cannot pursue the point.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Honour is satisfied.

Mr. Heffer: I want to see the Polaris submarine programme abandoned by the Government, first, because it is far too expensive and we cannot afford it. We particularly cannot afford it when people are unemployed and when there is a wage freeze which is partly due to this high military expenditure. I want to see the programme abandoned, secondly, because in present circumstances it makes no contribution towards a détente in Europe, towards a peaceful settlement of the European problem.


My third reason is this. I want to see the money which is used on this programme used to build houses and schools. For example, I want to see the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board get the £31 million for the new container and bulk carrying docks which it requires. That would be a greater contribution to the real strength of Britain than any Polaris submarine programme.
I urge my right hon. Friends to think again and not to be tied to the policies we inherited from the Tories. Let us return to the ideas that my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence expressed in the House and elsewhere on the Polaris programme prior to the 1964 General Election. That is what I am arguing for. I hope that my right hon. Friends will seriously take note of the points which have been raised by myself and my hon. Friends.

6.27 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). I accept that he was entirely sincere in what he said. Another point which has great merit is that, although I profoundly disagree with him, at least he is consistent, which is a refreshing change after listening to so many hon. Members opposite.
I remind the hon. Gentleman of something said by a very wise man who came from the same party as he does, no less a person than Mr. Ernest Bevin. Mr. Bevin made a statement which has many times been quoted, namely, that he never wanted to go naked into any negotiating chamber. That mean that Mr. Bevin was not prepared for Britain to sacrifice her defences for whatever ideals might have been thought to have been sincere at the time. Mr. Bevin's view was that, living in the dangerous world in which we live, we could not afford to do that.
The hon. Member for Walton spoke of the need for more houses and better housing conditions for many people. We all know the need for this, not only in Liverpool but elsewhere. What would the hon. Gentleman say if the Liverpool Council went flat out building houses galore without provision for hospitals, for roads, for sewerage works, and for all the other things which are necessary in a

great new municipality like that? The hon. Gentleman would be the first to offer criticism.
That is precisely the argument that we on this side adopt. We say that we are in great need of social improvement. A great deal was done during the 13 years in which the Tory Government had charge of the nation's affairs, but not enough. Never is enough done in this sphere, and we want to see further progress. But it would be foolish to make progress only in that direction and neglect our defence needs.
I come now to the observations made by the hon. Member for West-Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) in the earlier part of his speech. I shall be very careful, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I know how thin was the ice the hon. Gentleman skated over, and I do not intend to venture out that far. The hon. Gentleman criticised the risks to which naval personnel were put during the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia. He deplored what had happened. I assure the hon. Gentleman that there are still young men, both ratings and officers, in the Royal Navy and young men in other walks of life who are adventurous and like risk-taking.
Not only is this noteworthy in the Royal Navy. One thinks of the numbers of young people, men and women, who go mountain climbing, potholing, sailing, water ski-ing, swimming the Channel in very unpleasant and adverse conditions. One thinks even of the "ton-up" boys on their motor cycles. Why do our young people indulge in these dangerous and, some of us might even say, foolish sports?
The answer is that there are risks to be taken. The same answer applies to the criticism which the hon. Gentleman made of the Royal Navy and its operations during that difficult time in the Far East. The chance of combat in far-away places with strange-sounding names is still a great call to adventure to the youth of this country. Dangerous episodes in our history have always given a great boost to our recruiting.
Deplore it as one may, the world is a dangerous place, horrible things can happen in distant quarters and even here at home, and these dangers are a great attraction to our youth. Nowadays, young people are often criticised in many ways, but I regard it as very good that they respond to the challenge of danger.

Mr. Dalyell: I cast no reflection on the adventurousness of the young men. I was merely saying that this particular war was one which, in my opinion, was unnecessary, was brought about by a combination of certain Foreign Office officials and the hon. and gallant Gentleman's Government, and was the type of war on which we should never again embark. I cast no aspersions on the Navy or its men.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: All wars are unnecessary. They are all due to mistakes on the part of politicians on one side or other or in one country or another. If politicians were perfect there would be no wars.

Mr. Dalyell: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman allow me once more?—

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: No; I must get on. There are many others who wish to speak and the hon. Gentleman had a very good chance.
I come now to re-engagement, and I address myself to the Under-Secretary of State. On page 44 of the Estimates there is a complete schedule of Navy rates of pay showing the differential in pay between the man on a short engagement and the man on a long engagement. It is right and proper that there should be this differential, but, in order to improve our re-engagement rate, something more must be done.
Cannot re-engaged men in the Royal Navy have some sort of higher status, with privileges both at sea and ashore, longer leave, for instance, longer notice of drafting changes whenever the service permits—I know how difficult it is to promise such a thing—priority on the waiting list for married quarters and, perhaps. greater financial aid towards their children's education? Advantages of this kind might well be a spur to men who are uncertain about whether to reengage. They are after money, of course, but they want other things as well. Money is a consideration, but there are other things in life just as important, if not more important.
Again on the subject of money, I turn to the Navy's pay accounting system. I have recently been in correspondence with one of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues on this subject. A bad feature of naval pay accounting—it has been bad

for many years, certainly for all the time that I can remember—is that when men are paid they are given the sum of money which is due according to the terms on which payment is made but no brief statement of how the sum is made up and what their outstanding balance is. In self-accounting ships and establishments, a man can go to the ship's office, examine the ledger and have the amount standing to his account explained. This is fine in a self-accounting ship, and it is fine for a man who is willing to take the time and trouble to go and find out. But some men are shy and diffident about going into a ship's office. They think that they will be cursed at for being a nuisance, or something of that sort.
Would it not be sensible to give every man with his payment a slip of paper showing the period accounted for and, in two sections, his basic pay and his allowances lumped together, with the deductions made for allotments, Income Tax and so on. Lastly, there could be shown the balance remaining on the books and the amount which he is being paid on that day.
This sounds rather complicated as I describe it, but it need not be. It is time that the Navy came into line with industry and other Government Departments so that officers and men on the day when they are paid can have a brief guide as to the amount they are receiving and why they are receiving it. As I say, I have been in correspondence with one of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues on this matter. My correspondence began, in fact, some months ago with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew). So far, we have not come to a satisfactory conclusion, save that there is a promise of a centralised computer nay system to come in some time in 1969.
I do not believe that the computer will solve all the problems. What the man wants is a way of knowing how. say, the £10 19s. 6d. which he receives on pay day is made up and what it corresponds to.
Now, the Simonstown Agreement. Towards the end of January, there was a meeting in Cape Town. So far as I know, there has since then been only a Press release, but no White Paper and no official communiqué. It is evident from statements


made in the House that the new agreement is satisfactory to both sides from an operational point of view and for the purposes of personnel as well. But what is the position now regarding stores and equipment?
I was recently in South Africa and I heard many expressions of grave dissatisfaction at the recent behaviour of Her Majesty's Government regarding the provision of spares and stores for ships which were built in the United Kingdom, and particularly regarding the provision of sharp ammunition for those ships. I use the naval jargon, sharp ammunition —I am sure that the Minister knows what I mean—that is to say, ammunition loaded with high explosive as opposed to practice ammunition. What will happen when the initial outfits of ammunition for those ships, which were built in the United Kingdom, are near the end of their proper storage life. As the hon. Gentleman probably knows, all naval ammunition has a safe and efficient storage life. After that it must be taken to a remote place and destroyed, and replaced with new ammunition. I believe that it is possible to take out the explosive and refill some ammunition, but I could not say whether that is so in that case.
There is grave dissatisfaction in South Africa that Her Majesty's Government supplied the ships in accordance with the original Simonstown Agreement, supplied the outfits of ammunition, stores and so on, and is now being very difficult about supplying replacements. I would like a definite reassurance tonight from the Minister that that state of affairs will not be allowed to continue.
After all, we have had so recently—we discussed it only at Question Time today—an example of the grave results, grave in the true sense of the word, the loss of human life, of this Government's running out on a defence agreement, or an agreement to make a defence agreement, in Aden. If they are going to do the same in South Africa, heaven help them.

6.41 p.m.

Mr. Tom Driberg: I echo the congratulations already offered to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy,

from both sides of the House, on his first appearance at the Dispatch Box in a debate on the Navy Estimates.
I should like to make four specific points very briefly before coming to the main subject which I want to raise, a subject which has already been touched on by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers).
My first brief point is that I am afraid that I must correct one thing said by the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon). The quotation he attributed to the late Ernest Bevin should be attributed, I very much regret, for various reasons, to say, to another much-lamented former colleague, Aneurin Bevan.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I apologise for misquoting Mr. Bevan as opposed to Mr. Bevin. I admit that it was a slip.

Mr. Driberg: I thank the hon. Gentleman.
Secondly, the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) referred to Greenwich and to changes taking place there. No doubt my hon. Friend can assure us on one aspect of that matter. Whatever happens at Greenwich, I hope that infinite care will be taken to see that no damage is done to Wren's masterpiece, that superb building, the college with its painted hall, chapel and the rest. Will it continue in the care of the Royal Navy or pass to the Ministry of Public Building and Works?

Mr. Foley: I can give my hon. Friend the answer now. On Monday evening my hon. Friend the Minister of Defence (Administration) said that a decision had been taken that Shrivenham would be the centre for the defence college. The question of making full use of Greenwich is one that we are actively pursuing.

Mr. Driberg: I gather, then, that it is not yet finally settled what its complete future use will be. However, I have made my point.
My third brief point is that I was much interested to hear the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester reinforce what he said in his speech on Monday. Speaking from the Front Bench opposite, he said that he was in favour of sending British ships to join in the war in Vietnam.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: The hon. Member must not put words into my mouth. I said no such thing. I said that there would be nothing objectionable in our sending our ships to replace ships of our Commonwealth partners which themselves are operating in Vietnam's waters.

Mr. Driberg: If HANSARD got down the hon. and gallant Member's original words correctly, as I have no doubt HANSARD did, we shall be able to see in the morning exactly what the hon. and gallant Member said. I am aware that when my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) was speaking the hon. and gallant Member rose again and slightly modified what he had said before, after a rather anxious discussion with others sitting on the Opposition Front Bench. I am not surprised that he tried to wriggle out of it. If he looks at HANSARD he will see that what I said is correct. Perhaps he has already seen the typescript?

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: A moment ago the hon. Gentleman said that I was in favour of our ships joining in the war in Vietnam. That is not what I said.

Mr. Driberg: The hon. and gallant Member tried to wriggle out of it later on, but if one takes what he said this afternoon, speaking from the Opposition Front Bench, in the context of his observations on Monday, when he was expressing his personal opinion, I think that we shall agree that he did really mean what I have attributed to him. It is true that he said, "to assist our Commonwealth allies, Australia and New Zealand". But after all, if their ships or forces are in Vietnam assisting the Americans it would be impossible, under a unified command, to assist the Australians without also assisting the Americans in the war in Vietnam. I am afraid that I must continue to take it that that is what he really meant, in his heart of hearts. If he was advised afterwards that it was indiscreet—

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: It does not matter to me very much how the hon. Gentleman takes it. I know what I meant and what I said.

Mr. Driberg: I can only guess what the hon. and gallant Member meant, but I am sure that when he next speaks from the Opposition Front Bench he will be

extremely careful to prepare a script beforehand, in consultation with his seniors, and stick to it rather scrupulously.
That point was not quite so brief as I had hoped because of the interventions, which I had expected. My fourth brief point concerns Polaris. Tempting as it is to embark on that subject, it has already been dealt with at some length and very ably, by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), and I know that others may wish to speak on it. I shall therefore only say that I also thought it a little less than fair of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State to taunt some of us with having voted for the Government in 1965. As he well knows 1965 happens to fall chronologically between 1964, when there was a General Election, and 1966, when there was a General Election. It is a reality of Parliamentary life, which everybody understands, that when the Government one supports have a majority of only three or four in the House, it is impossible to indicate one's views by abstaining from voting. I should have been extremely happy to abstain from voting for the A.N.F. or any other force containing a nuclear element.
In the absence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, I do not think that I had better criticise him for what seemed to me to be the ultra-clericalism of his speech at the Polaris submarine launching luncheon last weekend.
The main subject that I want to raise is a somewhat more personal one. It was touched on briefly by the hon. Member for Devonport. It is the system under which boys of 15 can sign on for nine years in the Royal Navy, many of them not realising that the nine years only start when they are 18 and that they are therefore, in fact, signing on for 12 years without the hope of a break, and without any open options, to use a fashionable phrase, except after only three months—so my hon. Friend need not make a note to correct me: I knew that he was putting that down. That is when a boy is only about 15½ and cannot be expected to have made up his mind about his whole future career.
I am sorry to say that that seems to me to be a form of legalistic tyranny utterly inappropriate in the voluntary


forces of a democratic State, and also anachronistic at a time when those forces are being reduced. I say "legalised" tyranny because presumably the Ministry of Defence believes that it has the law on its side, since, as it insists, these boys have taken an oath to serve for all these years. The validity of this arrangement appears to rest not on a strictly contractual basis but on the single act of attestation administered, as I say, at as early an age as 15. It also seems possible, however, that the ordinary law governing infants' contracts may not apply. On this legal aspect, counsel's opinion is now being taken by the National Council for Civil Liberties.
What is surely more important than the purely legal aspect is the human aspect. There is ample evidence to show that a certain number—by no means most or all—of these boys come to regret bitterly the decision which they made at an age when, as I say, no one can possibly foresee what his views will be and how he will like the career he has chosen in 10 or 12 years' time. [Interruption.] Does the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) wish to interrupt?

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: I was pointing out that this was an experience that the Front Bench opposite had, but over a much shorter interval.

Mr. Driberg: The right hon. Gentleman has a great reputation as a wit in this House, but just occasionally his wit is misapplied. I am trying to deal with what I regard as a tragic human dilemma for a relatively small minority in the Royal Navy and I do not think that his flippancy is particularly in order on this subject.
In my opinion, there should be a chance of break for these boys either at the age of 18 or at least at the age of 21. I am aware of the arguments always put forward by the Service Departments, including the Navy, on this matter. I shall deal with them briefly in going through a letter I received last evening from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State.
He will, I hope, have seen the memorandum on this subject which the N.C.C.L. recently sent to the Secretary of State. The memorandum makes what seems to

me to be a very strong case for changing this practice. There is only one point on which I do not altogether agree with it. It refers to an incident that many of us I think had almost forgotten—the curious incident of the by-elections in 1963, when about 670 people, mostly Service men applied for nomination papers. It had been widely publicised at that time that this was a way of getting out of the Armed Forces. The memorandum suggests that this
… indicates that the probable proportion of dissatisfied servicemen must be much larger than is generally supposed".
The memorandum may suggest that—be that as it may; but I also suggest that, in view of the fact that this curious outlet had been widely publicised, 670 is a trivially small number in relation to the total strength of the Armed Forces and that therefore it could not be argued by the Navy or any other Service Department that they simply dare not risk letting these boys have a choice at 18, say, for fear that they would lose all the personnel of the Navy.

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: Does not my hon. Friend agree that, whereas the number of dissatisfied people in the Royal Navy may be small, it is the basis of any successful career, whether in the Navy or anywhere else, that people should be happy in it? Is he aware that in my constituency there is the example of a promising young naval heavyweight who has consistently been refused release by the Navy to carry on a professional boxing career in civilian life? It is true that the number of dissatisfied people may be very small, but I repeat that the basis of any career is that those who work in it should be happy to do the job.

Mr. Driberg: I am sure that that is true. I believe that the case my hon. Friend refers to is one of many very difficult cases that are quoted in the N.C.C.L. memorandum. It is a particularly sad case, as I recall. The Navy will not release this man and his father has deteriorated in both physical and mental health as a result of his anxiety about his son, and is now just about to go into hospital.
I am sure that if my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State has had the opportunity to read the memorandum and the case-histories contained in it, he will


have found some of them disturbing and moving. But this is not merely a sentimental case. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Gwilym Roberts) has suggested, what possible use to the Navy can a sullen, reluctant, unhappy sailor be? Can he contribute usefully to the atmosphere and discipline of a happy ship? We all know that there are such ships, and I am sure that the hon. and Gallant Member for Winchester has commanded such ships and knows them very well.

Rear Admiral Morgan Giles: I thank the hon. Gentleman. That is so.

Mr. Driberg: I am sure that we would all be a happy ship, serving under him —so long as he did not send us to Vietnam.
If, as may happen, such a sailor deserts again and again and is then punished by prolonged periods of detention, that is surely using public money without any reciprocal service.
It was just such a case of a constituent which recently drew my attention to this subject, A young man of 18 came to see me when I was seeing constituents with problems, as many of us do, one Friday evening in the town hall in my constituency. He was clearly in a state of some anxiety and uncertainty, and after some time he disclosed that he was a deserter from the Navy. This was his fourth desertion since he had signed on at the age of 15. He had been on the run for several months and was naturally worried about his future.
I do not know what hon. Members would have done, or would have felt they should do, in such a case. I am afraid that I felt obliged to advise this young man to give himself up voluntarily. I said that, if he did so, I would take up his case with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State and try to ensure that the fact that he had given himself up voluntarily would be taken fully into account at his court martial, and that I would also ask my hon. Friend to consider the possibility of discharging him when he had served his sentence. Naturally I could not give any guarantee, but I had some hope that the case would be treated with humanity and common sense. This lad, of course, expected some punishment, but I think that his chief

motive in agreeing to give himself up was his hope that he might eventually be discharged. He is now serving 90 days' detention, but so far the authorities are adamant in refusing to discharge him.
Last night, I received a letter to this effect from my hon. Friend. I am grateful to him for the personal attention that he has paid to the case and for arranging that my constituent should be seen by a second psychiatrist, the first psychiatric report having been negative. We know that my hon. Friend is personally a most kindly and humane man, but he has not been very long in his present position. The status of the Navy Minister has recently been down-graded. Since he represents the Senior Service, I think that my hon. Friend should be at least a Minister of State—of course, without any immediate increase in emoluments. But we may, therefore, suspect that he has not yet acquired sufficient experience and authority in his Department to temper the somewhat anchor-faced inflexibility of some of those who take these decisions.
I want to quote a few sentences from my hon. Friend's letter. He says of my constituent, whose name I will not mention, because I want to avoid causing unnecessary distress to his relatives:
Unless this new psychiatric report, however, is markedly different from the present one, I am sure it would be wrong to release him only on the grounds that he does not like the Navy and is therefore not likely to do well in it. As you know, we take great pains to ensure that a boy of 15 and his parents are fully aware of the terms of the naval engagement before he enters into it.
Perhaps that is so now, but is my hon. Friend absolutely convinced that it was so three years ago? Is he convinced that they all understand the terms of the engagement? That is not the evidence available to the N.C.C.L., who produced this memorandum.
My hon. Friend's letter goes on to talk about arrangements for discharge by purchase on compassionate grounds and the new right of discharge by purchase within three months of entry, about which I have already spoken. This is not, in my view, a very big concession. He adds, in any case, that this new rule is not retrospective and will, therefore, not help my constituent.
Then my hon. Friend adds sentences which do not seem to have been originally


drafted by him. I say this with all respect to him—they smack so much of the familiar bureaucratic line:
Once a rating has finished his naval training, he has to abide more strictly by the terms of his contract. It just would not be possible to run a disciplined Service if we let out any and every rating who expressed the desire to go.
I consider that to be absolute rubbish. Are not the police a disciplined service, and cannot policemen leave the police force when they want to? Is not the fire service, in its way, also disciplined? Apprentices in industry are bound for the period of their apprenticeship, but they are then free to get a job wherever they want to. It is rubbish to say that it would not be possible to run a disciplined Service unless there were absolute compulsion all the time. That is a ridiculous argument, and it suggests that the Service is a tyranny from which everyone must want to escape: we know that, for most people, that is not so.
Then comes the familiar argument:
We would be wasting the valuable training we give our ratings and, of course, involve ourselves in an indefensible waste of public money.
Again, the police have a good deal spent on their training, as do firemen. Anybody who acquires a skill, a man who has learned about electronics in the Royal Navy, or whatever it might be, has a skill which is an asset to the nation, wherever he may be employed.
There is also the provision for discharge by purchase,although that does not come until later on. To make up to some extent for what is called the waste of public money, a fairly high figure is often imposed when people want to buy themselves out. On the question of discharge by purchase, my hon. Friend says:
-Currently we are allowing those who have completed two-thirds of their engagement—counting from the age of 18—to apply for discharge by purchase".
That is to say, my constituent, who is now 18, would have to wait another six years. He would be 24 before he could even apply for discharge by purchase—and that in any case, as we are always reminded, is a privilege and not a right. So he might get out in about six years—a long time to look forward to in a job which one intensely dislikes.
I am sorry to say that one further sentence seems to me intolerably smug. It is:
You can see, therefore, that it would be very unfair to give preference to the few who cannot, or will not, make the effort to settle down.
That is a mid-Victorian, "Boys Own Paper" sort of comment. It is also extremely illogical. If it is only "the few" who "cannot, or will not, make the effort to settle down", presumably the majority do make that effort, or settle down anyway, because they like it, without much effort. Therefore, the Navy would be well rid of the few who cannot, or will not, make the effort. Why is it giving them "preference" if most of the chaps want to stay in, anyway, as we gather they do and as I believe that many of them do?
There are only one or two other points from the letter with which I need trouble the House, but they raise an important point of principle. In one paragraph of the letter my hon. Friend deals with the detention which my constituent is at present undergoing. He says:
Detention in the Navy is, of course, punitive. It is particularly suitable as a punishment for the serious offence of desertion.…
I wonder whether my hon. Friend thought out that sentence before signing it. Why is it "particularly" suitable as a punishment for desertion? I should have thought that the claustrophobic small cell in which people are locked up for considerable periods of time would be an incitement to seek freedom anew at the earliest opportunity.
Of course my hon. Friend adds:
… but it is also reformative. Every effort is made to administer it in a way which will help ratings, particularly the young and immature, to acquire a better sense of values as well as that valuable asset, self-discipline.
I make no reflection at all on those who are concerned with administering the detention quarters in which my constituent is imprisoned. They are doing the best they can in what are probably rather old-fashioned but hygienic buildings, but the way in which my constituent is being taught to acquire a better sense of values is that he is locked up in his cell stitching rope together to make matting. I hope that this will teach him to acquire a better sense of values, but I somehow rather doubt it.
For the reasons I have given, I feel particularly badly about this individual constituency case. All of us regret it whenever we take up a matter and fail to persuade a Minister. But in this case, as I have told the House, I played some part in persuading a constituent to return to a Service which he regards as a servitude and which he fervently detests, and I must continue to plead with my hon. Friend for his release. In the light of what has happened so far in this case, I do not see how I could be expected to give the same advice again.
Nothing I have said should be taken as a reflection in any way on those who have been concerned with the trial and detention of my constituent. I am not on this occasion raising the question of conditions in which Naval prisoners are detained; I do not think that they could be expected to be ideal. But I am sure that the lieutenant who was his defending officer did his best for him. Least of all would I presume to criticise or depreciate the Royal Navy itself, for which all of us feel the regard which the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester expressed in his closing words, or the officers and men who serve in what is, for most of them, the finest of Services and of vocations; but the whole of this practice about which I have been speaking needs urgent review, and I know that many hon. Members on both sides of the House feel that it ought to be reviewed.

7.10 p.m.

Captain Walter Elliot: I hope that the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) will not think me discourteous if I do not follow him in the special points which he has raised. I have a good deal of sympathy with the point about the boy of 15, in the Navy for nine years, who cannot start to count the beginning of his time until he reaches the age of 18. One must also consider the naval side. The hon. Member mentioned the electronics artificer as being an asset to the nation, and this is perfectly true. But the Navy has trained him and it has cost a lot of money. It will be expensive for it to retrain another man, and inefficient to change him.
The particular case of the heavyweight boxer was interesting. I have seen it in the papers only, and I would not try

to judge the case, but although one may sympathise personally with an individual wishing to get out because he can earn a good deal more money as a professional boxer, I am not sure if those are the right reasons for discharge. I understand that the Minister's predecessor gave an undertaking that he would look at this, and I hope that that still holds good and that, in due course we will hear what the investigation has produced.
I want to wish the Minister good fortune in his great responsibilities, particularly at this time. I should like to express the hope that he will not yield to the pressures, not only from his own Left wing, but from this side of the House. However, hon. Members on this side who hold similar views to his Left-wingers about economy are not quite so vocal. There are pressures from the country to cut back on our defence expediture too. I hope that he will lean the other way, to redress the balance. Over decades his predecessors have always gone through this period and sometimes the pressure is irresistible, and in the end they have had to give way.
This has led to very much greater expenditure in the end. It is hard going in time of peace. I always feel an air of unreality when I speak in this House or anywhere else about the possibility of war. After 25 years or so of peace, war seems far distant but I feel that we must remain vigilant for generations to come. I was not entirely encouraged by the contents of the hon. Gentleman's speech. This is nothing personal, and it was probably because he did not mention the subjects in which I am interested, and which I raised in the defence debate.
The Minister mentioned the surface-to-surface guided missile which I agree is important; he mentioned carriers which are also important, but he said nothing about our anti-submarine forces, which was a subject I raised in the debate and which I think is of paramount importance. One thing that I have to support me in saying that is that there is in existence a large submarine fleet operated by, one hesitates to use the words "a potential enemy" about Russia, but they have that great fleet, and, of all countries, we are most threatened by it.
The hon. Gentleman referred to amphibious forces, air power and nuclear


submarines. All of this is very important but he mentioned the phrase "antisubmarine" only once. Because of that I want to assure him that I do not intend to repeat my defence debate speech, but I will read a short paragraph from the White Paper at paragraph 15 which has fundamentally affected our position in the realm of anti-submarine forces if not naval forces in general. It says:
…it is no longer realistic for the Alliance to attempt to provide maritime forces for conducting a prolonged war at sea after a strategic nuclear exchange.
I take the view that we could have a prolonged war at sea. The only prolonged war that I can think of is a submarine war, without a massive nuclear exchange. We are told now that it is no longer realistic for the Alliance to attempt to provide forces for that sort of war. For years, and the Foreign Secretary repeated this yesterday, the Services and the Navy, from my own experience, have been told that this country will never fight a major war again, and that therefore our forces can be looked upon as a pool with the N.A.T.O. nations, and as such they should be enough.
Now we are told that the pool will not be there. I will leave that thought with the Minister, having drawn his attention to it. I hope that he will consider it. There is a most interesting line at the end of the paragraph which says:
Deterrence must be the first purpose of N.A.T.O.'s naval forces too.
That is very important. It obviously does not refer only to Polaris submarines. They are part of the deterrent, but it also refers to the whole of the N.A.T.O. naval forces. How are they to be related to the deterrent? I agree with the statement and I will give reasons for it. Has the Minister given any thought to this? I do not want to press him too hard, because he has not been in his office all that long, but I hope that the one or two ideas that I shall put forward will give him a line of thought. If the statement is properly implemented, that is that deterrence must be the first purpose of N.A.T.O.'s naval forces, then it nullifies, to a large extent, the first part of that paragraph, which rather worries me.
It may seem paradoxical that if we strengthen our anti-submarine forces, we

buttress and support our nuclear deterrent. We not only support it, we supplement it. I have mentioned the great Russian submarine fleet. In that fleet there are missile-firing submarines. If ever those were used, and we all hope that they will not be, one of their targets would be the land-based nuclear striking forces of the allies, including this country. Our anti-submarine forces should be able to destroy or neutralise those missile-bearing submarines, and that is one way in which they will support our deterrent.

Mr. W. Baxter: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman arguing that if there should be a nuclear war the nuclear forces of the enemy would not be capable of delivering a missile to a place like Gare Loch, near Glasgow.

Captain Elliot: I am talking about the deterrent. I am not talking about facing a nuclear war. Once the missiles are launched, the deterrent element has failed. I hope that I am building a case to show how anti-submarine forces can help to support the deterrent as part of a complete picture. If the hon. Gentleman allows me to develop my argument, I may make it clearer.
I believe still that the carrier strike forces are part of the nuclear deterrent. Whether they are as important as they were, with the development of missiles I am not sure, but they can still deliver the nuclear weapon. The protection of these strike forces with anti-submarine forces make our deterrent more credible. Our anti-submarine forces support the deterrent with a contribution which can be looked on as parallel to that of the shield force in Europe. They support the deterrent by anti-submarine operations protecting the Western missile-firing submarines. These undoubtedly would be sought out by enemy submarines.
To do all this, we must develop a capacity to survey activity on or under the sea and around the coasts of N.A.T.O. in exactly the same way as we have the capacity to detect missiles or aeroplanes. Our defensive shield should not only be on the mainland of Europe; it must extend right round our coasts. It is no good having a chain of Fylingdales if they are incapable, which they are, of detecting missile submarines in the ocean from where these submarines can attack us. The lack of discussion of these maritime


problems at such gatherings as the Western European Union always worries me. We have tremendous discussions about the land frontiers, but no discussions about the sea frontiers, which are just as important.
I have said that the Russian submarine threat is great. I am told that it is estimated that the Russian submarine fleet numbers between 500 and 1,000. I am told also that the numbers may not greatly increase, but that certainly the quality of the weapon will increase. Particularly there will be an increase in the missile-firing types. If our deterrent is to be fully supported and credible, we need anti-submarine forces to counter that threat.
The Minister said that we had 138 ships in commission. I asked him how many anti-submarine ships we had. I did not expect him to have the answer at his finger tips. He said that he would let me know at the end of the debate. There is no need for him to bother to do that, because I know that the number is far too small. At the height of the war when we were in such desperate straits in the submarine war, there were just over 100 Nazi submarines at sea but vast numbers of anti-submarine vessels were available. We can say that if we have only 138 ships in commission we have far too few antisubmarine ships. The same applies to maritime aircraft, which are an indispensable part of our anti-submarine forces.
It is well known that the nuclear submarine of various types was a tremendous leap forward in the technical development of that weapon. For many years it was well ahead of defensive weapons. Is the Minister satisfied with the development of our weapons designed to combat the submarine? In the swelling argument about east or west of Suez, in the context of anti-submarine warfare, it is accepted that Europe, including Britain and the North Atlantic sea routes, is the first priority. In this respect, our east of Suez policy, whatever it is, must take second place. If a choice had to be made because of lack of money. there is no doubt in my mind that we should have to go for our antisubmarine forces and not east of Suez. I hope that the choice will not be as stark as that.
I hope that I have put some ideas into the Minister's head and that in pursuit

of the statement that deterrence must be the first purpose of N.A.T.O.'s naval forces he will consider the development of anti-submarine forces. This has the added merit that if the nuclear weapons are never used and if, as I think possible, a conventional war, particularly a conventional submarine war, is a possibility, the anti-submarine weapons will be available.
In this White Paper we are giving up or running down a great many of our bases. That is a serious matter from the point of view of anti-submarine warfare. We needed these bases before and we may need them again. But the running down or vacating of our bases raises wider problems for the Navy than purely anti-submarine warfare problems. I have found it distressing that so many hon. Members opposite should talk about withdrawing from our commitments. Even if our strength is limited, we can play our part. Unless we are prepared to shoulder our fair share of the burden and support our allies, how can we expect them to support us?
I move on to look at the Navy as a whole. The first requirement for any Navy is that it should be balanced. In recent years, and in the years before the present Government were in power, there was a tendency to try to build a Navy to serve in certain parts of the world. I have heard it said—I have an idea that the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) said it—that we needed a carrier east of Suez but that the Navy did not need one west of Suez. In any one particular situation, perhaps at present, that might be a true statement, but I believe that over the decades and over the centuries the Navy has served this country so well and faithfully because it has been a balanced Navy.
There is a great temptation to try to prophesy the nature of the future wars, but, of course, it is extremely difficult to be right. Although there may be a trend towards this or that particular weapon —for example, the anti-submarine weapon today—the Navy as a whole must remain balanced. We may, through not having enough weapons of one particular arm, suffer heavily, but we will get by and we will strengthen that arm as time goes on. What is called the "brush fire" rôle is important—the rôle of trying to stop


small or incipient wars before they develop. That rôle has made a very big demand on Royal Navy resources. I believe it has made too big a demand.
It is with some trepidation, seeing my hon. and gallant Friend on the Front Bench, that I refer very briefly to the Royal Marines. No one has a higher admiration than I have for that corps. I think it is the finest corps in the world. If one looks at Vote A one will see that they are now about one-tenth of the naval manpower, which is a very much higher proportion than before the War. Their rôle now is quite different. Before the war and during the war they were an integral part of a ship's company. They manned their share of the armaments and they took on a lot of the ordinary jobs associated with ships.
Now, of course, they do not do that. I even see that the Royal Marines are part of the strategic reserve. I am sure that they are a very formidable part of that reserve. The fact is that that side of the Navy has become, perhaps for good reasons, rather too developed. There is no doubt that if the Navy does not have a carrier it will be unbalanced. The Minister of Defence yesterday referred to this in words which seemed to imply that shore-based aircraft were able to do the task. We should not fool ourselves about that. If the Government think that we cannot afford a carrier they will have to say so and presumably we will not get one. But it is no good pretending that shore-based aircraft can replace the carrier.
It is not merely a question of shore-based aircraft operating in the area. We learned during the War, and it is still true today, that unless the Fleet has the aircraft at immediate call, they are not close enough. It was a long time ago, but it was precisely that situation, relying on shore-based aircraft, that led to the sinking of the "Repulse" and the "Prince of Wales".
Do not let us pretend that shore-based aircraft can take the part of the carriers. They cannot. I must say that I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) that there is no need for us to think about these large carriers. I will go further. There are certain decisions that are made which just do not

take place. The Government have decided that we shall not have aircraft carriers. A month or two ago I asked the Minister what different types of ships could carry aircraft. Of course, there are about a dozen different types. Although we can get rid of aircraft carriers, there are still ships that carry aircraft. I asked the Minister whether it was intended to limit the ships of the Royal Navy to carry one type of aircraft, to which the Minister replied that he hoped not. So we can get ships that carry aircraft, and I do not think that as the years go on we will confine them to helicopters. There are a variety of ships that carry aircraft, and I believe that that decision will go by default.
I should like to say in passing that there is no need for us to think about these great big expensive 70,000-ton carriers. As time goes on and with the development of aircraft, I believe that we could do with much smaller ones of an entirely different appearance.
I mentioned the reduction of overseas bases. Quite frankly—I am not speaking for my Front Bench or for anyone else, but for myself—I am not against reductions in overseas bases—they may have to go —or to reducing their status to the order of an advance base. I may say quickly that I am not considering the political problems of such a reduction. That may raise problems as we see them in Aden, but that is a different matter. I am talking purely from the point of view of the Navy.
I am not a supporter of these fixed bases. One of the most depressing features of post-war defence expenditure is the base after base that we built at enormous cost which we then have to get out of because the political scene changes and all the money is wasted. If we are not to have any fixed bases at all, then in order to be able to carry out our commitments in support of our allies we have to develop—or perhaps I should say redevelop—the concept of mobile bases. I say "redevelop" because we had such bases during the last war. I do not intend to go into detail, but these bases could be completely self-contained. They must have one requirement, and that is a firm rear base, perhaps thousands of miles away from the scene of operation. If they have that these mobile bases can operate over great distances for long periods.


We read in the White Paper about the carrier patrolling off Beira for 71 days. That is a long time. I think I am right in saying the during the war the Fleets operated at sea for that length of time. It is an unusually long time for Fleets to operate, but they can do so if they are properly replenished. Whenever it is necessary they can exert pressure, reinforce forward bases, or carry out landing operations. I repeat that it makes me very nervous if we have a base which might be threatened and which in time of war might prove a death-trap, as was Singapore in the last war. It seems to me that as possibilities for two rear bases, South Africa and Australia are the points.
I have read about the Commonwealth Secretary discussing some sort of facilities in Australia and I hope that this is true. We know the situation in South Africa. I do not want to dwell on the political difficulties—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: No, the hon. and gallant Member should not dwell on that. He should confine his observations to the rôle of the Royal Navy.

Captain Elliot: I merely wanted to stress that these bases were a key to the operation of mobile bases which are essential to the Royal Navy. I have, however, finished with that point.
Traditionally, this country has always got into financial difficulty when we have attempted to keep large standing forces in different parts of the world. Although circumstances change, we still remain an island. We still remain dependent on our sea routes. A trend back towards a maritime strategy—and this today concerns not only the Royal Navy, but the Army and the Royal Air Force, too—would not only bring our defence spending under control and keep it to a size which we could bear, but it would enable us to play our part with our Allies in upholding our principles of democracy wherever they may be threatened.
The Minister of Power said yesterday that our besetting fault was self-denigration. A form of national denigration is to press for Britain constantly to withdraw from her commitments. I was very glad when the Foreign Secretary yesterday paid tribute to the benefits which have flowed from the proper discharge of our obligations, and I hope that this will continue.

7.42 p.m.

Mr. Frank Judd: In following the hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Captain W. Elliot), I should like at the outset to take up two points made earlier in the debate. The hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles) asked why the Government contemplated still constructing naval vessels in naval dockyards when it appeared on the evidence that the job could be done more cheaply elsewhere.
To make an inquiry of that sort is to ignore two fundamental points. The first is that if the dockyards are to do an efficient job in the maintenance which is required of them, they need the experience which is involved in constructing naval vessels.

Dame Irene Ward: Hear, hear.

Mr. Judd: Secondly, it ignores the point that frequently when ships have been built by civilian contractors, they are brought into naval dockyards after trial for extensive modification.
The second point which I should like to take up was one made by the hon. Lady the Member for Plymouth, Devon-port (Dame Joan Vickers) in what I regarded as a particularly thoughtful and constructive speech. The hon. Lady referred to the importance of welfare if we were to get recruitment on the scale that is needed for the modern Navy.
In the context of those remarks, I should like to draw attention particularly to the problems—psychological, health and welfare—of naval wives. Increasingly, naval wives seem to be younger, and the problems with which they are confronted as the result of prolonged separation from their husbands is something which we should not underestimate. There is also the difficulty that when naval personnel are seeking help on welfare problems, there is a certain degree of discouragement when they know that this will be recorded on their official documents. They know that frequently the visits, however well-intentioned, which Will be made to their homes Will he done by naval personnel in uniform. There is urgent need to humanise the Navy's welfare services, because this would be an important aspect in providing the general environment in the Service which will prove attractive.


Of fundamental importance to an efficient and effective Navy are the dockyards in which our ships are built, maintained and repaired. Our dockyards contain vast resources of capital equipment and manpower. They are engaged in a process of modernisation to service effectively a Navy which, although smaller in volume, packs more punch than was ever dreamed of in the heyday of the battleship. To do this effectively, absolute efficiency is necessary. I know from personal experience, and with the co-operation of the Admiralty authority which enabled me to get this experience, that men and management in the dockyards are determined to ensure this efficiency in the process of change. In talking about the needs of the Navy, however, we should not underestimate the difficulties.
The yards and the methods of administration and work within them were not designed to meet the needs of the present Navy. I know of the present Minister's deep personal concern about this and I know that, from visits which he has made to the dockyard in my constituency, all concerned have been impressed by his determination to get to the bottom of existing difficulties. If we are to see a smooth transition in this period of change, we in the House of Commons this evening must grasp the nettle of certain key problems.
The argument may be used that we do not want unnecessarily to cause a crisis of morale among those working in the dockyards, but there are already signs that all is not well. There is a drift of manpower away from the yards. There is a drift of qualified young men from the yards after their expensive training at apprentice schools. There is the constant stream of individuals and representative groups of workers lobbying those of us who represent dockyard constituencies on a host of problems.
To analyse the basic difficulties, we must look first at pay. We all recognise the present economic situation, but as soon as we emerge from the current restrictions we must take into account the shockingly inadequate basic rates of pay within the yards, particularly for unskilled personnel. We must take into account that over the years a thoroughly pernicious system has grown up which

has meant that overtime and incentive schemes have had to be used to give a basically adequate wage for people to take home at the end of a week's work. We know that the former job price contract system was completely discredited because it was used, and had to be used, as a means of making up basic pay. We know that, with the determination of all concerned, the new dockyard incentive bonus scheme is being more ruthlessly applied, but simply because it is being more ruthlessly applied the totally inadequate basic rates of pay are being shown up for what they are.
Secondly, we must take into account the working conditions of those employed in the yards. To put it mildly, those conditions compare not at all well with outside industry. The facilities for those employed in the yards are inadequate.
Thirdly, we must look at the problem of status of employment within the yards. There is an over-emphasis of the division between industrial and non-industrial employees. This consequently and obviously leads to tensions. It damages the team spirit which we would all like to see in the yards in the work which they undertake.
Inevitably there are delays in according changes of status to men who seek higher status for their employment. We have seen this, as the hon. Member for Devonport said, in the instance of the apprentice group instructors. We have seen it also in the instance of the chargehands. Some of us are concerned to know why these delays arise, because those involved in negotiating changes of status are aware of the chain reaction which may result from according a change to a particular group. That does not mean that the change should not take place, and some of the delays which have occurred recently are totally unjustifiable, but it means that we must call into question the whole basic division which exists in the yards between industrial and non-industrial employees.
All those points were brought out in the excellent Report of the Prices and Incomes Board. Those of us who have referred to the Board's recommendations have welcomed the Ministerial reassurances that these recommendations are under active consideration. However, every hon. Member is well aware of what this can mean when it is said by Ministers.


Periods of "active consideration" at times can last interminably. All concerned must realise that it is vital that decisive and clear-cut early action is taken on the recommendations of the Prices and Incomes Board, and we should welcome from the Minister an indication as to when we can expect action and implementation of the recommendations.
In this period of change to highly streamlined modern dockyards, the importance of communication between management and men cannot be overestimated. Anyone who knows the yards is aware that, for a host of reasons, this communication is not all that it should be. Men do not feel that they are being involved in genuine consultations about the changes which are taking place. Because of the inextricably complicated network of management, it is almost impossible to pin down the blame for the imperfection in communication at any one point.
I pay tribute to those in management who are doing a great deal of dedicated and imaginative work in difficult situations, but the system is too rigid and inflexible. It leads to uneven distribution of the work load and to bottlenecks. It results in duplication between naval and civilian managements at all levels.
Any of us looking at the administration of the yards must see that some of the decision making is too remote. There is too much power concentrated in the bureaucratic machines of Whitehall. There is obviously a need for a much greater degree of delegation to individual yards and to individual departments within these yards. If we are to see the yards which we want to see servicing the modern streamlined and effective Navy which we are told there is to be, there must he greater independence in the yards, collectively and individually.
We should be looking at the possibility of a new system of administration, perhaps similar to that now proposed for the Post Office. There is no indication yet that anyone in a position of responsibility is taking seriously the fundamental problems which exist in dockyard administration today. Until we take those problems seriously, it will be impossible to achieve the degree of drive and dynamism which is needed.
Another matter to which I must turn is that of the economic and social pro-

blems related to the yards. Round the yards, communities have grown up which are exclusively and almost totally dependent upon them. We must accept that there is uncertainty about the future within those communities. We need clear thinking from the Government about the foreseeable rôle of the yards. The Government must spell out the changes which are to come, and plan for them. For example, are the current extensive and large-scale investments at Chatham justified in the future overall long-term pattern? If they are, what is their longterm significance for the other yards? What measures will be necessary, and what thinking are the Government doing about alternative employment to meet run-downs when they occur, or shall we find that at some future date communities which have served the nation well in the past are confronted with the prospect of being pushed to one side and told that they are no longer necessary? This is the time when we must be thinking about these communities, especially when the Government are committed to comprehensive total disarmament as their long-term objective.
Anyone who cares to talk with people working in the yards will realise that at times there are elements of surplus capacity which could be used. During the past three days, we have been discussing the defence commitments of the Government, and the House can force itself into a downward spiral of despondency and gloom in discussing the negative concept of defence which is involved in the containment of violence when it occurs. It is absolutely logical to me, and there is nothing remote about it. If we are concerned about peace in the world, we must be as concerned about removing some of the causes of conflict as we are about containing violence when it occurs.
In the naval dockyards there is just the sort of engineering "know-how" available to make some of the simple engineering equipment which is desperately needed for the economic and social development of the developing countries. It would involve nothing complicated, but it is just the sort of machinery which could be manufactured without interfering with naval priorities. In trying to look after the interests of my constituents, it has been disheartening to me, whenever I have raised this possibility, to be met


with unconcerned and unimaginative bureaucratic reaction.
If we have a defence policy which means anything, we must be concerned with this other positive aspect of defence. What a fine thing it would be if we could demonstrate that communities in Britain which have made a valuable contribution to the defence of the world in the past can now become involved in fighting for the peace of the world by making a contribution, however modestly, towards the aid and development programmes which make for more sense in the context of the future peace of the world community.

7.58 p.m.

Dame Irene Ward: I wish to probe the enigma of the abolition of the Fishery Protection Squadron. I noticed that in his opening statement the hon. Gentleman brought in this subject very early on without giving any overall detail of how our trawlers were to be protected on their fishing exploits by a substitute programme to make up for the withdrawal and abolition of the Fishery Protection Squadron. I understood the hon. Gentleman to say when he was challenged with the fact that the announcement of this new policy had been publicised in the Press that what the Press said was incorrect and that we should not take any notice of what we read in the Press. For a few moments, I was under the impression that the situation about the protection of our trawlers at sea was to remain as it has been for a very long period.
In order to refresh my memory, I went immediately to my files to find out what had appeared in the Press on this very important issue. I know that it is fashionable in some quarters these days to say that what the Press says is incorrect, a scare or an exaggeration, or whatever it may be. I read this announcement in the Sunday Telegraph on Sunday and was therefore surprised at the terms in which the hon. Gentleman advised the House to pay no attention to what had appeared in the Press. I went immediately to get the account which I had read in the Sunday Telegraph, and here it is.
The heading was quite clear and accurate as regards the report itself, saying:

Navy's Fishery Protection Squadron To Go.
And this is so. The writer of the article was the Sunday Telegraph naval correspondent, Mr. Desmond Wettern, and I say immediately that I accept what this distinguished correspondent wrote.
If I interpret what the hon. Gentleman said correctly, the protection of the fishing fleet will now be part of the Royal Navy's duties under the Home Commander in Chief. That, however, does not do away with the fact that the abolition of the Fishery Protection Squadron, as presented in the Estimates, is a reality—

Mr. Foley: The statement made by the Navy Department, Ministry of Defence, was made on 1st February. Three weeks later, a delayed action article appears in the Sunday Telegraph. The heading is correct—the abolition of the Fishery Protection Squadron—but what follows is incorrect. As I have already said, we did not consult the Trawlermen's Association because the Navy will not give up any of the rôle which it has had in the past in fulfilling this task. What we have done is amalgamate the Squadron with the Home Fleet, so that, if necessary, more ships will be available to do this job.
Secondly, the article is incorrect because it refers to the fact that the experienced officers at present in the Fishery Protection Squadron will be lost and new men will do the job who do not know what it is all about. I have explained that these men will still be there and doing this job, attached to H.M.S. "Lochinvar". The work will, in fact, be enhanced rather than, as conveyed by the article, a betrayal of the trawler-men's interests.

Dame Irene Ward: I listened to the hon. Gentleman, but that was not the way he put it when the hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) and my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) and I intervened. Having been in the House quite a long time, I think that this is a change of policy, in whatever way the hon. Gentleman likes to present it.
I do not at the moment challenge what he is saying. What I am challenging is the way he presented it to the House. I noticed that he repeated that he had not


consulted the Trawlermen's Association. I regret that. Nor did he consult the British Trawler Owners' Federation. As we now assume, in Government and Opposition, that we believe in consultation, it was an extraordinary thing to do. The Sunday Telegraph naval correspondent was right to draw attention to it, because the details of the general objections of the British Trawler Owners' Federation are stated in the article. It had not been consulted either.
As I represent a fishing port, I believe that when there is this change of policy, which causes great anxiety, whatever the hon. Gentleman may think, it would have been much wiser—I say nothing at the moment about the change of policy itself —and in the interests of the trawlermen and those who man our fishing fleets, as well as of the trawler owners, if the hon. Gentleman had, through his Ministerial colleague at the Ministry of Agriculture, kept in touch with the interests concerned and discussed this change of policy with them.
I greatly resented the way in which the hon. Gentleman threw out the suggestion that we in the House of Commons are not entitled to take what is written in a paper like the Sunday Telegraph as being correct—

Mr. Foley: I will be brief. There is no change in policy. There is a change in the administrative structure and control, which is an inter-Departmental or inter-Service matter. There is no change of policy, so there was virtually no need to consult anyone. If the Trawlermen's Association can give evidence after a while that the service which it has had in the past is inadequate because of our administrative changes, clearly we will look at it.

Dame Irene Ward: That may well be so. I am simply saying that if there are to be administrative changes, which could he interpreted—

Mr. Foley: Wrongly.

Dame Irene Ward: Wrongly, perhaps, but the trawlermen have just as much right to express their view and anxiety as the hon. Gentleman has to say from the Front Bench that this is merely an administrative change. He is not a dictator and we will not tolerate him as a dictator.

I still say that it was very ill-advised to arrange the abolition of the Fishery Protection Squadron without consulting those who have had excellent service from it over many years. Those who earn their living at sea in the trawlers and those who administer the trawler fleet have had a great admiration for, and much support from, this Squadron. The hon. Gentleman has been too short a time in office to understand the relationships between the trawlermen and the Trawler-owners' Federation and the Fishery Protection Squadron well enough to know what he is talking about.
Whoever advised him to do this without consulting those who have looked to the Squadron for many years and telling them what his Department has in mind? The Ministry of Defence is vague about the reasons for the Squadron's abolition. This is exactly my point. The case has never been made. We have had no figures to show why this alteration is necessary. We do not know what the saving will be. I have a shrewd suspicion, of course, that this is to save money. If that is so, we want to know what will be saved.
I do not say that the trawler fleet will not be just as well served by the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy serves everyone's interests wherever it is called upon, and I am sorry that there are not more in the House of Commons today to listen to this debate. I do not say that the trawlermen's interests will not be adequately protected, but we must recognise that both Norway and Iceland are now doubling or trebling their protection fleets. The trawlermen and the trawler owners take very great exception to the fact that we are, so to speak, going out of line. If the position is to be exactly as before, why does the hon. Gentleman not seek an opportunity to explain the matter to the House in much greater detail?
The article states:
The Ministry of Defence counters such criticism"—
that is, the criticism that has been made by Mr. Laing:
by pointing out that in future the C.-in-C., Home Fleet will be able to assign as many warships as he thinks necessary for fishery protection.
The Under-Secretary should understand that if we are to get the best service from the fishing fleet—and, after all, that


fleet is not the responsibility of his Department but that of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—people like the trawler owners and trawler men must always have their interests and views taken into consideration.
What Mr. Laing says—and he is the Director-General of the British Trawler Federation—is:
In this sort of work you cannot have officers jumping in and out of the job.
The article adds that Mr. Laing had said:
Following recent international discussions it is hoped to establish the right of fishery officers of any nation to board foreign trawlers when necessary".
We are engaged in international discussions over all these matters. He also says:
We shall fight this plan. We have been trying for years to get the squadron built up.
That is true. We have never felt that our fishing fleet had adequate protection, and we wanted more ships made available.
What the hon. Gentleman has to show, as I hope he will later, is that this new administration—I will not use the word "policy", as it offends me so much—will have the confidence, and this is the important thing—of the trawler men and of the British Trawler Federation. This is where I think the Minister is very seriously to blame.
The British Trawler Federation and the trawler men have always been very co-operative in working with the Government in very difficult times. They have co-operated admirably for many years. Mr. Laing would certainly not have made such serious criticisms as he has if he had had all the facts in his possession and believed that the changed policy would be as effective as the old policy for the protection of our fishing fleet. The whole thing has been intolerably badly handled ministerially, and I look forward very much to hearing the real explanation. But I warn the hon. Gentleman that it is never a good thing to tell hon. Members who have had the honour of representing fishing ports for a long time that they should not believe all they read in the newspaper. We are just as capable of making our own choice of what we believe in the Press as he is or as anyone else is, and we do not want any advice or informa-

tion on that from those on the Treasury Front Bench.
For a very long time—I think since long before the hon. Gentleman rose to office at all—I have felt that the electrical knowledge and "know-how" about our Polaris submarine have been confined roughly to one area of the country only. During the war—and I was in this House during the war, so that I have some recollection of some of the points that were then discussed—it was always felt that diversification of important industrial production was absolutely essential. As a matter of fact, the North-East Coast suffered tremendously because of that view, as it was always assumed that any bombing raids would be made straight away on the North-East Coast.
I now say seriously to the Admiralty that as far as I can make out all the "know-how" on the Polaris is confined to the West Coast. There are a great many hon. Members representing West Coast constituencies who do not welcome these submarines, apart from their nuclear deterrent aspects. They do not welcome the work provided by them. It might therefore be a good idea if the know-how were shared with other parts of the country.
I should like the work and the knowledge to come to my area. It is bad to have all this technical expert knowledge of new developments in the nuclear deterrent to be centred virtually in one part of the country only. If so much is to rest on our Polaris submarines, I hope that when we, perhaps, decide to build a fifth nuclear submarine—when we can do so under the present economic stringencies—a share of some of the work, the development and the technical knowledge will be given to other parts of the country.

Mr. Foley: I share the hon. Lady's concern, because I was born and grew up in the North-East, and I am fully aware of the need for industry to come into that area. But the decision that was taken to build the first Polaris submarine at Barrow by Vickers and the second by Cammell Laird of Birkenhead was taken by her right hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench when they were the Government. Therefore, any strictures she may have should be directed in that direction and not in this. I should also


say that at least under a Labour Government there is no possibility of a fifth Polaris submarine.

Dame Irene Ward: The Under-Secretary has put that point very forcibly, but it does not make any difference to me. I asked my own Government about it when they were in power, and I would continue to press them if they were still the Government of the day. I am jolly sick of the way in which when any criticism arises from this side of the House up pops one of the little jack-in-the-boxes on the Government Front Bench and says, "This is what your Government did."

Mr. Foley: So they did.

Dame Irene Ward: I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not believe that I or anybody else thinks the Government are always right. I did not always think that my Government was right—that is the good part of democracy.
The fact remains that the Polaris submarine programme was started in Barrow, a place now represented by an hon. Member who fought me in 1964 when, I am glad to say, I defeated him. He does not like the Polaris submarine at all. The Government get a great deal of support from this side of the House and a good deal of controversy on their own, and perhaps it might be a good idea for them to see that candidates for election to constituencies where this highly technical work is done were really interested in and approved of the defence work being done there. That would greatly help industrial relations and would not make workers on the Polaris submarine think that they were, perhaps, not doing a service to mankind. The hon. Gentleman tells me that there will nest he a fifth Polaris submarine, and that may be so. I only suggest that it would be good to try to spread the technical "know-how" and not concentrate it in just one part of the country.
Although I gave way to the Under-Secretary on three or four occasions, he did not say "Thank you". Nevertheless, I am glad to learn that he comes from the North-East Coast, because he will know that we in that part of the country speak hard words, face hard facts, and look at the realities of the situation. I do not believe that the hon. Gentleman has handled the question of the abolition

of the Fishery Protection Squadron particularly well—certainly not as well as it would have been handled by the people of the North-East Coast.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Mr. Hugh D. Brown.

Mr. W. Baxter: On a point of order. As I was the only hon. Member on this side of the House who rose to speak when you called the hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward), who would you have called had that still been the position?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am not sure that the Chair should announce what it would have done in a hypothetical situation but, if it helps him, I will say that I might well have called him. Mr. Brown.

8.21 p.m.

Mr. Hugh D. Brown: I know that my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. W. Baxter) wishes to contribute to the debate and I assure him that I will not delay him very long. He may be interested to know that among the interesting things one discovers in an Estimates debate, I have discovered something that I have in common with the hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward). Like her, I do not always accept that everything the Labour Government do is right. However, contrary to the impression which might have been created by some of my hon. Friends, I am prepared to give the Government credit for many of the things they have done.
I feel rather like an innocent afloat in this debate. Ranged round me is a galaxy of Ministers, ex-Ministers, admirals, former admirals, captains, various officers and other ranks. Despite this, I have discovered some interesting facts in perusing the Defence Estimates. For example, I note that there is not equality of the sexes in the Navy. The tuberculosis allowance for women ratings is only ls. 3d. a day, while for men it is 1s. 6d. It is also interesting to note that the harmonium allowance is 4s. a day.
From the lighter side, I come to the burden of my remarks, which is the argument for or against reducing the number of men in the Royal Navy by 1,000—the Estimates' way of putting it. There is a danger that, in considering this matter, some of us may get into the frame


of mind in which hon. Gentlemen opposite think of restoring prescription charges in the National Health Service. We tend to think that if we could just cut defence expenditure, all our economic problems would be solved overnight. I wish it were as easy as that. Nevertheless, no one will deny that defence expenditure plays a big part in creating some of the economic problems facing the country or prevents us from solving them as quickly as we should like.
To build up my case for the reduction of 1,000 men, I shall resort to the usual Parliamentary tactic of quoting from some previous speeches. When the Bahamas Agreement—or the Nassau Agreement, as it is called—was debated in Parliament, the argument was adduced that the Polaris submarines would be a development of a multilateral N.A.T.O. nuclear force and that there would be the closest possible consultation with our other N.A.T.O. allies. I do not wish to make debating points, but since we have heard so much from hon. Gentlemen opposite about the independent nuclear deterrent, I remind the Under-Secretary that we made some extremely telling statements on this subject when we were in Opposition. For example, the present Foreign Secretary moved an Amendment on one occasion which stated that the House could
… have no confidence in a Government whose defence policy has collapsed and which, at Nassau, entered into an agreement which, by seeking to continue the illusion of an independent British nuclear deterrent, imposes further economic burdens upon the nation and makes more difficult the solution of Great Britain's defence problems.
On that occasion my right hon. Friend, commenting on Skybolt, said that precisely the same objection applied to Skybolt as applied to Polaris. He said:
How can something for which one totally relies on someone else to provide be prescribed as independent, especially when it is never final?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 975-83.]
In other words, there were always changes in techniques and nothing was ever final. He likened it, with his usual aptitude for descriptive language, to renting a television set. In that debate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said:
… Polaris or … Skybolt.… We support neither."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 1239.]

I am not interested in arguing across the Floor of the House, the question of whether or not we have an independent nuclear deterrent. I do not believe that it makes much difference whether it is a British nuclear deterrent or part of a N.A.T.O. deterrent or whatever concept it might be.
I have also been doing some research on what other influential people have said. For example, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House said that he was sacked from the shadow office which he had occupied for saying in 1960
… that it is silly for the Opposition to support an independent British deterrent which did not and could not exist!
He went on to argue that defence was never an issue which won or lost votes for either party. So, in spite of the abstentions last night, hon. Gentlemen opposite should not be too optimistic about that action weakening the ability of the Government to solve the major problems facing the country.
I did not attempt to speak during the two-day defence debate, although I listened to more of it than probably most hon. Members. I mention that to show that the disappointment which I am expressing is based on my feelings in the matter and not because I was thwarted in an attempt to speak in the debate.
I was deeply disappointed at the lack of philosophical content which came over in the defence debate. I link that with Polaris because, more than anything, this seems to epitomise the whole shocking obscenity of nuclear weapons. I get depressed when I hear my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite with their vast experience going into details about little things which are required to make the Services more efficient. When dealing with broad principles it seems an insult to our intelligence to reduce the matter to the level of playing about with words and an academic question of whether a conventional war is more likely than an atomic war.
This seems to be an emotive subject that we should attempt to illustrate to our own people, and indeed to the world, by showing the kind of world we are living in. In terms of men and money what does this mean? Presumably when operational the base will require 2,500 Servicemen, backed by approximately 1,500


civilians. I am not making a constituency speech, but at a time when it is recognised that in Scotland a quarter of a million houses are unfit there are something like 1,500 building trade workers on this site. We canot get all the details and information, but this number includes men with skills which are in short supply. There are 223 carpenters, 30 plumbers, 42 painters and almost 200 electricians and fitters in this one base.
I appeal to Members of the Government. I am not getting at them as a critic, but I ask how is it possible to sustain enthusiasm in this movement of ours if constantly we get this contrast of being able to find money for all sorts of obscenities when we cannot even find the energy, never mind the money, to cure some of the social conditions from which we suffer? We can find teachers and all sorts of qualified people in this base, but children in my area have been receiving part-time education for two or three years. How is it possible to suggest that Polaris should come first and that all sorts of demands for scarce manpower, for technicians or teachers, should come afterwards for these other objects?

Mr. Wall: While in no way questioning the sincerity of the hon. Member, may I ask if he would not agree that the views he has expressed are very similar to those expressed by his predecessors in the Socialist Party who spoke against rearmament in the 'thirties? Will they never learn the lesson?

Mr. Brown: I do not follow that, because it is too large a subject to deal with now, but I might have an opportunity of debating it with the hon. Member on some other occasion. It brings me, however, to another point I want to make. What ate we discussing? All this magnificent technique in strategy and weapons, what is it all about? Who is the enemy?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am afraid the hon. Member is now getting into a discussion about general defence policy, but this is Vote A of the Navy Estimates and he must come back to discussion of the Estimates.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) is arguing about

Polaris. Surely it is in order to argue against whom Polaris is to be directed?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. Member can discuss Polaris, but he must not go into wider considerations than those contained in the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Brown: I appreciate your dilemma, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in the Ruling you have given. I hope that you will be tolerant and will appreciate my dilemma, because it is extremely difficult to pick this out from the Navy Estimates. I am not trying to use this opportunity to widen the discussion, but it is very difficult to argue for a specific reduction linked to one item when relating it to some of the wider aspects. As four submarines are commissioned and are to be stationed 30 miles from my constituency, I am interested in Polaris and the rôle it is supposed to fulfil.
Who is the enemy? If the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) or some of his hon. Friends had been paying more attention in pre-war years to the real enemy, instead of fastening all their attention on what we now regard as the enemy, peace might have been secured. I hope that is not too ambiguous. I am not sure I have made the point I wanted to make.
Defence strategy, naval expenditure, and the question how we can make a reduction of 1,000 men, must be related, not to some academic intellectual exercise as to how we can use one type of aircraft or missile as against another, but to the question: who are the enemy? People will not come out into the open and answer this question. Is the enemy the Soviet Union?
I can only quote in support of my argument the statement made by the Secretary of State yesterday in relation to the changed political climate which exists in Europe. If this exists, it is high time that the Government took the Socialist precept to heart and, by setting a little example, did more towards securing the improvement in the climate which our own Secretary of State argued rises from a reduction in armaments.
Why at this stage can we not make a dramatic gesture? I do not like being personal, but I can give this assurance. I am never likely to be the Secretary of State for Defence, but I can promise the


House that my wife will never launch a Polaris submarine. I hope that I am not being too personal when I say, from my experience in Pollok last week, where there is a by-election pending, that the launching of this submarine jolted people. I am not blaming my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence or his wife. Perhaps this is why there were so many abstentions yesterday. I was not one of those who abstained. I do not disagree with my collagues. Therefore, I do not say this as a regular critic of the Government.
I implore the Government to discard their delusions of grandeur. It is not enough to have this brilliant, detailed, pragmatic approach. We need an example which would stir the hopes and aspirations of those who support us and, above all, of the people of the world. However much of a cliche it may sound, I still do not think it is out of place, not to think in terms of an enemy or the enemy, but to think in terms that people are basically good and that, given the right conditions and the right example, they will respond to any cut in expenditure we make. I suggest that we start here and now by taking 1,000 men out of the Polaris base.

8.38 p.m.

Mr. John Farr: I do not wish to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) in any detail, except to say this. Even if he has not practical experience, has he not read the history books? Did not we trust all these other people in 1939 and 1938? Did not Neville Chamberlain do just that when he went to Europe? Where did it get us? The hon. Gentleman argues that we should cast aside all methods of defence. If he applies his mind at all to the problem, he must realise that the peace we now enjoy in the world is a peace which was brought about by strength. It was not brought about by casting aside all the means and manner of defence.
The hon. Gentleman did no good to the Royal Navy, nor did he help his own cause, when he referred to any ship which will sail with the fleet as an obscenity. That is a phrase which he should withdraw. We on this side are extremely proud of the submarine which was

launched, no matter by whom, a couple of days ago.
I cannot help thinking, as we discuss these Estimates year by year, that the occasion is rather like the annual general meeting of a company. Flowery tributes are paid to the staff, and the results are analysed by the various shareholders. The only trouble is that each year—this year is no exception—we seem to have fewer and fewer operating units at greater and greater cost. In his interesting speech today, the Under-Secretary of State estimated the total expenditure in the forthcoming financial year at about £61 million, and he gave the number of ships operational at 138, of which five are aircraft carriers.
Two or three years ago, I was fortunate enough to be selected to attend one of the Navy's "shop window" demonstrations at Portsmouth. I well recall the impression which that visit made on all my colleagues and on me when we visited the "shop window" and sailed on H.M.S. "Hermes". There were with us hon. Members who, probably, held much the same views as those held by hon. Members opposite who voted against the Government last night and by the hon. Member for Provan, but when they came away from that "shop window" they could not help feeling great admiration for the dedication, skill and courage of the pilots who were flying off and landing almost where we stood. One or two of those hon. Members were thereafter much more reticent in propounding the views which they had previously held and expressed.
I suggest to the Under-Secretary of State that when the next "shop window" is arranged he should invite the hon. Member for Provan and some of his hon. Friends sitting about him now to pay a visit. They may well change their views after seeing the fleet in action and the courage, skill and determination displayed by the men serving in it.

Mr. W. Baxter: I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not imply that my hon. Friend or anyone on this side has not the highest regard for the integrity, courage and devotion to duty of the men in any of our Services. What we disagree about is the line of approach which this country should take to our future as a nation. This was the theme of my hon. Friend's argument. Moreover, he was


not talking about the Polaris submarine as such. He was talking about the Gare Loch and the unsightly mess which has been made of that beautiful part of Scotland by the desecration which has taken place.

Mr. Farr: I know that the hon. Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. W. Baxter) is too set in his views ever to change them, but I have hopes for his hon. Friend the Member for Provan who, if I may say so, is younger and, perhaps, has not seen quite so much of the world as the hon. Gentleman himself. I hope that after a little longer in this place and, perhaps, a visit or two to some of our ships the hon. Gentleman will take an entirely different view on these matters.
We have three aircraft carriers at present in active commission and two undergoing refit. Just about the most calamitous decision ever made by this Government was to abandon the plans for the new aircraft carrier, the design work on which had been almost completed by the Conservative Government. In a few years, it will be generally recognised for the bad decision it was. Moreover, people will fail to understand how, at the same period of time, when the aircraft carriers that we had were proving so useful in carrying out Government policy overseas, off Beira, for instance, in East Africa two or three years ago, and elsewhere—when their value was being proved almost daily—this Government took upon themselves the decision to abandon the new carrier which had been planned.

Mr. Foley: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that for many months we have successfully patrolled the Mozambique Channel with a squadron of frigates, without an aircraft carrier, and done it totally adequately.

Mr. Farr: I was, of course, aware of that. But the interception of the "Manuella" was carried out as a result of information conveyed from a Fleet Air Arm aircraft when that vessel was sighted. No effective operation of that type can be mounted where carriers are not in the vicinity and land bases are not available.
One does not have to be a soothsayer or even a Mr. Harold Wilson to foresee that in a very few years there will be other trouble spots which will be beyond the range of our land-based aircraft. For

instance, a trouble spot which one could envisage in a few years' time is the whole of the hemisphere of Southern Africa. Where will our F111s fly from land bases to get there? There might well be trouble around Hong Kong in years to come. Where will F111s operate from to do anything there?
If we are not to have a major fleet carrier we must have smaller vessels able to operate Fleet Air Arm aircraft in differing parts of the world as required, and I am sure that that view will soon be generally acceptable.

Mr. Paget: The hon. Gentleman is suggesting operating F111s against South Africa. Are there not moments when one can bless impotence?

Mr. Farr: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has many flights of imagination, as I know, because I live fairly near his constituency. I did not say anything of the sort, but merely gave it as an example of a possible trouble spot in the future. The hon. and learned Gentleman may well have to eat his words in a few years' time.
I had almost concluded emphasising how necessary it is that we should have in our plans in the years ahead some form of vessel which will fly off aircraft.
One other point in connection with the Navy Estimates is the fate of H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" in Londonderry. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) asked a Written Question about that subject today. He rightly called attention to the almost incomparable deep water facilities for training just off Londonderry and the fact that the Royal Navy may well lose the advantage of the training facilities in Malta. He asked if it would not be as well to reconsider the decision to run down H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" with a view to its closure in about 1970.
Apart from being a very useful base, H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" plays a great rôle in training naval reserve personnel from the Republic and the North of Ireland. It is very convenient for them to do their courses at H.M.S. "Sea Eagle". Northern Ireland is at present suffering what is, perhaps, one of its worst-ever spells of unemployment. The unemployed seem to become more numerous daily and, to


say the least, the Government's decision to close down H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" not only causes despondency among the many civilians who work there but does no good to the name of England and the Royal Navy where, so near the border of the Republic of Ireland, the British presence has proved to be eminently desirable in the past. So I ask the Under-Secretary of State, especially in view of what might take place regarding Malta, if he will give further consideration to the necessity of retaining H.M.S. "Sea Eagle".
My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) referred to the disquieting report in the Sunday Telegraph on the Fishery Protection Squadron. The article was quite emphatic and definite. I accept the Under-Secretary of State's assurance that it was misinformed and incorrect. But then many hon. Members on this side have been naive enough to accept assurances of that nature from Ministers only to find days or weeks later that those assurances were wrong and that the Minister concerned was not stating the facts. We are often seeing statements in the Press proved correct despite Governmental assurances to the contrary. I accept what the hon. Gentleman has said on this subject, having faith in him. I hope that he will not let us on this side down because, if he does, we shall not forget it and we shall take an early opportunity of reminding him about it.
The prospects for the Royal Navy are bad when one recalls that only a few years ago we had a great assortment of ships in different fleets throughout the world. Now we struggle along with just over 100 ships which are called major vessels. No cruisers are left in commission and we have five aircraft carriers.
One cannot help thinking at times that the Navy under the present Administration is in real danger of deteriorating to a type of coastal force. We all recognise that soaring costs and changing circumstances have perhaps made part of this alteration necessary, however undesirable it may be. But the crux of the matter has been the decision to abandon the new fleet carrier, and it is sad to think that in the years ahead the pièce de résistance of the Navy will not be a major capital ship but four Polaris submarines skulking

below the off-shore waters of the Continent in depths where the White Ensign will never be seen.

8.54 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Lomas: The hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) began with an attack on my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown), accusing him of bringing the Navy into disrepute. The hon. Gentleman finished by saying that the outlook for the Navy was bad. I can think of no greater contradiction in terms. He should appreciate that the day of military grandeur is gone and in the modern world we need a different kind of Navy to carry out the difficult jobs that it has to do.
Perhaps I may say to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State that, in the short time he has been in his job, he has mastered to a great extent many of the problems with which the Navy is faced and I wish him well in the days ahead. I am sure that he will agree with me that his predecessor, our hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu), laid the foundations in many ways for an effective Navy and in so doing earned the affection and respect of the Navy wherever it might be.
It may seem rather strange that someone coming from the West Riding of Yorkshire, namely, Huddersfield, West, should intervene in a naval debate, but there are two reasons, as my hon. Friend well knows. The first is a constituency interest and the second is that 20 years or so ago I was in the Royal Marines, desperately trying to keep in order such people as the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett). Because of that period in the Marines, I developed a very fond affection for the Corps and for the Royal Navy itself. I want to press my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary for a firm assurance that the Royal Marines will retain their individuality and their own organisation and will not be treated as a separate branch of the Navy, or anything else, but, as they have always been, as a separate force to which men are proud to belong.
My constituency interest arises because in my constituency there is the firm of David Brown, which is renowned throughout the world for a whole multitude of manufactured goods and which is supplying a tremendous amount of the


gearing equipment for the Royal Navy. It will be found from the Estimates that among the ships in the course of construction, the Leander class frigate "Andromeda", and the ships launched but not yet accepted into service—the Leander class frigates "Juno" and "Argonaut"—and the ships already accepted into service, the assault ship "Intrepid" and the frigates "Sirius", "Phoebe" and "Minerva", are all equipped with David Brown's gearing equipment. It can therefore be seen that Huddersfield has a stake in the Royal Navy. There are many more ships in commission which have this equipment, and that in itself speaks very highly of the special skills and know how of the people employed in that firm.
Going through the pages of the Estimates one cannot help but return to the subject discussed by my hon. Friend the Member for Provan. Under the item "Naval stores, armaments and victualling" the expenditure is no less than £214 million, or almost one-third of the total Navy Vote, and the time has come for the House carefully to examine the way in which the money is spent, to see whether it is being spent wisely, whether it could be better spent and whether it should be spent at all.
The Estimates for armaments stores have risen from last year's figure of £30,890,000 to no less than £56,347,000, an increase of 80 per cent. or £26 million, which is £3 million more than the total increase in the Navy Estimates themselves.
We know that this is because of Polaris, and we have to ask the question which my hon. Friend the Member for Provan was asking—do we need it? Is it absolutely essential and crucial to the safety and defence of the country? Is it light that there should be a constantly escalating figure in defence expenditure and that expenditure on armaments stores should constantly be rising and that we should be spending £56 million on armaments stores out of a total of £620 million on the Navy this year? In 1966–67, it was almost half as much. This year we are spending nearly 9 per cent. of the total Navy Vote on armaments stores, whereas last year it was just on 5 per cent., £30 million out of £597 million. The year before that there was a 6 per cent. expenditure on armament stores—£32 million out of £544 million. At a

time when the country is going through a very difficult economic period, which could not have been avoided no matter which Government was in power, it is crucial that we should examine expenditure minutely to see whether that £26 million could have been saved, or whether it should even now be spent.
As my hon. Friend has said it is true that we decided as a Government to hold back on the fifth Polaris submarine, and for that we should all be grateful. If we had gone ahead and spent more money on, for example, aircraft carriers demanded from the opposite side of the House, then taxation and everything else would have had to be increased and the social services would have suffered correspondingly. We are told, and I hope it is a fact of life, that the independent nuclear deterrent is finished, and that it will become part of a collective security system. This is the only future open to us.
We have to recognise that this great issue of defence must be tied up with our social services, and in all the things which are involved in trying to make this country more economically sound than it has been, and in trying to supply the people with the things that they so rightly deserve. We are spending a total of no less than £65 a second on defence, and the Royal Navy alone, in the Estimates we have before us, will be spending something in the region of £12 million a week.
We should ask ourselves whether we are getting value for money. I do not think that we are in every sense of the word. The attitude of the Navy Ministers towards the ratings and officers has been very good indeed, and great improvements have been made in their conditions. It is vital that we should examine every item of expenditure, to see where cuts can be made without impairing the efficiency of the Royal Navy.
I plead with the Under-Secretary of State to look again at this vast expenditure on guns and ammunition, torpedoes and missiles, to see where, if at all, it is possible to make any economies. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Harborough referred to the fact that we have no cruisers in operation. This is true. What truth is there in the rumour that H.M.S. "Blake" has been in Portsmouth Dockyard for a very long time


indeed? I am told on reasonably good authority that she has hardly, if ever, been to sea. We should have a close look at this to see whether money is being wasted on the vessel.
I turn now to my own corps, the Royal Marines. Perhaps for a second I may unite both sides of the House in saying that this is a good opportunity to pay tribute to one of the good servants of this House, the Principal Doorkeeper, the very famous "Polly" Perkins, a former Royal Marine. Mr. Perkins is one of those individuals who seems to know what is going on in the House better than the Whips. If one wants to know what time one will get away, one sees "Polly" and he will provide the answer. He retires very soon from a distinguished career in this House, and we all wish him the very best.
Together with a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House, I went to the Royal Marine barracks at Lympstone, which is where I began my training 25 years ago. We saw the training and the character building and the high standard demanded of the Royal Marines producing men who were highly trained and capable of performing in any theatre of operation. It can be said that the marines do not just turn out a soldier or a sailor; they turn out a marine who is proud of the fact that he is a marine. Twenty-five years afterwards, it was almost catching, because after a pretty good lunch and following a visit to the sergeants' mess we were watching the assault course, and, in a rather adventurous mood, we said that we would like to do it ourselves. Thank God the commandant-general never took us up on it, otherwise we should not have been in the House today. We would never have survived.
The rôle of the marines is crucial. The hon. Member for Harborough referred to the fact that it represents one-tenth of the strength of the Royal Navy. But if we are to have an effective Navy the marines should be used much more than they are today as an amphibious force ready at a moment's notice on Commando ships or other ships to go into action. I am concerned with the defence of the country, but I wish to ensure that there is no wastage and that all our

troops and ships and everything connected with the Navy can be operational as soon as is necessary. In that way, we could save a lot of money.
The "teeth-to-tail" ratio in the marines is the envy of virtually every other service in the world. This is something to be borne in mind. The cost effectiveness of the Royal Marines should be an example to other Services. I know that the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) would echo that sentiment. The marines, if used effectively, can save this country a tremendous sum of money and do the job which they have to do. I hope that we shall have from the Under-Secretary of State some recognition of the great work which the Royal Marines are doing and will be able to do in the future.
When I spoke in the debate on the Navy Estimates in 1965 I said that there was no point in having the most wonderful and grandiose type of Royal Navy if the net result meant economic bankruptcy. This goes for all forms of defence. Yet in the opening speech from the Opposition we heard phrases to the effect that the Government spent "little enough" on defence and on the Royal Navy. The implication is that we should be spending more. We can argue among ourselves on this side of the House about priorities, but surely there can be no argument between us when we hear demands from the Opposition for the spending of more and more money on defence. It begs the question which they refused to answer yesterday and tonight, and which they possibly will not answer when we debate the Army and Royal Air Force Estimates, namely, if they would not save money but spend more, where would they get it from, or what would they cut? The Opposition cannot have it both ways. They cannot demand, on the one hand, that there should be more Polaris submarines, more aircraft carriers, more anti-submarine vessels and more equipment, and, on the other hand, say that we must try to operate within the same budget framework. It cannot be done.
I do not think that the Government have gone far enough in their defence cuts. However, I assure them that, if it comes to a vote, I shall vote for them. I shall vote because of my belief in this Government. I am told that there are many hon. Members on this side of the House with consciences, and that the only


way they can exercise their consciences is by me voting for the Government. They are under the misguided impression that I have not got a conscience. Well, I have, but I will make quite certain that they can exercise theirs and get their names in the paper, while I go through the Government's Lobbies tonight.
I would say in conclusion that what we have to strive for, as a party and as a Government, is for an effective, efficient, well-drilled, well-disciplined, and well-organised Royal Navy. We have to change completely our attitudes and our beliefs in the old system under which the Royal Navy was organised. We have to change our idea of the strategy that existed many many years ago.
We have to protect the future—of course we have. The defence of this country is an important factor in our lives. We have to protect the future, but, at the same time, we must not endanger the present by over-reaching ourselves or by over-spending.
If it were possible to find some way of reducing this tremendous amount of money, this expenditure of £65 a second, on defence, the money so saved could go to help many of those in this country who are today still living under the shadows of poverty, distress, and hardship. It could go to relieve those overseas who are in need of our assistance.
If we can get rid of the scourge and threat of war, and can use some of the money that we devote to the weapons of war to provide the tractors and the things which are needed to till the ground and feed the people, we will be doing a far greater service than voting year after year an increase in the Defence Estimates. I sincerely hope that the Navy, Army and Air Force Ministers will look at their Estimates carefully, will prune wherever they can, and will recognise that, although defence is important, it is absolutely crucial that we do not overspend and, by overspending, destroy everything that we have sought to create.

9.13 p.m.

Dr. Reginald Bennett: It is a very happy moment to be privileged to follow the honourable "leatherneck" from Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas), and to join with him in paying tribute to our very old friend "Polly" Perkins of the Churchill Arch,

whom all of us know so well. He has been in the House longer than most hon. Members who are in the Chamber at this time.
I can speak with even more certainty than did the hon. Gentleman of his capacities in forecasting the course of events, especially as the evening draws late, because once when I was a P.P.S. to a Leader of the House he used to send me up to ask "Polly" Perkins what was happening and what was going to happen. This, I think, is the greatest tribute to him. He is the finest "galley wireless" I have ever served with, and I hope that he will enjoy many years of happy retirement. He is a great man.
The hon. Gentleman went on in part of his speech to make observations about the large increase or perpetual rise in the figures for ordnance and other armament stores that figure in these Navy Estimates. I am bound to say that he is in good company there, because he is, in fact, orthodox to the last degree of orthodoxy. In his party's manifesto in the 1964 General Election, his Leader announced to an expectant country
We are not prepared any longer to waste the country's resources on endless duplication of strategic nuclear weapons.
Apparently that, like one or two other points I have to mention, is not quite the same when he is in power. That was what he said when he was on perhaps a Front Bench, but not the Treasury Bench. His hon. Friend will have a bit of a job to persuade him to change when he has already changed from that to the antagonistic view which he obviously holds today.
Representing, as I do, a naval constituency, I can speak with some knowledge of the fact that there is probably no group in the life of the country which is more plunged into the witches' cauldron of politics, or is more aware of the fact that it is in this witches' cauldron of politics, than the people who serve in the Navy. For this we may thank more than anyone else the Prime Minister for the magnificent speech he made in Plymouth, to which reference has frequently been made this evening and which I would like to discuss a little, on 27th September, 1964. In an intervention I said that it was 1963, but it was, of course, made during the process of electioneering.


These Navy Estimates can be considered only in the light of that prospectus, which was issued by the company promoter and which we are now to see translated by him into action when he gets into the chair. There are one or two headings in this which we cannot help attending to, because it is nonsense to discuss these Estimates without referring to what we were given to expect.
We must first consider the Polaris and nuclear submarines, which have been much discussed today and will continue to be discussed. The Plymouth speech referred to the Conservative pursuit of the nuclear illusion. This was stated in the aforesaid election manifesto of the party opposite in 1964, in a paragraph which I would like the House to appreciate headed "Tory Nuclear Pretence":
The Nassau Agreement to buy Polaris knowhow and Polaris missiles from the United States of America will add nothing to the deterrent strength of the Western Alliance and it will mean utter dependence on the U.S. for their supply. Nor is it true that all this costly defence expenditure will produce an 'independent British deterrent'. It will net be independent, it will not be British, and it will not deter. Its possession will impress neither friend nor potential foe.
That, to say the least, was a little surprising when seen alongside the remarks made today by the Under-Secretary, in perfect personal good faith, I am sure, which I wrote down because they were such a monolithic tribute to "the importance of the programme", meaning the Polaris programme, and "the importance which we attach to keeping to the timetable of the programme".
Was there ever even visualised by George Orwell a more magnificent volte face, a more superb specimen of double-thinking translated into the most costly units? I would love to know, do they really mean it? Does the Under-Secretary, nice chap as he is, really mean what he says? If he does, did his Prime Minister really mean it at Plymouth? This is a puzzle, the answer to which only hon. Gentlemen opposite can tell us. Some of them have expressed certain impatience with the processes of thought which they are expected to pursue in trying to keep up with that dexterous fellow, but this is one of the most superb exercises in cynicism whichever way we take these allegations. It is about as repugnant to us as it is to some of the

hon. Members who sit below the Gangway opposite. But this is what we are discussing, and it is an answer which we have not yet received. I hope that the hon. Gentleman can tell us which is the truth. We would love to know.
Then we have this little question of aircraft carriers. The famous Plymouth speech devoted impassioned paragraphs to the allegations that there were not enough aircraft carriers to carry out the duties required of them. Now that the right hon. Gentleman's party is in power, the first thing that we have come across is the cancellation of the only aircraft carrier which was even projected. In the Navy Estimates this year, this wonderful flip-flap which has been performed by the party opposite is followed up by a studiously evasive paragraph, No.15, in Chapter IV:
New ships which the Royal Navy will need for its future tasks are being planned: until these are ready in about the middle 1970's, the carrier force will continue to be a component of the highest importance.
What does that mean? What sorts of ships? Apparently they are not carriers, because until they are built the carrier force is expected to continue.
The Minister has said that we must keep our aircraft carrier force as long as possible into the 1970s and that we shall not order any new ones. The functions served by the carriers after the 1970s, he says, must be provided by other means. Does that mean with aircraft, with rockets, with helicopters, with water skis, or what? This is the most fantastic piece of mumbo-jumbo to which we have been treated.
It is a matter of delightful humour and wit to consider this question, but it must be remembered that there are poor fellows flying round risking their necks by making night landings on aircraft carriers. If the carriers come to a full stop, pilots are liable to overshoot, and that is not a pleasant process even by day. The Government ought to take a more responsible attitude towards what is to be done. After all, who wants to fly around and have to land on a "clapped out" old carrier in the 1970s? That is no way to induce people to join up.

Mr. Foley: If the hon. Gentleman takes that view, can he explain how it is


that there are more people coming forward to train and serve in the Fleet Air Arm today than there were two years ago when the decision was still to carry on building an aircraft carrier?

Dr. Bennett: I can venture one explanation, and it is that wives are happy to let their husbands join now because they will not be able to fly. I know from personal experience that that is their attitude. The decision to cancel the carrier was a popular one. The wives thought that it was a spendid idea, and it is the wives who control recruitment nowadays.
In the debates on the Navy Estimates of 1962 and 1963, I said at prodigious length, which I do not intend to repeat tonight, that I was in favour of building a carrier. However, I pointed out consistently that I did not think that we ought to have a conventional carrier with all the arrester gear and other landing aids for high speed supersonic machines to land on the deck at a velocity equal to the world land speed record. I have always thought that that was wrong.
The decision must be re-examined. We cannot say that the carriers have now finally gone to the scrapyard, and that is the end. We must have something which will carry aircraft. What staggers me is the blindness of the Admiralty, or whatever it is called now, in failing to recognise the potential of vertical take-off and landing aircraft. Obviously there will be a need in the future for a type of aircraft carrier from which aircraft can operate, but taking off and landing vertically, by which I mean helicopters or V.T.O.L. fighters and other strike aircraft. After all, they are reality and not a mere pipe dream any more. They are rather a long-term dream, perhaps, but we know that such machines can fly.
Nothing is more appropriate for operating off ships than V.T.O.L. aircraft, and they can reach sufficiently high speeds to be serviceable in the sorts of operations which might need to be undertaken.
Those are points which I have made over the years, and I see no reason to change my views now—

Mr. Dalyell: In view of the serious weight: thrust ratio difficulties, as more

and more airfields are developed all over the world, surely the need for the very difficult V.T.O.L. aircraft diminishes?

Dr. Bennett: The V.T.O.L. fighter aircraft will always be needed for ground support. With wars breaking out constantly in some part of the world, usually in Asia and often in unmade country, the V.T.O.L. machine is the only one which can operate. There are still vast tracts of country where the ordinary high velocity machine does not have the standing control or ability to be ready on call at any period of its operational endurance. The vertical take-off machine is the operational aircraft of the future.
This is a long way from Vote A, but this is a question of the employment of the Navy. The ships of the future must include a sizeable vessel with a flat top which can take vertical take-off fighters—in spite of their slightly decreased efficiency, compared with those that use endless runways—and helicopters, and can be staffed with "leathernecks" of the type who has just left the Chamber. This is the obvious future of the Navy, beyond any contradiction.
So far, I have spoken about the ships, or hardware, but must now consider the bodies to man the ships. One of the fiercest reactions which I have ever experienced is that of the former comrades of my toil, the naval doctors, who have been double-crossed so flagrantly by Socialist Ministers in this latest phase. There is no doubt about what has been done. They have been "diddled" and double-crossed in a way which has never been seen before. This is a shocking affair and is not just a matter of choking off a few officers who cannot defend themselves.
This matter was debated in the House on a special Motion, but it is intensely germane to Vote A of the Estimates this year. If the doctors of the Services are given this scurvy treatment by a Government in their usual state of financial embarrassment, what can this portend? Surely it can portend only an indifference to whether they stay or go. This was as good as said by the hon. Gentleman's colleagues during that debate—that they can go, no doubt into the National Health Service, but probably abroad.
The Minister did not say that, but that is what they said. An indifference


to whether they stay or go, which is undoubtedly that of the present Government, means that they are prepared to see a smaller establishment of such doctors, which in turn means that they must be envisaging a smaller responsibility for those doctors—in other words, a reduction in Vote A.
I did not invent this. This is the feeling which I have picked up far and wide in my constituency. The naval medical service is largely based in my constituency. They see that their own professed dispensability means dispensability of some of the men who should be in their charge. This might please some hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite, but I do not think that it will please the Government, who have set tasks which the limited number of men and equipment are already unable to carry out.
So it appears that medical recruitment will be stopped abruptly and a blow to naval recruiting generally must follow, despite the recent recrudescence in recruitment in the Fleet Air Arm.
I now quote again from our beloved Prime Minister, who said, in his famous speech at Plymouth:
And there is another issue. We believe in fair wages, fair conditions. Under the Tory pay pause"—
my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) quoted this earlier in another context—
which they would now like you to forget, it was public servants, Government employees, who got the rough end of the policy"—
not, apparently, the Service doctors—
It fell on me as Labour Party spokesman to lead the attack on the Government's pay pause policy and to censure their wanton breach of national agreements, to which their word and honour were pledged, in respect of a whole range of Admiralty employees, here and elsewhere.
Fine words, but we are accustomed to fine words from that quarter, are we not? Let us see some deeds and not words.
These words bring me to the next point, the dockyards—

It being half-past Nine o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after half-past Nine o'clock and may be entered upon and proceeded with at this day's Sitting at any hour during a period of two hours after half-past Nine o'clock, though opposed.—[Mr. Gourlay]

Supply again considered.

Question again proposed.

Dr. Bennett: These soul-stirring words of our beloved Prime Minister apply not only to the naval doctors but to the Admiralty employees in the dockyards, as also does the immediately preceding passage of our beloved Prime Minister's great speech, which the House must like to hear, because it should be graven absolutely for ever for posterity:
Now I turn to the problem of the Royal Dockyards.
We remember the cuts in 1963, and earlier this year, here, and in Portsmouth and Chatham too, involving a loss of 500 jobs in this area.
This is the wonderful stuff:
I believe, and I state this with all the sincerity at my command"—
This is not John Bird speaking:
that I believe our reappraisal of defence policies, with our emphasis on the role of the Navy's regular job, will provide better security, better assurances for the future than the vacillations of Tory defence policy.
Lovely stuff, is it not? Do you know what happened, Mr. Deputy Speaker? What happened was that between that election and the following one dockyard employment had gone down by, I think, 800—far more even than the 500 mentioned. It went plunging down under the Labour Government that ended a year ago. I should love to know what has happened since.
So, throughout naval policy, we have had an identical process of cold-blooded deceit. In every case, whatever has been promulgated the reverse has happened. It is an astounding record. There are people doing time who have done less well than that. The present Administration have grossly mishandled the Navy, and I would implore them while they are still there, heaven help them, to get out a serious policy which will give the Navy something to look forward to, and something to do.

9.33 p.m.

Mr. William Baxter: We have listened very attentively


to a most interesting speech by the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett). I will have the charity not to express my point of view about it, or I might be expelled from the party—[HON. MEMBERS: "Which party?"] The party of which I am a member. There is only one party on this side, though we have our disagreements just as hon. Members opposite have theirs. I enjoyed the hon. Gentleman's speech very much.
I have waited with some patience to intervene in this debate, not that I have very much to say but because my name is appended to an Amendment seeking to make a token reduction of 1,000 men. This is the traditional method of expressing one's dissatisfaction with the Government's actions.
Before I go further, I would remind the House that not only the Opposition but hon. Members on this side have a regard for our naval personnel. Whilst we may disagree on what should be the future rôle of the Royal Navy, everyone thinks that, by and large, those in it have always done their duty as they have seen it.
It seems to me that both Front Benches have spoken in unison today, and that makes one wonder why. To me, it is a clear indication that whenever a Member of Parliament becomes a Minister of the Crown, especially in the Defence Department, some hypnotism or other is used to bring him to book and get him to accept the Establishment's point of view rather than that which he was returned to Parliament to pursue. Be that as it may, I can only express great dissatisfaction with the policy which the present Government are pursuing, particularly in these Navy Estimates.
The second reason why I have stayed in the Chamber to listen to all the speeches that have been made—I have been here for about seven hours—is that I intervened when my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary opened the discussion. In reply to that intervention, probably rightly, he chastised some of my hon. Friends and myself for certain views which we were now holding. He did so because about a year ago we voted for the Defence Estimates which were introduced on that occasion. It is true that many of my hon. Friends voted for

them, but we did so with a great deal of reluctance. After all, there were certain important factors to bear in mind.
We had a sense of loyalty to the party which had only just been returned to power. We wished to give the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and his colleagues an opportunity to put into operation policies which it would have been difficult for them to implement in such a limited period. However, we hoped that they would implement the policies of the party which had sent them to power, and it would have been remiss of us not to have given them that opportunity. But surely that does not bind us for all time to dot the i's and cross the t's of every action the Government may take in future, and be Lobby fodder if we feel that they are departing fundamentally from the policy which they were sent here to pursue?
A number of quotations have been made from previous speeches, and I will make several later. It can be proven conclusively that the Labour Party was elected to power to do something very different from what the Government are doing. A majority of three placed the party in a precarious position, but that should not now deter us from taking a stand if a matter of principle is at stake. Had we gone in to the Division Lobby against the Government or had we abstained when we had a majority of only three the alternative would have been even worse than the then Government Front Bench, because our action would have put the Conservatives back in power.
As I have listened to this debate I have been struck by certain sentiments which have been expressed and which were contained in some words used by the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon), when he said, in effect, "All wars are unnecessary and most are made by mistake". That is profound in this day and age.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: That phrase does not represent a new thought. It has been true throughout history; at any rate, the history I learnt.

Mr. Baxter: One can interpret phrases in different ways, and—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. This is a serious matter, but the hon. Member


has only once mentioned the Navy Estimates. I must ask him to come a little closer to the subject under discussion.

Mr. Baxter: I merely wished to answer the point which the Chair had permitted the hon. and gallant Member for Wells to put. In any case, I commend the words which the hon. and gallant Gentleman used to the House. While it is historically correct to say that most wars, naval or otherwise, have been made by mistake, those mistakes have cost a considerable amount, and if a mistake should be made again and if we find ourselves involved in a naval conflict in the not far distant future, it will not be sufficient for us to say, "A mistake has been made". We should remind ourselves in advance of the consequences that such a mistake would bring about.
We discussed the Defence Estimates yesterday and today we are discussing the Navy Estimates. In this discussion great play has been made with the fact that our naval forces will defend the people of Britain in the immediate years ahead. Is not this a fallacy? Psychologically, it pays whichever party is in office to say that our forces are capable of defending us, be they Polaris submarines or any other form of defence. The opposite is the case. This is not for the defence of our people, it is for the destruction of other people. The Polaris submarine will not defend a single soul in our island but it will destroy people in another part of the world. This is the deterrent factor so many people talk about, but it is too late if a mistake is made.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: As the hon. Member was kind enough to quote what I said a moment ago, may I put this to him? Surely the purpose of defence is to prevent these catastrophes happening. That is what we are searching to do here tonight.

Mr. Baxter: I agree about the sincerity of hon. Members on both sides of the House in their search for defence, but, as I have indicated, the word psychologically puts a person on a pinnacle when he says, "We are providing the Polaris basis for defence purposes", whereas to be honest—and I challenge the hon. and gallant Member—the Polaris

submarine will not be used for defence but for offence if war breaks out.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: rose—

Mr. Baxter: I have given way to the hon. and gallant Member and he has had his chance.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: The hon. Member challenged me to say whether the Polaris submarines were a measure of defence or not. Of course they are a measure of defence. This is the whole purpose of this equipment, to prevent these catastrophes from happening.

Mr. Baxter: I admit the sincerity of the hon. and gallant Member's contention. He believes that they are for defence, but they are not for defence in reality; they are for aggression. They are to deter, so that we may say, "If you strike at us, we can counter-strike very soon". The Polaris submarine is not a defence instrument but an instrument of destruction and the whole construction is one of deterrence to deter anyone who tries to strike at our island. The hon. and gallant Member has rightly pointed out that a mistake can take place; he should have regard to that possibility.
I turn to my hon. Friend on the Front Bench. The Under-Secretary said in an interjection that we shall have only four Polaris submarines. What is so wonderful about the number four? On whose advice, whose authority, whose calculations has it been conceived that four submarines of a Polaris type will give us an adequate defence force? The Opposition, with the same advisers as my hon. Friends have had, decided that five of these submarines would give them some semblance of defence. There are two questions; one says four and one says five. Does my hon. Friend say that because another Polaris submarine would cost £50,000, £60,000 or £100,000 we should stop at that, for this so-called defence force would be effective?
I wish there were some realistic approach to this and some facts and figures placed before the House before we ask asked to concur in a decision of the Cabinet, be it Conservative or Labour, because we are entitled to have as much information as anyone who sits on the Front Bench. I remind my hon.


Friends who sit on the Front Bench that they were elected by the same type of electors as those who elected me. They are in their positions only because of selection by an individual, the Prime Minister, whoever he may be.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: A few moments ago the hon. Member said that he thought these Polaris submarines were to be used for aggression. If he genuinely thinks that would be the purpose either of his Government or a Government from this side of the House and that it was the purpose of his Government to aggress with Polaris submarines, should he not have voted against them last night rather than abstaining?

Mr. Baxter: The hon. and gallant Gentleman was not voting against submarines last night. I will go into the Lobby with his party if it tables a Motion to abolish all the Polaris submarines, because I am in favour of that. I am trying to point out the inconsistencies of this so-called debate, which is a sham, with one side of the House saying, "We need five", and the other side saying, "We need four".
My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and myself took the opportunity some months ago of going to the Polaris base in the Holy Loch and inspecting what was happening there. It is one of the greatest crimes against the people of Scotland and against the people of Great Britain that the base should be permitted. We are spending anything from £50 million to £100 million there. As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown) said, even in the construction of this vehicle of mass destruction we are employing about 1,800 building trade workers. Those workers could be well occupied in building decent houses for people to live in—not houses with outside lavatories, not houses with walls streaming with water, not places which are not fit for human habitation, not places which are less fit for habitation than many byres and pigstys.
Because of the unlimited amount of money which has been poured into the Polaris base, the building trade workers there are getting a higher rate of wages than they can get on building houses for the people of Glasgow. The Secretary of State for Scotland has to answer Ques-

tions asking why the cost of houses is higher in Scotland than it is in England. The extra money being paid to those who work on the Polaris base has an indirect bearing on the cost of houses.
I give this counsel to hon. Members who have counselled me and others on this side to go and see the Army and Navy exercising themselves to destroy an enemy. They should go and see the money we are spending needlessly on the Polaris base. My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire and I plodded miles and miles up into the mountains to see what they are doing up there. They are moving mountains for the simple purpose of stock-piling nuclear missiles. Who owns them? Are they the property of the British Government? Are they the property of America? Who pays for the Polaris base? Who pays for the space which is being provided for those bombs? Is it America? I see no signs in these Estimates that America is making a contribution towards the cost.
I demand an answer from my right hon. Friends. My hon. Friend and I refer to 1,000 men in our Amendment. Eighteen hundred building workers are employed at the Polaris base. Shame upon the House. Shame upon my party which permits such a thing to go on. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am thankful for your support. I put it on record that you agree entirely with what I am saying. [HON. MEMBERS: "Order."] The formalities of the House may be important to my hon. Friends on the Front Bench. They are not so important to me. The Polaris base and workers who could be employed in Glasgow are much more important to me than describing an hon. Member as "the right hon. Gentleman", instead of as "you". That might be important to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), but it is of damned little importance to me.
There are other questions to which I call attention. Are we an independent nuclear Power? We are entitled to an answer, but we have never had it. What did the Prime Minister say about it? The hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham has quoted his Plymouth speech. I have been through many volumes of HANSARD looking up not only the Prime Minister's speeches but the speeches of others of my


right hon. and hon. Friends on this important subject. But it would be remiss of me to bring in lesser fry when the most important man of the lot has made his position abundantly clear. I should like to know whether he has changed his mind. I am entitled to know.
On 31st January, 1963, my right hon. Friend the present Prime Minister stated his position. He said:
What is the argument for pretending to be an independent nuclear Power? Is it, firstly, because we want the right to use it in some private war of our own…or is it the view that if we are in the nuclear club we shall be consulted…I think that the answer is simpler—pathetic, perhaps, but not immoral. It is nostalgia…
Having dealt with the arguments for, as put to us in this debate, let me repeat why, in our view—and I quote our own defence statement—Britain should cease the attempt to remain an independent nuclear Power."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol.670, c. 1241–2.]
And that is what my right hon. Friend went on to do.
Are we or are we not a nuclear Power? I demand an answer. I asked my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State who controls the nuclear forces that we possess, the four Polaris submarines. Rightly or wrongly, he gave the answer that N.A.T.O. would control them. If N.A.T.O. controls our Polaris submarines—I have seen no agreement to that effect, but I take my hon. Friend's word as correct—I go on to assume that as West Germany is a part of N.A.T.O. the West Germans would have a say in the use of nuclear weapons if our Polaris submarines were gifted to N.A.T.O.
What did the Prime Minister have to say about giving Germany a finger on the trigger?
I make perfectly clear now where we stand. We are completely, utterly and unequivocally opposed, now and in all circumstances, to any suggestion that Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger or any responsibility, direct or indirect, for deciding that nuclear weapons are to be used."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol.670, c. 1246.]
If we hand over our nuclear submarines to N.A.T.O., then West Germany, as part of N.A.T.O., will have a considerable say in their use. It is not logical to expect that West Germany will be put outside and that America, Britain and the other

smaller nations in Europe will have the say in this part of their equipment. It is fantastic that we should be in this position today.
Why should the people of Great Britain be saddled with the hundreds of millions of £s expenditure to provide these nuclear submarines and a base if it is all to be handed over to N.A.T.O.? If it is to be handed over to N.A.T.O., what percentage of the cost will the N.A.T.O. nations bear for what we hand over? Or are we so stupid and feckless that we are prepared to hand over to N.A.T.O. millions of £s of equipment, whether it is good or bad, without the N.A.T.O. countries paying any contribution towards the cost? I cannot understand the Government's attitude.
I have been listening to the debate and I am in some difficulty in understanding whether we are returning to the Defence White Paper of 1957, when we decided that we would be more dependent on nuclear deterrents, missiles, Blue Streak and what-have-you, than the conventional method of war. I thought the decision was that we would more or less do away with the conventional method of war. Then there was a switch of policy back to the conventional and away from the Blue Streaks, missiles and so on.
Am I right in saying that we are now returning to the policy the Conservative Party introduced and then scrapped, or are we staying with the conventional type of force?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we cannot go over the whole question of the Defence White Paper. The debate is confined to the rôle of the Royal Navy.

Mr. Baxter: I appreciate that, Mr. Deputy Speaker. One may talk about defence in the context of the rôle of the Navy and the Navy Estimates and that is what I was referring to. You have put me off my train of thought to some extent, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I shall merely say that great and important decisions are made in the House in connection with the Navy Estimates and other Estimates, and debates take place without many facts and figures being laid before Members to convince them one way or another.
I protest against that. It is fantastic that we should not get as much information as


my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench. I do not think that they can be trusted more than we can. To judge from the leakages which take place from certain meetings, few of them can be trusted. I should like a little more information to convince me of the rightness of the policy being pursued.
I hope that there will soon be a new approach to the question by the Cabinet; that they will recognise their obligations to the party that sent them here; that they will recognise their obligations to the policy we propounded at the election and will try to put into operation.
For the life of me, I cannot think that Russia can now be looked upon as a potential enemy of this country. When I have seen my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of Russia, Mr. Kosygin, shaking hands, holding hands, and more or less kissing each other, I should not think that those people would fight anybody in the future. I do not see why we should be worried about Russia, but even if, without our consent, we should be brought into a war which arose by a mischance between Russia and America—one remembers the Cuba incident—we would be the first to be destroyed. The time is ripe for our party to give a little more consideration to that.
Today I have seen a lot of lilies, or daffodils as they are called in some parts, on the breasts of many Members on both sides of the House. I was reminded of the Good Book, where it says:
Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow;
they toil not, neither do they spin:…yet…
even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.
One will also find that in that part of the Good Book it says:
Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.
I remind hon. Members of those phrases. I suggest to them that they should remember the evil of today and not build up for themselves more evil in the years to come.
The policies pursued by this Government and the last have no basis of reality. They do not recognise that, by example, we can save ourselves and save the world. All the preparations for war which have gone on from time immemorial have never stopped war taking

place, and what has been said is true—that most of these wars were started by mistake. Another war could start by mistake and destroy the human race. I counsel the Government when considering these Estimates or any others appertaining to the fictitious name of defence to have regard to example rather than the method of approach that we have adopted in the past.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Eric Fletcher): Before the hon. Gentleman sits down, may I ask whether it is his intention formally to move the Amendment standing in his name and that of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Hugh D. Brown)?

Mr. Baxter: I would be happy to move it now, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I beg to move,
That the said number be reduced by 1,000 men.

10.1 p.m.

Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine: It was towards the end of the speech of the hon. Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. W. Baxter) that I began to think that the two parties had changed sides in the House and that we were back to the days when Labour was in Opposition. All the earlier part of his speech was directed to his own Front Bench and no one on this side could have been more critical of the Prime Minister and his policy than the hon. Member. In these circumstances, it places us on this side in some difficulty in trying to debate the issue with the hon. Member. I hope that he will not feel embarrassed if I say that I do not think that he made one point on which I would support him.
In the last three speeches from the benches opposite—and no doubt this applies to earlier speeches—the same disillusionment has been clearly indicated. The hon. Member for West Stirlingshire earlier referred to the four Polaris submarines. He indicated clearly that it is no good looking in the White Paper to find out why there should be four Polaris submarines. Earlier, another hon. Member asked, "Who is the enemy?" Again, one finds nothing in the White Paper to tell us who the enemy is.
The whole balance of the White Paper is wrong. If we are to have naval forces designed to do anything, we have to know


what we are to do with them and why. The whole proposition on which we are having this debate is wrong. Paragraph 7 of the White Paper says:
Ever since October 1964, the British Government has argued inside N.A.T.O. that allied strategy must be designed to fit the forces which the national government arc prepared to make available.
Yet, now an Amendment has been moved to the effect that we should have 1,000 men fewer.
I could understand a proposition that we did not need a Navy or that our commitments were as set out in the White Paper and that our policy should be whatever it is. But for the Government to say that we have been urging on N.A.T.O. a strategy to fit the forces available is to put the cart before the horse. I urge the Government to have another look at this. They should find out what needs to be done, then what forces we need and come back to the House and state what we have to pay in order to have them. It is clear from the White Paper that we do not know what is available to meet whatever threat there may be. If we are not told what the threat is or what forces are available, the White Paper is not of great value.
Another factor which has emerged from what was said by each of the last three speakers from the Government side is that we have not got the information in the White Paper which we need to make an adequate contribution to a debate of this sort. When I first came to the House, I made it my habit to try to make a sensible contribution to each of the debates on the Navy Estimates, but it became clear to me that the more often we were provided with these documents, the less and less was available the information which we needed to work on, and of all the White Papers on the Navy which I have seen, this provides us with the absolute minimum of information.
Last year, I was very disappointed to find that there was no reference in that White Paper to the protection of shipping. This is a country which has 4,000 merchant ships, and a White Paper which deals with the Navy without making any reference to the protection of shipping is virtually valueless. I looked at this White Paper to see what it had to say about

anti-submarine warfare. My hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark) may want to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I had the privilege of going to see H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" and I was very impressed with the work done there and felt that a great deal was being done not only for the naval forces of this country, but also for the naval forces of N.A.T.O. and other countries. I should like to know what is going on and what is happening about training in anti-submarine warfare.

Mr. R. Chichester-Clark: I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree with me that events in other parts of the globe may well have caused the Government and others to have had second opinions about closing the base at Londonderry. While I shall certainly be interested to hear anything the Under-Secretary has to say on this subject tonight, I would not like to press the Government into saying something which they would later regret, and I would rather have mature consideration. I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that the economic and strategic case for keeping this base is overwhelming. It was always said at the time of the proposed closing by the experts who were against keeping it that even then the case was balanced on a knife-edge, and events may have changed their minds where there may now be an overwhelming strategic argument for keeping the base, as hon. Members on both sides of the House always thought that there was.

Mr. Irvine: I am sure that my hon. Friend is right. I was merely paying my tribute to the work which has been done by H.M.S. "Sea Eagle" and saying how important the anti-submarine rôle was for the Navy.
The hon. Member for West Stirling-shire said that we might find ourselves at war with Russia. We know that Russia has 400 or more submarines and if she has 400 submarines and we have 4,000 ships, one would have thought that at least some mention might have been made in the White Paper about how it was proposed to deal with that situation.
When discussing these matters with the Royal Navy, I have gained the impression that the modern way of dealing with submarines is to have a carrier in the middle of a force which is then able to use


various methods of discovering where the submarines are. But we all know what the carrier situation now is. I use antisubmarine warfare simply as an example to show how inadequate the White Paper is for giving us the information which we require to make a sensible contribution to the debate.
I want now to refer to our policy east of Suez. During the last war I had the privilege of spending a considerable time in the Indian Ocean and, probably like many other hon. Members, I visited all those salubrious places, like the Chagos Archipelago and elsewhere, which now appear in our discussions. I find it very difficult to persuade myself that if we give up the bases and are driven back to wherever we can provide a base, on places like the Chagos Archipelago, we will ever build up any adequate force or presence in the Indian Ocean, and if we do I would have thought that it would certainly be a great deal more expensive and more difficult to maintain than would be the case with a carrier, which at least would be mobile. I imagine that everybody knows where the Chagos Archipelago is and certainly our enemies would know, and I would prefer a mobile base for my areoplanes to a place like that.
In any event, have we any indication in the White Paper as to what sort of aircraft would be required and in what numbers or how we would be able to have any presence in the Indian Ocean? Yet we find on page 7, paragraph 27 the statement:
We are continuing our discussions with the Australian Government about the possibility of having new facilities in Australia.
I have had the privilege of seeing the place which is called the naval base in Western Australia. It is a very nice harbour, with no facilities at all. They told me when I was there that half the world population is facing the Indian Ocean, and could be policed from a naval base in Australia. I have recently been there and the impression that I received, talking to people, was that we had lost interest in that part of the world and that it was no good people there thinking that very much would come of this.
What can be the logic of considering whether to have facilities in Australia, if there is nothing nearer than perhaps Cyprus? This seems to be a White

Paper which does not give any sensible solution or indication as to what is required. I have one good word to say about it. Page 54 refers to the training of Commonwealth and foreign naval personnel. I should like to draw attention to that. I commend the Royal Navy for the work that is being done. It says:
…about 700 Commonwealth and foreign naval personnel, from some 29 different countries, are under training in the United Kingdom".
That is not only an important matter for the Commonwealth but an important link between naval Service men in different parts of the world the worth of which cannot be over-estimated.
The last matter that I wish to raise is that of re-engagement which is dealt with in page 70 of the White Paper. It seems that the figures set out there for the Royal Navy are anything but satisfactory. All of us with Service men in our constituencies have been faced with the problem of young men who have enlisted into one of the Services and who come to us asking: "What is the future of a Service career with the present Government in power?"
I have a letter sent to me by one of my constituents the day before yesterday, in which he refers to the recruiting posters and the advertisements of the glowing prospects of a Service career. He sets out what his son has been doing and says that he has been mentioned in dispatches and so on. The letter goes on:
He feels he must look for a job when he returns in April because he does not want to be axed, at the age of 30, with a wife and family".
A little later he goes on:
I feel that the Government should make clear their policy or we will have no potential senior officers at all.
That is not an isolated incident. If the Government continue with their present policy and do not make the position clear so that these young men will know whether they have a future, they will find that future figures will be even more depressing than those in the White Paper. I hope that the Under-Secretary will give some attention to the prospect that we may have something in a subsequent White Paper which will enable us to make a more coherent and sensible contribution to a debate such as this.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: On this naval occasion, I am sorry that he is out of the Chamber, because I should have liked to say a word to welcome the gallant Admiral the Member for Winchester (Rear Admiral Morgan Giles), who opened this debate and did a job which I did for a number of years. The process of stepping from one's own opinions on the back benches to one's party's opinions on the Front Bench may be a difficult one. The hon. and gallant Member stumbled a little, once or twice, but in that I am sure that he will have the sympathy of his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell).
I should like to take up one thing which the hon. and gallant Admiral said. He congratulated us on having a nuclear deterrent of sufficient size to be credible. It is not size which makes a nuclear deterrent credible. What makes it credible is an ability to make someone believe that one might dare to use it. That is what credibility means. Whom can we persuade that we might use the nuclear deterrent—a non-nuclear Power? We were nuclearly operational at Suez. It did not impress the Egyptians or anybody else. It did not impress anybody in the recent confrontation in Indonesia.
Suppose the Chinese were to decide to take over Hong Kong. Would they believe that we would use our nuclear capacity to destroy all their cities? They would not even take it into their calculations. They would not believe it any more than we would. Take a nuclear Power—Russia. Playing nuclears with Russia is like playing poker with transparent cards. We would have to back down at every stage in that confrontation. They know that we would have to back down. Even if they used a nuclear on us, we could not reply because of the terrifying vulnerability of our cities. We cannot, with our concentrations of population, trade, cities. We cannot go into that sort of macabre trade. We are not in it. A nuclear in our hands is totally incredible.
That used to be the opinion of our Prime Minister. He has been quoted quite a lot. I would quote from Lord Slessor as quoted by the Prime Minister on 16th January, 1964:

'for Britain and France the only advantage of a small missile submarine force seems to me to be that it would afford us the doubtful consolation of a posthumous revenge—devastating no doubt, but not lethal—after our countries and the bulk of our population had been obliterated'".
I do not think that it would even give us that satisfaction, because nobody would obliterate us. They would leave enough to be able to deter with a threat to the rest. This is the hopelessness of trying to be nuclear when we are vulnerable to this degree.
After all, the Rand calculation was that it would take about 13 nuclears to reduce this country to an ungovernable unit. We are within range of and absolutely indefensible from at least 500 medium-range rockets.
I wish to make another quotation from the Prime Minister. He really did say this; it is not a parody, although it sounds like it:
Then, of course, on Polaris"—
he was talking to the then Prime Minister—
we have made it clear a hundred times that we intend if returned to power—that is what we are asked by the right hon. Gentleman—to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement on the basis of our declared policy that our proper contribution to our Alliance and that our most effective military strength in this country is secured without the illusion which is created by nuclear missile carrying submarines. I have said a hundred times—and the right hon. Gentleman is capable of reading what I said—that we shall renegotiate or, if one likes, denegotiate the Nassau Agreement…we said that we should renegotiate this Agreement to end the proposal to buy Polaris submarines from the United States."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th January, 1964; Vol.687, c. 440 and 444.]
Nothing could be clearer than that. Why was it not done? We were told when we came to power that this nuclear capacity was no longer an independent British deterrent and that it was to serve an international force, the A.N.F. The A.N.F. has sunk into oblivion. We are now told that it is assigned to N.A.T.O. Quite frankly, that simply is not true. There are no ships assigned to SACLANT. That is the curious thing. SACLANT is a naval command without ships. It is a naval command which, frankly, became an absurdity a great many years ago. Its job was to convoy ships across the Atlantic in a nuclear war. I think that


at some point it became apparent to somebody that there is not much point in convoying ships to an indefensible port. All that would happen would be that the enemy would take out the port and the ships too. So we are left with the independent nuclear deterrent, at great expense, which we have pledged ourselves time and again to abolish.
We are told so often this is the wrong time. But actually could there be a better time to get rid of this? At last we have the non-proliferation agreement pretty well signed up between the two big boys. The problem is to get the non-nuclear powers to come in. What better method is there than by saying, "We are the other effective nuclear Power. We know that it is useless to us. Take it from our experience. We have learned the obsolescent impotence of our position. Take our example."
Let us lead the other non-nuclear Powers. This is the moment to get agreement. This is the moment to do it and not to say how pleased we are that we are getting on with Polaris and that there must be no delay in producing these ridiculous craft.
It really is at times difficult. We are told to get rid of this nuclear position. That was why we were elected. We were elected to put up the national productivity. We were elected to maintain full employment, yet we are creating unemployment as a financial convenience. It is not very easy for a Socialist looking for a Government to support.
I turn to the whole position of these Navy Estimates. I would like to refer to one of the finest speeches which I have ever heard in my Parliamentary career. That was the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) last night. In that speech he effectively demolished the oceanic rôle for this country. We have no more business than Holland, that was once an Empire, than Sweden that was once an Empire, to try to police the oceans of the world, or to imagine that we have that kind of oceanic responsibility. The job of our Fleet, as of the Dutch fleet and of the Swedish fleet, is coastal protection, shipping, fishery protection and that kind of thing. The rôle of an oceanic

naval Power is the rôle of a world Power. It is not our rôle any longer.

Captain W. Elliot: Will the hon. and learned Member give way?

Mr. Paget: No, I am sorry; time is short.
I wanted to say a word or two about the "phoney", decadent position in which I see us. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West stripped the White Paper on Defence with almost surgical brutality. I have seldom seen any Government document so scientifically torn in pieces. It was left naked but, unfortunately, unblushing.
When, however, the right hon. Gentleman was challenged to state the Conservative policy, he was not prepared to answer, because what he had stripped and exposed was the Conservative policy. And he is against it. I am against it, too. The right hon. Gentleman was just about as opposed to his party as I am to mine.
The trouble is that this is simply the Conservative Party policy being carried on. It is rather worse, because the pretences upon which it is based year-by-year grow thinner. I am not saying that it is the fault of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence. He has made a perfectly competent Conservative Minister of Defence, probably falling in somewhere between Lord Head, who was rather good, and the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), who was rather bad. He has, however, been a conventionally-minded Conservative Defence Minister, getting worse and worse because the policy is worse. It is a policy based upon accepting the commitments which were appropriate to a great empire and pretending to provide means to perform them. Each year that pretence becomes more transparent and more feeble.
We have a nuclear deterrent which is neither British nor a deterrent. We have an east of Suez policy that is impotent even to cope with the trouble in Rhodesia. We have an oceanic policy and we cannot afford even an aircraft carrier to support it. This is decadence. Decadence is when a nation is prepared to prefer pretence knowing that it is pretence to reality. Decadence is when we lie not to deceive our enemies, but to deceive ourselves, and are satisfied with our lying.

10.28 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Wall: We can agree that we have had a very wide ranging debate, although there has been a considerable concentration on Polaris. I made my maiden speech on the Navy Estimates some years ago and, to express a personal view, I hope that this will not be the last of our Navy debates. I remember one spokesman from the Government Front Bench indicating during the defence debate that in view of the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence it might be possible in future for our Service debates to be spread across the whole field of defence. I hope that that does not come about. I believe that we can get at the points of importance to each Service by having at least one day for each Service. Both sides of the House would, I think, agree that we need to make the best use of available funds, but we disagree on how this should be done. We also appear to disagree on the importance of maritime strategy and the need to have adequate mobile sea/air forces.
I again reiterate my congratulations to the Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, the hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Foley), on becoming the political spokesman for the Royal Navy I congratulated him some days ago during the Adjournment debate which we had on the Simonstown Agreement. On that occasion, I commiserated with him for having to answer a rather tricky debate, and I must repeat that commiseration today, but for rather different reasons. Today, he has been attacked far more from his rear than from his front. I worked out a scorecard, and I reckoned that out of eight Government back-benchers who spoke today six dissociated themselves from the Government's defence policy and the other two had certain reservations.
In a brilliant speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham (Dr. Bennett) pointed out the reason why. It is because Front Bench spokesmen of the Government Party, when in opposition, made a series of unfortunate and irresponsible speeches, and they are now suffering from those speeches, having taken over responsibility. Responsibility breeds an understanding of the real problems. We on this side believe that adequate defence forces are the nation's insurance policy. Surely one of the funda-

mentals in life is that it is very foolish to under-insure, and that applies to an individual, a family or a State.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Rye (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine) pointed out, in the White Paper which we are considering there is very little information about the future of the Navy or a clear appreciation of the rôle of the Royal Navy. I will admit that in the years immediately after the war there was a natural uncertainty as to the rôle of the Senior Service, and that was manifested by both political parties. Looking at the 1957 White Paper, I note that paragraph 24 says:
The rôle of naval forces in total war is somewhat uncertain.
At the end of that year came the first of the Conservative five-year naval defence plans. That ran from 1957 to 1962. In 1958, the rôle of the Navy was clearly defined, with three separate commitments: peacetime, limited war and global war. In subsequent years, the re-equipment of the Fleet proceeded apace. This included new ships such as the County class guided missile destroyers, new aircraft such as the Scimitar and Sea Vixen, and new weapons such as Sea Slug. In 1961, it became clear that the Navy would also play its part in the airborne nuclear deterrent by the use of Buccaneer aircraft operating from aircraft carriers.
The second five-year plan started in 1962, and in the White Paper of that year the Navy's rôle was redefined. Paragraph 8 states:
We must continue to make it clear to potential aggressors, however, that we should strike back with all the means that we judge appropriate, conventional or nuclear. If we had nothing but nuclear forces, this would not be credible. A balance must be maintained, therefore, between conventional and nuclear strength.
The next paragraph goes on:
In short, we must maintain carefully balanced forces to deter every form of aggression and military threats
In those days, the rôle of the Navy was crystal clear. In the following year, the Navy was entrusted with the responsibility of creating and operating the British seaborne nuclear deterrent. In 1964, the rebuilding of our amphibious forces was announced.


I had always been a fairly consistent critic of the then Government's defence policy. I notice that in the 1964 debate, I was able to say:
The Navy Estimates presented to us today show a return to a maritime strategy which should always have been the basis of our policy. I believe that we have the right men. We are now getting the right ships, and we certainly have the right ideas. Real progress has been made this year."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1964: Vol.690, c. 1054.]
In eight years, Conservative Governments had been able to re-equip the Royal Navy and provide it with the capability of dealing with any threat which might be made against these islands or against our allies.
What is particularly important to remember is that the percentage of our gross national product spent on defence decreased over the years of office of that Government from 8.1 to 6.5 per cent.; in other words, almost every year there was a decrease in spending on defence forces. Now the present Government have been in power for about three years and the amount which they propose to spend is exactly the same as when the Conservatives left office 6.5 per cent. of the G.N.P.
I must admit that, after the Secretary of State's abortive bladder-puncturing exercise last night, figures can mean almost anything, but an impartial listener must agree that the result that the Government's Defence Review has achieved so far is that each of three Services is uncertain of its future rôle, in terms of either a Continental or a maritime strategy.
I will give some examples. In Europe, B.A.O.R. is uncertain of its future. The R.A.F. has had all its advanced aircraft cancelled and is uncertain of exactly what aircraft it will get, which will mostly, be foreign-built anyway. Malta was recently in a state of virtual revolt and Gibraltar is still being blockaded. In the Middle East we face a blood-letting which can, perhaps, only be paralleled by our withdrawal from Palestine under a previous Labour Government. In Southern Africa, we are withdrawing our C.-in-C. and naval forces after about 100 years on the station. In the Far East, the future of our forces in Singapore and Hong Kong is uncertain. It was said in the House the other day that we do not

even have a clear defence treaty with the Government of Singapore.
These facts and others that I shall refer to later resulted last year in the resignation of the First Sea Lord and this year in the lowest morale of the Senior Service in living memory. This decline of morale has not been arrested, of course, by the speeches and activities of some hon. Members on the Government side during the defence debate. The Daily Telegraph's leading article this morning talks of
…unilateral nuclear disarmers, pacifists, little Englanders, anti-Americans, anti-Germans or universal xenophobists…
These contributions and some of those today have added nothing to the safety and security of the Realm.
Why is morale so low? The answer is that every sailor knows that it takes seven to ten years from the date that a new class of ship, aircraft or missile is conceived to the date that it becomes operational. As my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers) said, the Government are themselves uncertain about the future rôle of the Navy. How can they, therefore, have a clear policy about the future design of our ships, aircraft or missiles?
Because the sailors know this, a sense of complete uncertainty prevails over the whole Service. There is a veil of secrecy about the rôle of the future fleet working party. Nothing is said about this most important working party in the Defence White Paper, but the Press hint at a further White Paper on the Navy some time in the summer. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will say whether we are to expect another Defence White Paper or a White Paper on the Navy later this year.
I have made serious charges against the Government and it is, therefore, incumbent on me to be a little more specific. I want to deal, first, with questions of matériel and then with personnel. First, the deterrent. My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport and Fareham and others of my hon. Friends have quoted the famous speech which the then Leader of the Opposition made in Plymouth just before the 1964 General Election, but I think that part of it bears quoting again.

##
The present Prime Minister said:
Nuclear missile carrying vessels add nothing to Western strength and simply mean more and more pressure from other countries to become nuclear Powers.
He said, a little later:
I believe we shall need an expanded Naval shipbuilding programme. How are we going to pay for it? Out of the savings made through stopping the wasteful expenditure on the politically-inspired nuclear programme.
Other interesting statements were made by the Prime Minister and other leading members of the present Government Front Bench, as were quoted by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) today.
One of the best, I believe, is attributed to the present Paymaster-General. Referring again to Polaris, he said:
I think that it is not a national weapon, but a weapon produced for the convenience of the Tory Party, and that the charge should go to the Conservative Central Office."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1964; Vol.690, c.973.]
The Prime Minister said that we should cut the Polaris programme and expand the naval shipbuilding programme. What happened? The Prime Minister retained the Polaris programme and cut back on the conventional shipbuilding programme. I know that hon. Members opposite will say that he cut one Polaris submarine, but by this act he undermined the credibility of the whole of our deterrent force. With five boats, we could guarantee at all times to have two submarines on station; with four, we can no longer guarantee always to have two submarines at the right time in the right place. Therefore, we cannot guarantee a second strike weapon available in all eventualities. That is what the Prime Minister achieved by cutting back one Polaris submarine.
It is true that the Government side have continued the Fleet submarine programme. The first "Dreadnought" was built in the day of the Conservative Government, and the weapons of this ship were torpedoes. I should like the Minister to tell us whether the torpedoes in the existing Fleet submarines are still the immediate development of the prewar torpedoes; in other words, torpedoes not fitted with the various decoy devices, and so on. I believe that our torpedo development in the Royal Navy has been very slow. We have gone ahead with

many forms of weapons, but have rather forgotten the torpedo—and that is the main weapon of the Fleet submarine.
Perhaps he can say something about this matter, particularly as the Minister announced a new class of Fleet submarine which is to be ordered, I understand, in the coming financial year. As I have said, the Government seem very keen on these Fleet submarines, and I believe their support of what used to be called the hunter-killer submarine is based on the fact that it is a wholly defensive weapon. This is the kind of mentality that could—and I only say "could"—reduce the Navy to a coast defence force in the next 10 years.
We have heard a lot about carriers in this debate. Last year, the Government decided to cancel the carrier replacement programme. They said in last year's White Paper that
Britain would not undertake major operations of war except in co-operation with allies.
That view was repeated by the Foreign Secretary yesterday. He said:
…Our aim is that we should not again have to undertake operations on the scale of confrontation outside Europe.
I hope he is right. Obviously, that is the aim of any Government, but one cannot be certain. It takes two sides to decide where hostilities may break out. We cannot always control these things. But it is just as well that the Government do not feel capable of any confrontation operations on the Indonesian scale—or, indeed, any confrontation—because it is pretty clear now that the Royal Air Force cannot guarantee air cover to units of the Fleet or to amphibious landings.
Have the Government really studied the lessons of Vietnam, which seem to be crystal clear? Carriers are mobile—they can always operate at maximum efficiency—whereas Vietnam has shown that major airfields take ten times as long as expected to construct, and ten times longer, therefore, to work up to peak efficiency. In bald terms, it takes about a year for a major airfield in Vietnam to operate at peak efficiency. Equally, I understand from American experience that it has been found that interdiction bombing missions of more than 500 to 600 miles, or close-support missions of over 300 miles, are inefficient. Therefore, airfields have to be built and rebuilt within those ranges. A carrier can,


however, be moved. A further lesson from Vietnam is that cheap airfields are inefficient.
The question which the Government should now examine very carefully is whether or not cheaper carriers can now be built. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear Admiral Morgan Giles), in his very impressive speech, suggested that carriers based on an oil-tanker design and operating vertical take-off aircraft could be built for, perhaps, half the cost of the CVA0-1. It has been estimated that they would cost between £15 million and £20 million apiece. This is probably an underestimate. Nevertheless, I am certain that if one removed all the sophisticated control and guidance equipment from a carrier and placed it in a smaller and far less vulnerable vessel—say, a frigate—all the computerised information could be fed from the frigate to one of what my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester described as "Healey carriers". One hopes that they will bear the right hon. Gentleman's name and that they will come into operation.
Such a carrier could come within our economic power and it would enable us to undertake a maritime strategy whenever there was a threat to our allies or ourselves. After all, if carriers are to go, then fleet operations or amphibious landings in hostile air space are out. The right hon. Gentleman may not be aware that his new policy is known in Royal Navy circles as "the red carpet treatment". In other words, one operates only where there will be no opposition, and the red carpet is put out by the friendly inhabitants. The trouble is that one can never be certain for how long friendly inhabitants will stay friendly. In other words, the red carpet can change colour. One can never be certain what will happen in this world, and I should have thought that British maritime history proved that, above all else.
This "red carpet" policy should appeal to the pacifist section on the benches opposite. Surely they see their opportunity. If they do not, I will describe it for them. From the Navy's point of view, it goes like this. No aircraft carrier—therefore no offensive operations and, thus, no need for guided missile destroyers costing from £20 million to £30 million each. That means no

amphibious vessels costing according to the White Paper £13 million or amphibious troops such as the Royal Marines. One merely needs one or two antisubmarine frigates and some minesweepers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) pointed out, the Royal Navy could well become a coast defence force in the next 10 years—but at what an appalling cost to our national security.
A similar view was expressed by the predecessors of hon. Gentlemen opposite in the pre-war years. As I pointed out in an intervention earlier, they spoke and voted against re-armament right up to the eve of World War II. One wonders if some of them will ever learn the lessons which history teaches us.
I now come to the important question of surface-to-surface missiles. Does the Minister appreciate that there are in use today fast patrol vessels of the "Osa" and "Komar" classes, mounting four or two guided missile launchers respectively and firing missiles with ranges of up to 30 miles? These vessels are in service not only with large fleets, including the Soviet Navy, but also with small fleets such as those of the U.A.R. and Indonesia. How will the Royal Navy deal with these small, fast vessels?
Commander Courtney, the then hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East, initiated an Adjournment debate on this subject some years ago. At that time a Conservative Government were in office and, having stressed the need for surface-to-surface missiles, Commander Courtney was told by the Civil Lord of the day that the best answer was the fixed-wing aircraft operating from an aircraft carrier. But now the fixed-wing aircraft in the Royal Navy and the carrier is to disappear. What defence will we have against these weapons?
In last year's White Paper the Government promised in paragraph 6 that
…a strike capability against enemy ships will be provided by surface-to-surface guided missiles.
And paragraph 2 stated:
We shall develop a small surface-to-surface guided weapon for use against missile-firing ships.
That is not mentioned in this year's White Paper. Why not? Can the Minister guarantee—and guarantee he must—that


this weapon will be both effective and operational before the aircraft carrier phased out? If he looks carefully into the matter he will see that it would probably be cheaper and more satisfactory to retain the carrier.
I want to ask the Minister a question about surface-to-air weapons. Seadart is our new surface-to-air missile. It is mounted on a type 82 guided missile destroyer, one weapon on a hull of 5,000 tons. I see in Jane's Fighting Ships that the Germans are to mount Tartar—the American equivalent—on a hull of about 1,500 tons. How much will this vessel cost? What is her rôle? When are the other three to be laid down, if ever? The Minister will know that I have been pressing this matter in Parliamentary Questions for some time. Will he now admit that this vessel, the first of this class of type 82 destroyers, was built solely as a platform for Seadart to enable us to sell Seadart to other maritime nations?
This afternoon in an Answer to a Question I was told that no Seadarts have yet been ordered by foreign Powers. Now that the Germans, the Dutch and the Italians have decided to purchase the American Tartar, will not the Minister admit that, in the absence of aircraft carriers in the future, there is no positive rôle for these vessels and that the three follow-up destroyers of the type 82 class will in point of fact not be built? Will not the Minister admit that the best estimate of cost is about £30 apiece and that therefore the four vessels would cost about £120 million, which is much more than the cost of CVAO-1, which I believe is about £75 million.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: Would the hon. Gentleman care to exlain to the House why, so far, in support of his views about aircraft carriers, he has not prayed in aid their rôle in the blockade of Southern Africa in fulfilment of the United Nations policy with regard to Rhodesia?

Mr. Wall: I think that the aircraft carrier has played a vital part in the blockade of Beira, against the country of our oldest ally. I think that the answer to a question asked earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Rye

was that, though there is not a carrier on station at the moment, there are I believe Shackletons operating from Madagascar. They could not have operated unless they had that land base in Madagascar. Aircraft carriers would have had to have operated continuously off the port of Beira, as they have for a number of months.
I want to turn to amphibious forces.

Mr. Foley: Does the hon. Gentleman argue that we should have the carrier and four of type 82, or does he suggest that we should have the carrier and only one type 82? What is he asking for?

Mr. Wall: I am sorry. Obviously the hon. Gentleman has not been paying attention. What I said was fairly clear. I said that if the Minister goes on with his four type 82 destroyers they will cost considerably more than it will to cancel CVAO-1. I suggested that we could build a Healey carrier for one-third of the price of CVAO-1, that we should do that, and that, unless we did that, there was no necessity for the very expensive guided missile destroyer such as the type 82 which, in any case, merely mounts one weapon on a 5,000 ton hull, whereas the Germans can mount the equivalent weapon on a 1,500 ton hull and therefore produce a much cheaper ship.
I want to turn to amphibious forces, because they are, quite rightly, given priority in the White Paper. I believe that they could make the most valuable contribution to Britain's requirements in a non-nuclear war. Again, they must have support. The Minister must agree that helicopters are sitting ducks in enemy air space. It is essential that these forces, if used, are adequately covered.
We on this side very much doubt that, even after we get all these American aircraft that we are supposed to be going to order, even if we displace the giant turtle in the island of Aldabra to which the Secretary of State referred yesterday, naval forces can be properly covered by R.A.F. aircraft. It would be much better if we built a cheaper type of carrier operating both R.A.F. and naval U.T.O.L. aircraft.
When talking about amphibious forces my thoughts immediately turn to the


Royal Marines. I want to make it clear that the rôle of the Royal Marines is still on land, sea and air. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Carshalton (Captain W. Elliot) mentioned that they were no longer at sea. That is not quite true, because they are still embarked in frigates in the West Indies and in the Persian Gulf and do an excellent good job. When I joined the Royal Marines, two-thirds of the corps was at sea. I am sorry that the percentage has now been reversed. I think this illustrates the flexibility of the Royal Marines. They can switch rapidly from the sea to the land or the air, because in the past the Royal Marines provided aircraft pilots and are now providing helicopter pilots and parachutists.
They have, above all, excellent mobility, and I think that if the Secretary of State will examine this phrase he loves so much—"cost-effectiveness"—he would probably find that the Royal Marines have more cost-effectiveness than any other of the Services.
We have three pages—pages 16 to 19—in the White Paper on confrontation, and almost every force is mentioned, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Malaysian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force, but there is no mention of the Royal Marines.
I think the Minister knows that the Royal Marines had a Brigade and two Commandos—which performed valiant service in Singapore, Brunei and Borneo, and another in South Arabia, a Commando operating in Aden in the frontier area of Radfan and Beihan, and I hope that next year he will ensure that they are not left out when tributes are paid.
I see from Vote A that the strength of the Royal Marines is cut by 400 men. Does this mean that we are going to lose a Commando? At the moment we have a Brigade Headquarters and five Commandos, two in South-East Asia. two at home as part of the Strategic Reserve, and one in Aden. I hope this does not mean that we are going to have one of the teeth of the Corps cut out, because that would blunt one of the teeth of the Royal Navy.
May I join with others in paying a tribute to Mr. Perkins, who was a member of the Royal Corps, who has given

very fine service to this House and is a friend of many of us. I am sure the whole House will join me in wishing him many happy years in retirement.
I must watch the clock, so I will not talk about the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Navy, which were so well covered by the excellent speeches of my hon. Friends the Members for Carshalton and Rye, nor about the Fishery Protection Squadron, covered by the hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) more than adequately.
I hope that the main points on the Fishery Protection Squadron will be dealt with by the Minister, perhaps later on if not in the winding up tonight. Really the nub of the problem is whether this is just an administrative change, or whether it means the abolition of the Squadron as such?
I turn to personnel, very briefly. There are one or two questions I want to ask the Minister to deal with. I talked about the future of the Fleet Working Party and the effect of the cancellation of the carrier, secrecy about this working party and the fact that uncertainty about the future was affecting officers' morale. I think that officers' morale in the Senior Service is very questionable today, and I am very worried about it. I am worried about the effect of "wet" and "dry" promotions—

Mr. Eric Ogden: When the hon. Gentleman speaks about morale in the Service, does he not think he might be doing an injustice to officers in assuming what only they have a right to say?

Mr. Wall: No, I am not doing them an injustice. It is not their fault that their morale is low. I think the policy of the Government has produced such uncertainty that nobody's morale could be high in these conditions.
I was going to ask the Minister about one of the unfortunate effects of "wet" and "dry" promotions. I am told that in promotions from commander to captain, about three out of four commanders on the "wet" list are promoted to captain, but only one out of ten commanders on the "dry" list.
This means that a large number of good "dry" list commanders decide to retire early so as to get a good civilian


job at as young an age as possible, leaving some of the less enthusiastic or efficient to run most of the Navy's training. This could become a serious problem. In order to solve it, could a slightly longer term of duty be given in the key training jobs, say up to five years? The Minister is now putting into use some very important complicated training equipment both for the air arm and for the Navy itself, and one wants to be sure that the people running the equipment are of the best possible quality.
Now, the question of junior officers. We discussed the Royal Defence College yesterday. Have I got the progression of the naval officer right? I understand that it is a year at Dartmouth, followed by a year at sea as a midshipman, followed by six months at Dartmouth again. He then goes to university or the Royal Defence College for either a year or three years, depending on whether he takes a degree. Presumably, this means that he goes to sea again at the age of 22 or 23.
When does he do what we used to call his sub's course, in other words, his courses in naval gunnery, torpedoes, and so on? Does he do it at that rather late age? When does he go on to do the full specialist course, the long course, as we used to call it? I am sure that it is the right idea to give all Service officers a much broader background, but there are disadvantages. For example, if we send young midshipmen to university for three years, we may find that it broadens their outlook so much that they might decide not to stay in the Service. But, nevertheless, I am sure that the Minister is on the right lines.
Now, Greenwich. There was a time when the hon. Gentleman who is now Minister of Defence (Administration) conducted a campaign against the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. We shall, therefore, look very closely at any decision the Government make about the future of the Royal Naval College. There has always been an important traditional and historical link between the Senior Service and Greenwich.
Next, I have a question about mortgage schemes, of which I have given the Minister notice. Mortgage schemes for house purchase are available for ratings

but not for officers. This seems rather extraordinary. Could the hon. Gentleman explain why there is this discrimination?
I come now to the subject of training. My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough suggested the use of Malta for certain training establishments. Malta has better weather and, with far more daylight, can thus offer more training time. What about the joint anti-submarine school now at Londonderry? I hope that the Minister will bear in mind what my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Chichester-Clark) said when he made not only a moving appeal but the very sensible suggestion that the school should be left where it is. There are in that area now 20 per cent. unemployed, and this is, therefore, a serious question. If, for one reason or another, the Minister decides to—[HON. MEMBERS: "Look at the time."]—I consulted the Minister on when he wanted to speak, and I intend to sit down at the time when, I understand, he wishes to speak, and not before. Perhaps hon. Members will not interrupt further.
If the anti-submarine school has to be moved, I suggest that Gibraltar might be a good place for it. Modern nuclear submarines need at least 100 fathoms depth of water to train in. From Gibraltar one immediately has the Atlantic with 100 fathoms or more, which one does not find off Plymouth, if I may dare to say that in the presence of my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport. One also has the Atlantic and Mediterranean conditions within immediate reach.
I have another five minutes, and I shall conclude by stating what I believe to be the real strategy needed for the future of this country and the future of the Royal Navy.

Mr. Heffer: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that there has been an arrangement between the two Front Benches that the Minister should be given only 20 minutes to reply? If that is the position, it is an absolute disgrace. Several of us have asked a series of important questions, and we want answers.

Mr. Wall: The hon. Gentleman must take that up with his own Front Bench. All I am saying is that I shall sit down at the time I have been requested to do


so, and not before. I shall not be put off by interruptions from hon. Members opposite.
Britain has always had to face the two competing needs of continental and maritime strategy, and the basic problem is how to provide forces capable of exercising both and how to get the balance right. A continental war, except in Europe, has been ruled out, I think, by all hon. Members on both sides. May I make a personal suggestion but one which, I believe, deserves some consideration? I suggest to the Secretary of State that he might consider giving the Army and the Air Force the rôle of being wholly responsible for continental warfare, that is, B.A.O.R. and such weapons of continental warfare as armour and tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, he should give the Navy, together with the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Marines, the primary responsibility for looking after maritime strategy outside Europe, including nuclear, maritime, amphibious and raiding operations and for providing the necessary sea/air and limited land forces.
I want to stress the importance of maritime strategy. The House must realise that, in every major operation since 1945, the Navy has had to provide the initial and sometimes the entire air support needed—in Korea, Suez, Kuwait, East Africa and the Beira blockade. But the real lesson for the future can be found in Vietnam. I commend to the Secretary of State's attention an article written by a friend of mine, an American, Anthony Harrigan, in Navy Magazine for December, 1966.
It is clear that, up to and including the Second World War, sea power was able to exert an influence, sometimes an important influence, over land battles. Today sea power is becoming capable of direct intervention in the land battle. It has great advantages. There is no need for bases or airfields in countries where the population is unfriendly; no need for expensive harbour installations or base camps; no problems of security tying down a large number of defensive troops.
As we do not want and, indeed, cannot afford to get tied down in a continental war outside Europe, maritime support would be the cheapest and most effective form of assistance that we could

give when necessary to Commonwealth or other friendly countries, or, indeed, to the United Nations.
Sea power is mobile and can achieve surprise. It is invulnerable to sabotage and guerilla warfare. We have reached a time, particularly since the introduction of nuclear propulsion, when ships can remain at sea almost indefinitely. We are approaching the time when little that operates from shore basis would not be able to operate from ships at sea.
Airmobile units capable of verticle envelopment can operate from carriers; giant sky cranes operating on a shuttle service could lift containerised cargoes of up to 20 tons to an airfield five miles distant and return in 7½ minutes; 10 tons could be carried for up to 1,000 miles. In short, to quote Professor Sokol in Brassey's Annual:
While formerly naval ships had little chance to affect land in a decisive manner except indirectly through economic pressure and the support of land and air forces, they now are in a position to reach far inland with their weapons and hit targets with unprecedented force. This is a really radical change from earlier times, but one which favours sea power over any other part of national strength.
This surely demonstrates the future for the Navy. By Polaris we can deter war. By maritime air/sea forces operating from friendly bases in Southern Africa and Australia, we could exert the maximum influence in what at present appears to be the decisive area at the minimum cost.
I hope that the Government will move from this rather negative White Paper to reappraise the nation's needs for an effective maritime strategy. Then, as they move gradually out of fixed bases, the money thus saved can be employed not to increase our standard of living but to build the necessary ships. aircraft and amphibious forces for use anywhere in the world from whence our islands may be threatened. Thus, and only thus, can we ensure our national security and possibly our national survival.

11.8 p.m.

Mr. Foley: In opening the debate I said I would refer in closing to questions relating to manpower, conditions and service and the dockyards. I am glad I did because, in the light of what the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) has just said, one would imagine that there is a serious decline of morale in the Navy


and that we have a Navy of ill-equipped vessels, or said to consist of vessels we do not have and so on. Plainly, it should be stated that even hon. Members on this side who, in their own political or moral judgments, have grave doubts about Polaris, would resent the implication that we were paying lip-service to the notion of the Royal Navy but in practice taking the opposite line by our actions. We resent this attitude intensely and were it not for the hon. Member's service in the forces one would wonder whether he was talking us into a crisis in the Navy. I can only put it down to a narrow party political point. The hon. Gentleman had little else to say about the White Paper or the broad strategy and he had to resort to these nuances which are untrue.
One can see this from the figures for re-engagements which I gave earlier and which are worth repeating. Whereas the re-engagement figures for men on nine-year engagements fell from 33 per cent. in 1964 to 23 per cent. in 1965 and to 21 per cent. later that year, they have picked up to 25 per cent. The rate for men on a 12-year engagement fell from 54 per cent. to 45 per cent. and it has remained at that level since. So we are starting to pull back from the years of decline.
We have serious shortages and reference has been made to these. There are shortages in artificer mechanician apprentice, naval airmen, medical, stores, writer and steward categories. In all these categories we have to fight to hold our own, let alone win back. But we seem to have stopped the downward trend and we must try to reverse it. I am grateful for the suggestions made for schemes to enhance the idea of re-engagement and I promise that we will look at them. There has been the re-engagement grant for men in the branches where there are shortages and there is the assisted house purchase scheme which gives grants to long-service ratings to buy houses. These are all inducements to good, competent, qualified men and they enhance the whole status of the Royal Navy and its personnel. Since the scheme started in the autumn of 1965 something of the order of 3,350 sailors have been helped to buy their own homes.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral

Morgan Giles) suggested extending this scheme to officers. There are difficulties in the way of extending the scheme to officers, but we will consider it.
Representations have been made about ratings leaving the service and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) for going into such detail and showing such concern about a particular case. This concern was reflected in representations from other hon. Members. I have received the report from the National Council for Civil Liberties but I have not yet had the chance to study it. I promise that I will do so and with considerable sympathy.
Many boys sign on at a very early age, but I should point out that they do so with their parents' agreement. These are not 15-year-olds hiving off on their own and joining the Navy.

Mr. Driberg: Or they come from broken homes.

Mr. Foley: Even if they come from broken homes they have a guardian or other responsible adult. They are minors and as such they cannot undertake this attestation on their own. I think that my hon. Friend missed this point. I take the broad point which he made on this matter.

Mr. Driberg: And in relation to my constituent.

Mr. Foley: He raised that point in the first instance and then broadened it. The case of my hon. Friend's constituent places one on the horns of a dilemma. We cannot have everyone going at the same time. Clearly we have to control premature discharge as far as we can and in as fair a way as possible. But the Services will not be helped by having a series of discontented youngsters. One has to try to find a way of measuring compassion. This is one of the most difficult things I have had to consider since I started this job. To try to exercise this kind of judgment is difficult.
Hon. Members will be aware that we have managed to insert a break point within the first three months of the engagement of junior entrants. That may not be the whole answer, but it is a step in the right direction and we must see how much further we can take this, bearing in mind that two-thirds of the


annual intake into the Navy are under 171½. If we had a shorter initial engagement, as has been suggested, we would need to increase our annual intake of recruits and our training load. The more specialist the Navy becomes, the more difficult and expensive this would be. Clearly, if considerable sums are spent on training someone in a specialist skill which will equip him later on in "Civvy Street", the cost involved is a factor which cannot be ignored when these decisions are made.
The Navy is now undertaking a far-reaching study of manpower and personnel structure and training requirements and I have directed that it should look into the whole question of the motivation of those who re-engage and those who do not after the first period of service, taking into consideration the sociological factors and the realities of the present day when people marry earlier and the implications of a wife and children and the resulting pressures to be home which may not have been thought of at the initial stage of enlistment, or even in the first three or four years of enlistment.
New construction is under way in all the dockyards and major tasks are now in progress, including the conversion of H.M.S. "Blake". I am glad to see that my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Lomas) is present. He wanted to know what had happened to H.M.S. "Blake". She is at Portsmouth and the conversion is to enable her to operate the new Sea King helicopters. That is the reason for a possible overstay. Hon. Members seemed to think that H.M.S. "Blake" had been lost and forgotten. On the contrary; she is very much in the forefront. Other tasks include a refit of H.M.S. "Eagle" at Devonport, the installation of all gas turbine propulsion in H.M.S. "Exmouth", Chatham, and the special refit of H.M.S. "Ark Royal" to enable her to operate the Phantom aircraft. "Ark Royal's" refit, which began at Devonport in February, this year, is one of the most challenging tasks that a Royal Dockyard has ever been required to carry out. The equipping of Rosyth and Chatham Dockyards to handle nuclear submarines is going ahead. Facilities at Rosyth will be tested when they are brought into use by the refit of H.M.S. "Dreadnought", which will be the first full refit of a nuclear

submarine to be carried out in this country.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Will my hon. Friend say exactly what this expenditure at Rosyth will be?

Mr. Foley: I cannot say offhand, but I promise to write to my hon. Friend and give the precise figures involved and, if he is anxious, the nature of the kind of work which will be done there.
One can fairly say that the kind of work undertaken in the dockyards of today becomes more exacting as the complexity of modern ships increases. This requires new management techniques and a balanced labour force so that one has the skills in the numbers required at the moment required, and anyone who has any knowledge of ship repair or shipbuilding will be aware of the problems posed in a refit. It is only when a ship is opened up that the extent of the repair work to be done can be seen, and this has meant that at times there has not been the right use of manpower in the dockyards. It has meant, too, that incentive schemes have been devised which have related to half or two-thirds of the labour force, but not to the remainder.
Somehow we must, in terms of incentive schemes, try to find a method whereby all can benefit, in addition, as I mentioned at Question Time, to the reexamination which is going on, and the discussions with the trade unions, with a view to creating a wage increase and a new industrial structure as from July of this year.
I want to deal briefly with an aspect of Navy life which is somewhat new, and it is the emphasis placed in recent years on the building of married quarters for the Navy. This is going ahead at a great pace. There are still places where we need more houses, but we have 9,000 quarters and we are building a further 5,000, for completion within the next three years or so. Together with hirings this comes close to meeting the demand as we see it.

Dr. Bennett: Can the hon. Gentleman look into the point that I raised about whether, in the programme of naval married quarters which is now being set up at Gosport, it is wise to have nine-storey blocks of flats for families with small children? There seem to be grave objections to this sort of thing.

Mr. Foley: I was about to mention the complex which is being developed in the hon. Member's constituency. I will certainly look into this, but the fact of life in many parts of the country is that people must live in huge blocks of flats, particularly families with young children, as the centres of towns are cleared, simply because of the cost and availability of land. I will look into the matter and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that subject, would he look closely at the suggestion that I made in opening this afternoon, about Malta being regarded as a permanent part of the home station for ratings and troops returning from overseas bases?

Mr. Foley: I am not sure whether I should take this very seriously. I assume that the hon. and gallant Member is proposing this in a serious way? I would prefer to await the results of discussions which may be taking place with the Malta Government now. Clearly if the cost of keeping people overseas, as distinct from the cost of keeping them here, is greater, I appreciate the point. I am not convinced, but I will look into this and write to the hon. and gallant Member.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: This is meant to be serious and it is meant to be part of the discussions with the Malta Government now. Time is of the essence.

Mr. Foley: I want to deal with the question of whether we are trying to hide something. The working party was referred to. We have had a report from the working party and we are in the process of trying to determine the shape and size of a future Navy. I have referred to the criteria with which we are working and the difficulties, in terms of looking ahead and anticipating commitments and devising a Fleet for the 1980s and 1990s. I hope that when hon. Members opposite read what I have said, they will see that we have made considerable progress. I hope, in answer to the hon. Member for Haltemprice, that later this year we will be able to announce decisions about this.
The White Paper may seem disappointing to some because it does not reflect decisions taken, but taking decisions pre-

maturely might be worse than putting them off until the thing can be viewed as a whole. It is in this context that one cannot talk about aircraft carriers or mini-aircraft carriers or "Healey carriers", with respect to the Secretary of State, until one looks at the situation as a whole, and at the Navy's rôole in the future.

Mr. Wall: The Government announced the Defence Review three years ago. They have had three years to look at all of this. Why do they want another six months?

Mr. Foley: Once certain studies and analyses have been made, it can be decided that this is not something which we can afford, or which is relevant. This happened with TSR2 and the aircraft carrier. It would be rather foolish for hon. Members opposite to speak of this in terms of a weapons system, when we have referred to type 82, Ikara, Seadart, Broomstick and ADA, which will be at sea in 1971. This is part of the weapon system which may well be the kind of equipment we want for the 1980s and the 1990s. It would be foolish to pretend that progress has not been made or that decisions have not been taken in this whole field.
The hon. and gallant Member for Carshalton (Captain W. Elliot) was especially concerned about our antisubmarine preparedness. He will be reassured to hear that more than 90 of the 138 operational ships in service in the coming year have this capability. The White Paper also refers to a number of measures in this direction, including an expansion of our fleet submarine building programme, the introduction of the Sea King helicopter and the development of two new anti-submarine torpedoes, one to be fired from submarines and the other to be dropped from helicopters, supported by a wide-ranging under-water research programme.
My hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West and the hon. Member for Haltemprice, relating back to a previous incarnation, were rather anxious about the marines. I assure them both, and I am sure that the whole House will join me in saying, that the rôle of the Royal Marines is well known and that they have proved their worth on numerous occasions. I am confident that there is a continuing and worth-while rôle for them to


play in the future. Although, at the same time, we must continually keep the rôle and requirements of all our Forces under continuous review, we have no plans at present for reducing the size of capability of the Corps.
There were a number of other points with which I would like to have dealt. I will write to hon. Members about those which I am not able to deal with tonight. To my hon. Friends who have raised questions on Polaris, I say that we have tried, both in reply to Questions and today, to give a clear indication of our commitments in terms of Polaris. Nothing has been hidden in terms of expenditure. Nothing has been hidden in terms of our belief that Polaris is a worth-while contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent. This has been made clear. It was made clear in the two-day defence debate.
I well understand hon. Members who possibly attempted in the course of the two-day defence debate to make their points in terms of the British nuclear strategy. Some were successful during those two days. Many more have been successful tonight.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Minister aware that the Americans are no longer producing the type of Polaris missile that is being sold to this country? Can he say solemnly at the Box that our Polaris submarines when they arrive will not be obsolete and that their missiles will be able to penetrate the Russian defences?

Mr. Foley: What I can tell my hon. Friend and what I am saying now is something that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in the defence debate during the previous two days, namely, that at least half the American Polaris fleet is equipped and continues to be equipped with the A3 Polaris missile.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The old one?

Mr. Foley: I remember my hon. Friend asking about Poseidon and whether this would come to us. He was told that the Americans were equipping some of their Polaris submarines with Poseidon but that at least half would continue to be equipped with the A3. This is the missile which we have got.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I am talking about the new ones.

Mr. Foley: I am not sure whether my hon. Friend wants a better one. I

respect his views in this matter because he has been constant in his anxieties and his Questions over the years. I would certainly not suggest, and I am sure that the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) would never suggest, that my hon. Friend was wanting more Polaris missiles. I am sure that that is not the case.
On fishery protection, I have stated categorically our position.

Mr. W. Baxter: A number of questions were directed at my hon. Friend concerning Polaris, N.A.T.O. and all that sort of thing, but he is not giving satisfaction or even attempting to reply to those questions.

Mr. Foley: We should need much longer time—

Mr. Baxter: rose—

Mr. Foley: This is a naval debate. If one wanted to take the broad strategy, one could have done it on the two-day defence debate. I promised that I would deal with human matters relating to conditions of service and manpower in my winding-up speech. If the hon. Gentleman was not here at the beginning, that is too bad. I said that I would do that, and that is what I have done—

It being half-past Eleven o'clock, the Debate stood adjourned.

SUGAR BEET (RESEARCH AND EDUCATION)

Deferred proceeding resumed—

Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to Order (Sittings of the House(Morning Sittings)), put forthwith the Question,
That the Sugar Beet (Research and Education) (Increase of Contributions) Order 1967, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th January, be approved:—

The House proceeded to a Division—

Mr. WILLIAM WHITLOCK and Mr. JOSEPH HARPER were appointed Tellers for the Ayes; but no Member being willing to act as Teller for the Noes, Mr. SPEAKER declared that the Ayes had it.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Whitlock.]

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-six minutes to Twelve o'clock.